

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PROCEDURE TITLE</u>	<u>CREATED / REVISED:</u> 02/01/11
SOD 10	INTRODUCTION	
SOD 11	DEFINITIONS & EXPLANATIONS	
SOD 12	TRAINING SCHEDULES & REPORTS	
SOD 13	ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SOD-10

CREATED / REVISED: 08/26/12

TITLE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION – INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE: Establish policies and procedures to be followed for the operation of the Division.

B. POLICY: From General Order 3-123, The Special Operations Division shall be a group of sworn personnel organized, trained, and deployed for specific missions requiring unconventional techniques, a high degree of teamwork, and utilization of specialized equipment and methods above and beyond those needed for normal operations. The Special Operations Division "SOD" shall consist of the following groups:

- Specialized Services Team (SST)
- *Witness / VIP Protection Unit*
- Hostage Negotiation Team
- Civil Disturbance Unit

**SOD-10.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION**

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SOD-11

CREATED / REVISED: 02/01/11

TITLE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION – DEFINITIONS

A. Definitions:

- **Active Member** – An Active member of an SOD Unit is someone who has successfully completed the unit’s specific phased tryout process and; Who has been approved by the SOD Commander for placement on the roster; and who is considered to be at the “Exceeds Satisfactory” performance level or above. An Active member is authorized to receive the appropriate annual Technicians Pay and take advantage of applicable privileges granted from time to time by the Sheriff or his designee.

- **Alternate Member** – An Alternate member of an SOD Unit is someone who has successfully completed the unit’s specific phased tryout process and; who has been approved by the SOD Commander for placement on the roster; and who is considered to be at the “Exceeds Satisfactory” performance level or above; but is not eligible to receive the relative annual Technicians Pay for one or more of the Following reasons:
 1. All authorized positions, on the specified SOD unit, are filled with Active members.
 2. An Active member, who is placed on Probationary Status, may be reclassified as an Alternate member.
 3. An Active member who has become injured, whether Injury on the Job (IOJ) or personal injury, that renders the active member unable to perform at a Full Duty status beyond 90 days.

- **Eligibility** - Any Sheriff’s Deputy with a minimum of one year of service with the Prince George’s Sheriff’s Office and who has passed all applicable Tryout Phases may be selected for a position on an SOD Unit. One-year service is defined as: the date of graduation from a full police academy for new Deputies, or from the date of hire for Experienced Police Officer or “EPO” lateral Deputies. The applicant’s one-year anniversary date must be prior to the beginning of first phase as listed on the SOD Unit’s specific tryout announcement. The applicant’s most recent Past Performance Appraisal must be at least at the Exceeds Satisfactory level.

SOD – 11.1

- **Exceeds Satisfactory Performance** – Exceeds Satisfactory Performance is that level of performance required of all SOD Active and Alternate members, whether on or off official scheduled duty, whether working their applicable primary assignment or the SOD assignment. Exceeds Satisfactory performance is measured by, but not limited to the following:
 1. Past Performance Appraisal – Annual, Promotional or Transfer

NOTE: A member’s PPA that falls below the Exceeds Satisfactory level will result in the member being placed on SOD Probationary status for not less than 90 Days.
 2. No documented negative incidents such as, but not limited to:

NOTE: A member being found guilty, at fault, or in violation of an agency General Order, will result in the member being placed on SOD Probationary status for not less than 90 Days.

- a). "At fault" - Departmental vehicle accidents
 - b). Guilty verdict, (which includes voluntarily paid fines), on motor vehicle traffic citations.
 - c). Internal Investigations that have been concluded and found the complaint "Sustained" against the member.
 - d). Failing to meet the specific SOD Unit's Annual, Bi-annual, Quarterly or Monthly minimum standards, (ie: Firearm's Qualifications, Physical Fitness Qualifications, Minimum Training Hours requirements, etc)
- **SOD Probationary Status** – A member who's unit Commander has deemed the member's performance to have fallen below the Exceeds Satisfactory level will notify the member in writing that are will be placed on SOD probationary status, the reason for the probation, and the steps required to be removed from SOD Probationary status.
 1. Minimum time = 90 calendar days & Maximum time = 365 calendar days.
 2. A member who's SOD Probation last for more than 120 days, or is who is on SOD Probation more than one time in any Fiscal year, may not be eligible for Technicians Pay and will not be permitted to take advantage of applicable privileges granted from time to time by the Sheriff or his designee.

SOD – 11.2

3. Removal from Probationary status, and returned to an Active or Alternate member in Good Standing, will require written approval from the SOD Commander. The SOD Unit Commander should forward all of the following that apply, but not limited to, that support the request.
 - a). Memorandums from supervisors, unit members, other applicable personnel
 - b). Recent PPA score, or applicable Special PPA
 - c). SOD Unit Physical Fitness Test results
 - d). Attendance reports
 - e). Training reports
 - f). Court documents
- **SOD Privileges** - From time to time the Sheriff or his designee may approve SOD members to take advantage of special privileges. The specific SOD Unit Commander, the SOD Commander, a Bureau Chief, the Chief Assistant Sheriff or the Sheriff may suspend any member's ability to take advantage of any or all SOD privileges. The SOD privileges may include, but not limited to:

1. Take home vehicle use – The Active member’s use of their departmental issued vehicle to and from their residence, if that residence is located outside of the county geographic borders.

NOTE: Take home vehicle use, outside of the county borders, is not equal to “Personal use” outside of the county borders. A member may not use their issued vehicle for personal business outside of the county borders unless authorized by a Bureau Chief or above.

2. Use and wear of specific SOD Uniform – An Active member may wear the prescribed SOD Unit’s uniform whenever the agency class D-utility uniform is designated for wear or is the uniform of the day. The active member must wear the class of uniform their primary assignment calls for unless approval is gained from the member’s primary assignment’s unit Commander or above.
- **SOD Suspension** – A formal notification, authorized by the SOD Commander, Chief of the Bureau of Administration, Chief Assistant Sheriff or Sheriff, that removes an Active or Alternate member of any SOD unit. The suspension could be general and last indefinitely or it could have specific details, including a specific time frame. An SOD member may be suspended for the following, but not limited to:

1. For cause as requested by the specific SOD Unit’s Commander
2. Failure to meet the minimum qualifications after being placed on Probationary status.

SOD – 11.3

3. For failing to return to the Exceeds Satisfactory level of Performance.
4. A member that was previously Suspended from any SOD unit must have the approval of the specific SOD Unit Commander and the Approval of the SOD Commander. The member that wishes to return to Active or Alternate member status will require written approval from the SOD Commander prior to beginning the unit’s specific tryout process. The SOD Unit Commander should forward all of the following that apply, but not limited to, that support the request.
 - a). Memorandums from supervisors, unit members, other applicable personnel
 - b). Recent PPA score, or applicable Special PPA
 - c). SOD Unit Physical Fitness Test results
 - d). Attendance reports
 - e). Training reports
 - f). Court documents

SOD – 11.4
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SOD - 12

CREATED / REVISED: 02/01/11

TITLE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION – TRAINING

- A. Each SOD Unit must conduct applicable training as mandated by the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission and/or prescribed the Unit's individual Standard Operating Procedures.

- B. The SOD Unit Commander shall:
 - 1. Ensure completion of an annual, calendar year, unit training schedule to be submitted to the SOD Commander no later than the first business day in December every year for the following year.

 - 2. Complete a detailed training report, using the specific SOD unit's authorized format, no later than the close of business the very next business day following the unit training time.

 - 3. Training Reports must include, but are not limited to:
 - a). Deputy in charge of training time
 - b). Instructor/Instructors teaching the training
 - c). Date, Time of training
 - d). Location of training

- e). Roster of all unit members in attendance with specific arrival and departure times as well as any Active members not present and reason for missing the training.
 - f). Weather conditions at the time of training
 - g). Detailed narrative of type of training with goals and outcomes
 - h). Detailed Critique of actual training with recommendations
4. Make the completed training report available, upon request of the SOD Commander, the Chief of the Bureau of Administration, the Chief Assistant Sheriff or the Sheriff.
 5. Forward a copy of the completed training report to the agency training coordinator.

NOTE: At the discretion of the SOD Commander a synopsis of the completed training report may be forwarded to the agency training coordinator in place of any lengthy, detailed, specific, or confidential training reports.

SOD – 12.1
SOD – 12.2

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SOD - 13

CREATED / REVISED: 08/26/12

TITLE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION – ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

A. Assignments:

- General order 3-123 describes how activation of an SOD unit will be authorized.
 1. Requests for assistance from any SOD Unit must be submitted to the Commander of the SOD in a timely manner.
 2. Requests for Participation form, Threat Assessment reports, Mission Checklists, Operational Plans, and/or other applicable documents will be utilized, when practical, so as to assist in the authorization of deployment process. (See Attachments # SOD-13a, b, c)
- Post assignment documentation will include those reports that are applicable but are not limited to:
 1. Threat Assessment
 2. Mission checklists
 3. Operational plan, (Daily log for assignments that go beyond one day)
 4. After Action Report

5. Operation Critique with recommendations

NOTE: For assignments that incorporate several SOD Units, such as Barricaded suspects, the SOD Commander or the designated Incident Commander will decide who will compile the necessary documentation, but at minimum each involved unit must complete a critique of their participation.

SOD – 13.1

B. Monthly, Quarterly, & Annual reports:

- Each SOD Unit will complete a monthly report, to be forwarded to the SOD Commander no later than the close of business on the 10th of the month following the reporting month. The report will list the following, but is not limited to:

1. Total Assignments
2. Total Assignment Productive hours/Overtime hours
3. Total Training hours/Overtime for training hours
4. Personnel status changes
5. Applicable information that could affect the unit's readiness

- Each SOD Unit will complete a Fiscal Quarter report with the monthly totals from the three (3) previous months. The Quarterly report is due to the SOD Commander by the close of business on the 15th of the month following the reporting fiscal quarter.

1. July–Sept 2010 = 1st FY11, Due Oct 15th
2. Oct – Dec 2010 = 2nd FY11, Due Jan 15th
3. Jan – Mar 2011 = 3rd FY11, Due Apr 15th
4. Apr – Jun 2011 = 4th FY11, Due July 15th

- Each SOD Unit will complete a Fiscal Annual report with the annual totals from the monthly and quarterly reports. The Annual report will be due to the SOD Commander no later than July 15th for the previous fiscal year.

C. SOD Selection Process:

- Each SOD Unit will determine the minimum qualifications, standards, or requirements that an eligible person must meet to be considered for placement on the Active or Alternate member roster. These qualifications, standards, or requirements will be explained in a multi-phase tryout announcement.

- Each SOD Unit will forward a request to conduct a Commander, in proper format, at least 45 days prior of the tryout. Upon approval of the SOD Commander announcement will be disbursed agency wide and the permitted to begin the relative tryout process.
- Any Active or Alternate SOD member that is formally suspended from the roster again. The SOD unit Commander must request the individuals reinstatement.

SOD – 13.2

D. Vehicles, Weapons and Equipment:

- Each SOD Unit Commander will ensure full, complete, and accurate inventory of all assigned Vehicles, Weapons, and Equipment is maintained within the unit's files. A unit inventory will be completed and presented as part of the unit's annual report.
- Each SOD Unit Commander is responsible for ensuring vehicles and equipment assigned to individuals or assigned to the unit specifically is inspected, serviced, and maintained according to the accepted specifications.
 1. Inspections sheets must be completed at a minimum of once a fiscal quarter. The completed sheets will be filed with the SOD unit Commander with copies available upon request or as necessary.
 2. Requests for repair or replacement must be sent in writing to the SOD Commander.

SOD – 13.3

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

PROCEDURE TITLE

SPECIALIZED SERVICES TEAM

SST 10	INTRODUCTION
SST 11	DUTIES
SST 12	SCHEDULING
SST 13	UNIFORM
SST 14	EQUIPMENT
SST 15	VEHICLES
SST 16	PHYSICAL FITNESS AND OTHER TRAINING
SST 17	COMMUNICATIONS
SST 18	RANGE AND TACTICAL TRAINING
SST A	APPENDIX

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-10

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE: Establish policies and procedures to be followed during the

general operation of the unit.

- B. **DEFINITION:** The Primary Specialized Services Team (SST) consists of a Team Leader/Commander and fourteen (14) members. Members of the team are eligible to receive Technicians or “Tech” pay. Tech pay is that pay negotiated in the Deputy Sheriff’s Association contract and authorized for SST members who have completed formal SST/EST training and routinely are assigned SST duties/responsibilities.
- C. **MISSION STATEMENT:** Recognizing that the presence of a highly trained, highly skilled law enforcement tactical unit has shown to substantially reduce the risk of injury or loss of life to citizens, other law enforcement personnel, and suspects; and recognizing that a well managed “team” response to critical incidents, it is the intent of the Prince George’s County, Maryland Sheriff’s Office SST to provide a highly trained and skilled tactical team as a resource for the Sheriff’s Office in handling of critical incidents.

SST-10.1

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-11

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – DUTIES

- A. Members will perform those duties as outlined in Appendix “A”.
1. Members will perform those duties assigned that are consistent with the overall objective of the Office of the Sheriff.
 2. An I.R. WILL be written on all incidents involving SST, and will be turned in at the end of the Duty Shift.

SST-11.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-12

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – SCHEDULING

A. Duty Hours

1. The duty hours will be set forth in a schedule to be published monthly by the Section Commander or Team Leader.

B. Leave

1. Leave is reviewed and granted on a case by case basis according to current General Order's and Standard Operating Procedures.
2. As long as the SST Team remains in a part-time or "Ad-Hoc", status leave should be reviewed by each team members primary assignment supervisor. A copy of the approved leave slip shall be forwarded to the SST Team Leader.

SST-12.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-13

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – UNIFORM

- A. Members will wear the blue utility uniform while on duty.
1. Boots will be bloused.
 2. No collar brass will be worn.
 3. Blue or Black T-shirts and/or turtlenecks are permitted as the seasonal change over dictates.
 4. Rank designation will be black collar chevron.
 5. Black flight jacket with subdued patches (when appropriate).
 6. Subdued Patches (Badge star, S.O.D. Patch, PGSO Patch & Name Patch)
 7. No other pins or patches are authorized for wear on SST Utility Uniform.

SST-13.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-14

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – EQUIPMENT

- A. All team equipment will be stored in a safe and secure location designated by the Commander or Team Leader of the SST.
- B. Equipment will be visually inventoried once a month at minimum.
- C. All SST individually issued equipment is to be maintained in good working condition and stored in a safe and secure location.

SST-14.1

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-15

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – VEHICLES

- A. Each member of the SST will be issued a take home vehicle.
- B. Vehicle 480 (Transport/Equipment Truck) will be kept at all times at the PGSO Headquarters.
- C. Vehicle 460 (Plain Panel Van) will be kept in a safe/secure location designated by the Commander or Team Leader of SST.
- D. Vehicle 593 (Peace Keeper) will be kept at the PGSO Headquarters.
- E. It will be the responsibility of the SST Team Leader to ensure that all vehicles are properly maintained.

SST-15.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-16

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – PHYSICAL FITNESS AND OTHER TRAINING

- A. Members will utilize the Physical Training Room or other approved location for no more than two (2) hours three (3) times a week.
- B. Each member will have their issued pager and/or cellular phone with him during physical training.
- C. Members will maintain a log of their physical training and have it available for inspections.
- D. All training will be cleared through the Agency Training Section in accordance with General Order 3-119.
- E. The SST Supervisor will keep a log of the type of training being performed and the members in attendance.
- F. Each member of the SST of the rank of Sergeant and below will be required to pass a quarterly physical fitness test.
 1. The test will consist of the following elements:
 - One & half, (1.5), mile run in fourteen (14) minutes or less.
 - Obstacle Course completed: So. Md. Criminal Justice Academy Laplata, Ft. Meade Anne Arundel, or PGPD/SOD Riverdale.
 - 45 push-ups in 1.5 minutes or less
 - 45 sit-ups in 2 minutes or less
 - 5 pull-ups – overhang
 - a. Any team members who do not pass the Quarterly fitness test will be placed on a probationary status until the following test period. In order to remain on the SST during the probation period, a team member must show physical improvement on a week to week basis. The three month probation is strictly for the purpose of getting in shape to meet the test standards.

SST-16.1

- b. Team members who are on probation and do not meet the physical fitness test standards a second time, will be removed from the SST.
- c. Team leaders will take into consideration a team member's probationary status when assigning physically demanding assignments.
- d. Team members of the rank of Lieutenant and above are not be required to meet the test standards, but will be expected to maintain a good physical conditioning.

SST-16.2

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-17

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – COMMUNICATIONS

A. Members will be in contact with Communications at all times during their tour of duty, and will ensure their ability to be contacted at all times except when on approved leave, via:

1. Pager
2. Radio or
3. Telephone (Cellular or Land-use)

SST-17.1

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: SST-18

CREATED / REVISED: 07/19/06

TITLE: SPECIALISED SERVICES TEAM – RANGE AND TACTICAL TRAINING

- A. Reporting Time: As designated by the SST Team Leader
- B. Reporting Place: As designated by the SST Team Leader
- C. Clothing:
 - 1. The uniform of the day will be either the blue utility uniform or designated training uniform.
 - 2. Running clothing will be carried in each member's vehicle.
 - 3. A clean SST uniform will be carried in each SST member's vehicle.
- D. Weapons:
 - 1. Each SST member will have all issued weapons available at the range for inspection and use.
 - 2. Each SST member will clean all weapons fired at the range before securing from the range.
 - 3. Fresh ammunition will be loaded into service weapons each range date.
- E. Training Report will be completed and left for inspection by the SST Team Leader.
- F. Range or Training Officer of the Day:
 - 1. A Range or Training Officer will be assigned each training date by the SST Team Leader.
 - 2. The Training Officer will:
 - a. Verify that the training location or range is reserved for SST use.
 - b. Requisition or gather the needed supplies; i.e.

SST-18.1

- i. Ammunition
 - ii. Staplers
 - iii. Staples
 - iv. Targets
 - v. Hearing protection
 - vi. Eye protection
 - vii. First aid kit
 - viii. Range book
 - 3. The Training Officer will ensure that the site is clean before SST personnel secure for the day.
 - 4. The Training Officer will ensure that all weapons are cleaned before

SST personnel secure for the day.

- G. Scheduling: All SST training will be scheduled by the SST Team Leader or designee.

SST-18.2
APPENDIX "A" (DUTIES)

- A. All requests for SST assistance that are urgent in nature, will be acted upon with the approval of the SST Team Leader, or incident Commander, and in accordance with General Order 3-119.
 - 1. Requests for SST assistance by another Office of the Sheriff section will be submitted through the SST Team Leader, or Special Operations Commander.
- B. Requests for Assistance from other Jurisdictions/Agencies
 - 1. Requests for assistance from other jurisdictions will be approved by the Commander of the Special Operations and/or Chief Assistant Sheriff.
 - 2. SST Mission Information Packet will be completed before assistance is given to another jurisdiction.

3. Other agencies or jurisdictions will conduct all arrests and appropriate paperwork unless prior approval is given for joint operations.
4. Incidents Reports will be turned in prior to securing from shift and in accordance with the current General Order.
 - a. A copy of the search warrant, if applicable, will be attached to the original Incident Report only.
 - b. Information pertaining to defendant(s) arrested/confiscated articles and completed search warrant return may be submitted by supplemental Incident Report, if applicable.

C. Other Duties

1. The members of the S.S.T. may be assigned to any section in the Agency as needed.

D. General

1. SST may be assigned those tasks deemed important for the overall advancement of the mission of the Office of the Sheriff. All assignments will be conducted and completed to the absolute high standards and traditions of the Office of the Sheriff.

SST-A
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PROCEDURE TITLE</u>
	<u>CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT</u>
CDU 10	POLICY
CDU 11	RESPONSIBILITIES
CDU 12	LEVEL OF RESPONSE
CDU 13	INITIAL RESPONSES TO A CIVIL DISTURBANCE
CDU 14	COMMAND AND CONTROL
CDU 15	TRAINING
CDU 16	EQUIPMENT
CDU 17	UNIFORM
CDU 18	USE OF FORCE
CDU 19	INTELLIGENCE
CDU 20	ARRESTS

CDU – TOC – 1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-10

CREATED / REVISED: 12/23/11

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT - POLICY

- A. *The Sheriff has authorized within the County Office of the Sheriff the establishment of a Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU), which will be activated during periods of civil unrest. The Unit will assist the County Police Department and the County Department of Corrections with the transfer and containment of prisoners and will assist the Police Department with incident response.*
- B. *Certain responsibilities of Office of the Sheriff Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) are outlined within the Prince George's County Emergency Operations Plan (PGC EOP) which delineates the roles of County and non-County supporting agencies for the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases of emergency activities.*
- C. It is the policy of the Prince George's County Office of the Sheriff to protect the rights of citizens to peaceably assemble and lawfully express their views. It is the responsibility of The Office of the Sheriff to preserve the peace and to protect life and property
- D. The Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) provides the Prince George's County Office of the Sheriff with a limited capability to respond to large public gatherings, demonstrations, disturbances, or other public safety incidents. The trained personnel can ensure a highly organized, disciplined response to any spontaneous incident or unusual occurrences. In fulfilling these responsibilities,

the Office of The Sheriff will make reasonable efforts to employ non-arrest methods of crowd management as the primary means of restoring order. Should such methods prove unsuccessful, arrests shall be made for violations of the law. All arrest shall be based on probable cause, and arresting deputies shall use only the minimum necessary force to make and maintain the arrest.

CDU-10.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-11

CREATED / REVISED: 12/23/11

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT - RESPONSIBILITIES

NOTE: See also Civil Disturbance, Law Enforcement and Mass Arrest annexes within the Prince George's County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).

A. Assistance to the County Police

The Office of the Sheriff may, at any time during a major event, respond to assist and augment the Police Department by providing resources to patrol in or around a crisis area; helping to secure perimeters around any incident, and upon request of the Police Department; deploy the Special Services Team and/or Civil Disturbance Units. Office of the Sheriff personnel, with the assistance of the Police Department and the County Department of Corrections, as applicable, will:

- *Complete arrest documents.*
- *Identify and process prisoners.*
- *Provide prisoners access to water and lavatory facilities, when necessary.*
- *Serve charging documents.*
- *Transport prisoners from the scene.*
- *Transport prisoners needing medical treatment to a medical facility.*

The Office of the Sheriff will be responsible for providing transportation and maintaining custody of prisoners to the appropriate processing center.

B. Assistance to the County Department of Corrections

The Office of the Sheriff may, at any time during a major event and once prisoners are at processing sites, respond to assist the County Department of Corrections as they:

- *Identify and process prisoners.*

- *Provide prisoners access to water, food and lavatory facilities, as necessary.*
- *Serve charging documents.*
- *Take prisoners before a District Court Commissioner.*
- *Transport committed prisoners to the Department of Corrections.*

CDU-11.1

NOTE: In the event that large numbers of detainees are arrested, the Department of Corrections gymnasium, the Sheriff's holding cells in Hyattsville or Upper Marlboro, or any designated location may be used for prisoner processing.

C. The Civil Disturbance Unit Commander shall:

- 1) *Command and direct all CDU related activities, in accordance with the provisions of this manual, Office of the Sheriff General Orders and procedures found within the Prince George's County Emergency Operations Plan (PGC EOP);*
- 2) *Every January and July, review and update accordingly the roster identifying each current member of the Civil Disturbance Unit and their respective commanders, and;*
- 3) *Every January and July, deliver a copy of the roster identifying each current member of the Civil Disturbance Unit and their respective commanders to, at a minimum, the following individuals:*
 - a) *Commander, Teletype / Records Division (to be maintained within the Teletype Section);*
 - b) *Commander, Special Operations Division (to be utilized in any Office of the Sheriff Incident Command Center), and;*
 - c) *The Agency Director, Budget & Finance.*
- 4) *Maintain liaison and coordinate with his / her counterpart within the Prince George's County Police Department Special Operations Division (PGPD – SOD) for of Office of the Sheriff Civil Disturbance Unit involvement in PGPD-SOD training exercises (e.g., coordinate participation of PGSO-CDU in the PGPD-SOD annual civil disturbance training conducted at Jug Bay Nature Park, each year, etc.)*

CDU-11.2

D. Division Commanders normally assigned agency members of the Civil Disturbance Unit shall, *through cooperation and coordination with the Civil Disturbance Commander,*

- 1) *Ensure the timely and effective deployment of personnel to resolve or contain any situation within their respective Bureaus or when the CDU is called out. (See also SOP CDU-21, Call-up Procedures).*
- 2) Maintaining a current roster of CDU-*member* deputies within their Division.
- 3) Contact deputies from their Division in the event of a call-out, *and;*
- 4) Coordinate *attendance to* training and equipment needs of deputies with the Civil Disturbance Commander.

CDU-11.2
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-12

CREATED / REVISED: 07/31/06

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – LEVEL OF RESPONSE

A. The policies and procedures presented in this SOP are based on the concept of operational flexibility, and it is expected that officials will exercise sound judgment and proper command and supervisory responsibility in the control of a civil disturbance. It may be possible to predict a level of civil disorder by the nature of a pre-planned event. Each Civil Disturbance is unique and commanders and officials must, therefore, plan and respond according to the nature and size of the disturbance. The CDU Commander will have primary responsibility for managing the deputy's response. This includes community out-reach and possibly notifying the following listed departments or agencies.

1. Public Safety Communications – requesting a dispatcher
2. PIO Office
3. Department of Corrections
4. Prince George's County Police Department
5. State Highway Administration
6. Department of Public Works and Transportation
7. Homeland Security
8. Maryland Park Police, Mounted Unit
9. Prince George's County Fire Department

B. The CDU Commander, in conjunction with the Commander of Special Operations Division, will make the determination as to the level of manpower needed to effectively manage the situation. This may require any of the following levels of commitment.

1. SOD personnel, in addition to on duty CDU deputies.
2. SOD, all CDU assigned deputies.
3. SOD, all CDU personnel including a call-out.

C. A Division Commander may request that the CDU be placed on alert if there is a potential need for deployment to a scheduled event or in which there is a reasonable expectation of a significant commitment of police resources to protect public safety or preserve the peace. The commander of Special Operations Division will make this determination based on the situation's Seriousness and potential for escalation.

CDU-12.1

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-13

CREATED / REVISED: 12/23/11

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT - INITIAL RESPONSE TO A CIVIL RESPONSE

A. The first officer(s) to arrive on the scene of a civil disturbance should:

1. Observe the situation from a safe distance to determine if the gathering is currently or potentially violent.

2. Notify the Public Safety Communications of the nature and seriousness of the disturbance. Request the assistance of a supervisor.
3. If approaching the crowd would not present unnecessary risk, instruct those gathering to disperse.
4. Attempt to identify crowd leaders and individuals personally engaged in criminal acts.
5. The primary responsibility of the O.I.C. at the scene during the initial stages of a civil disturbance is the rapid assembly of sufficient forces to immediately confront the participants.

B. The officer in charge shall do the following:

1. Assess the immediate situation for seriousness and its potential for escalation. If the disturbance is minor in nature and adequate resources are available, efforts should be made to disperse the crowd, and/or redirect traffic around the incident.
2. Transmit the following to the Public Safety Communications:
 - a. Location of disturbance
 - b. Number of participants
 - c. Activities of participants
 - d. Direction of movement
 - e. Ingress/egress routes for emergency vehicles
 - f. If utilizing Court radios, notify fire control to make notifications.

CDU-13.1

- C. Identify the number of personnel and equipment necessary to contain and disperse the disturbance and relay this to the Public Safety Communications.
- D. Establish an outer perimeter sufficient to contain the disturbance and prohibit entrance into the affected area.
- E. Establish a staging area within proximity to the scene.
- F. If CDU officers are needed, contact the Commander, Special Operations Division. A decision involving partial or full activation of CDU officers will be determined based on operational needs.
- G. Once it has been determined that a CDU call-out is necessary, the Commander of the Bureau, or his designee will advise the Public Safety Communications of the staging area and the need for a separate channel.

The Commander of the Special Operations Division will be notified along with the CDU Commander.

H. The CDU Commander will notify:

- 1) *The Office of the Sheriff Teletype section to notify all personnel assigned to the Unit's teams that the Unit has been activated (see also SOP: CDU – 21 'Call-up Procedures'), and;*
- 2) *The liaison Division Commanders and direct them to contact their CDU personnel for a call-out.*

CDU-13.2

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-14

CREATED / REVISED: 12/23/11

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – COMMAND AND CONTROL

- A. The Division Commander or his designee will remain in control of the overall incident or event, until the arrival of the Commander of Special Operations or the Commander of the CDU. At the conclusion of an event, the Division Commander, or his designee shall submit an Incident Report thru chain of command.
- B. *Incidents falling under the scope of the Prince George's County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) shall be managed utilizing the Incident Command System (ICS) and may designate other county entities as the primary response agency (e.g., County Police for most law enforcement functions, Fire Department for incidents involving fire, hazardous materials, biological concerns, etc.) **See also the 'Civil Disturbance', 'Law Enforcement' and 'Mass Arrest' annexes within the Prince George's County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).***

CDU-14.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-15

CREATED / REVISED: 07/31/06

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – TRAINING

- A. The Commander of the Civil Disturbance Unit is responsible for the development, coordination and documentation of CDU training. A two day course was developed by the Prince George's County Community Policing Institute. All personnel shall maintain proficiency by attending bi-annual training.
- B. There shall be a standing unit of 12 Deputies at all times. This unit will have one leader, a Lieutenant. The overall Commander shall be the Commander of Special Operations.
- C. The Community Policing Institute has designated instructors who participate in CDU training and are responsible for deploying less-lethal munitions, i.e. the Pepper ball gun and the FN-303. Only fully trained and qualified CDU personnel may deploy such equipment and munitions. The on-scene commander must authorize the use of less lethal munitions.

CDU-15.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-16

CREATED / REVISED: 07/31/06

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – EQUIPMENT

A. All sworn CDU Deputies have been issued the following:

1. Chemical agents gas mask and replacement cartridge
2. Riot Shield and helmet with nape pad
3. Riot helmet pouch
4. Tactical team bag
5. Shin guards
6. Elbow Padding
7. Upper body protection system
8. Tactical leather gloves
9. Flex cuffs (10 pack)
10. Gas mask pouch
11. PPE suit

B. The Community Policing Institute will be responsible for testing each mask annually.

CDU-16.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-17

CREATED / REVISED: 07/31/06

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – UNIFORMS

- A. The authorized uniform for the Civil Disturbance Unit will be the blue utility uniform. Each trained CDU deputy will receive two pairs of navy blue Battle Dress Uniform pants. These uniform pants are authorized to be worn only for a Civil Disturbance incident, or CDU training. Deputies are authorized to blouse the Battle Dress Uniform pants. All Deputies shall wear their soft body armor.

CDU-17.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-18

CREATED / REVISED: 07/31/06

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – USE OF FORCE

- A. All deputies involved in a Civil Disturbance shall follow the department's Use of Force Continuum, General Order Manual 7-107

LESS-LETHAL FORCE DEFINITION

Less-Lethal Launchers fall into the category of Less-Lethal Force Technology and Equipment: Those items which, when used properly, are less likely to result in death or serious injury than force commonly referred to as "deadly" Force that is neither likely to cause death or serious injury, but the possibility of a fatality, however remote, does exist.

- B. All deputies shall adhere to the General Order Manual and specific Standard Operating Procedures when deploying less lethal options, such as the individual dispensers of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), spray or foam, Pepperball Launchers tm, or the FN-303's.
- C. The Less Lethal Launcher is deployed as an additional deputy tool and is not intended to replace firearms, other less-lethal tools or self-defense techniques. Less-Lethal Launchers are extended range impact weapons that have the capability of delivering the following projectile payloads:
1. Oleoresin Capsicum (primary round)
 2. Marking Paint – washable and permanent. Marking paint rounds may be used when authorized by a Sergeant or above.
- D. Each discharge, including accidental discharges, of a Less-Lethal Launcher shall be documented on an Incident Report and submitted for review through chain of command. The Unit's Sergeant is responsible for completing the I.R. and obtaining Use-of-Force numbers.
- E. Grenadier/Munitions
1. Only trained and qualified deputies from the Special Operations Divisions may deploy such equipment and munitions, at the direction of a Command Staff Officer.

CDU-18.1

2. The goal of this type of deployment is to stop unlawful conduct and/or restore order, and to reduce the likelihood of injury to bystanders, deputies and disorderly persons in a crowd.
3. The CDU Commander shall consider whether or not a crowd situation exists which constitutes a riot. A deputy supervisor must make that

determination and, if so, command them to disperse.

F. Issuance of Warnings

1. The issuance of warnings shall be of such amplification and repetition as to be heard by the whole assemblage.
2. The CDU Commander shall make issuances from stationary vantage points that are observable to the crowd, or to a large number of participants.
3. Additional warnings, where necessary, shall be given from portable amplification or from deputy vehicles, equipped with public address systems.
 - a. The warning will consist of an announcement citing the offense or violations that are being committed by the participants, and a request or order, whichever is applicable, that the crowd disperse. Whenever possible, this warning shall be written prior to the announcement, to ensure clarity and accuracy.
 - b. The entire warning process shall be documented by means of an audio-visual recording, if available. If this is not available, then written documentation must be retained and made a part of any arrest files.
4. The standard dispersal announcement is as follows:

“I am (name/rank) a deputy sheriff for Prince George’s County Maryland. I declare this to be an unlawful assembly in violation of the Maryland Annotated Code and order all those assembled at (give specific location) to disperse immediately. If you do not disperse you will be subject to arrest.”

G. The type of device (level of force) must be selected based upon several criteria, which shall include:

1. Using the minimum amount of force reasonably believed to accomplish the objective.

CDU-18.2
2. A determination of the violations of law present (riot, looting, throwing projectiles, etc.).
3. An assessment of the threat to public safety by the actions of the crowd.

H. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

1. As with all chemical munitions, several considerations should be made before its use. Some include:
 - a. Wind direction
 - b. Effective range

- c. Escape route
 - d. Contamination
 - e. Target size (individuals/groups)
 - f. Plan of action after deployment
 - g. Escape route for crowd to disperse
2. In managing a crowd, the policy of this department is to use the least stringent level of force necessary to accomplish the objective. The application of force is confined to the escalating levels of force as outlined below, although it may not be feasible to apply each level in turn. Circumstances may require that one or several levels be discarded dependant upon the level of opposition encountered.

 3. Individual command officials may independently direct the use of force when the squad under their direction is detached from the rest of the unit and when the isolated unit's safety or that of other persons is jeopardized. If conditions permit CDU Commander shall be apprised of the situation prior to initiating any use of force at this level of command.

CDU-18.3
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-19

CREATED / REVISED: 07/31/06

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT - INTELLIGENCE

- A. The CDU commander will notify the Viper Unit (Intelligence), and the Office of Homeland Security, when the following occurs:
 1. Notification of possible protests
 2. Notification of meetings or upcoming activities that may involve CDU
 3. Any preplanned deployment of CDU that is Office of The Sheriff specific (does not involve Prince George's County Police).

- B. The Intelligence Unit in conjunction with the Homeland Security office shall assist in obtaining pertinent information from protest organizers, group leaders or confidential informants. Members of this unit will conduct surveillance of protest groups and serve to identify group leaders. A list of deputy's names and contact numbers shall be left with the On Scene Commander, prior to the deployment.

CDU-19.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-20

CREATED / REVISED: 12/23/11

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT - ARRESTS

- A. The Office of The Sheriff will make reasonable efforts to employ non-arrest methods of crowd management as the primary means of restoring order. Should such methods prove unsuccessful, arrests shall be made for violations of the law. All arrest shall based on probable cause. In the event of a mass demonstration, arrangements will be made with the Department of Corrections and the Prince George's County Police, requesting their assistance. The Office of the Sheriff will provide a transport bus for prisoners as needed. The Department of Corrections will assist with central processing. Additional officers from the Prince George's County Police District's Investigative Section will assist with central processing.

B. *See also:*

- 1) *Standard Operating Procedure CDU – 11 ('Responsibilities'), and;*
- 2) *The 'Civil Disturbance', 'Law Enforcement' and 'Mass Arrest' annexes within the Prince George's County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).*

CDU-20.1
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: CDU-21

CREATED / REVISED: 12/23/11

TITLE: CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT – CALL-UP PROCEDURES

- A. *The Office of the Sheriff Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) will be called into service at the authorization of the Sheriff and/or by a request to the Sheriff by either the Police Chief or the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC).*
- 1) *Upon authorization by the Sheriff or his / her designee, the Teletype Section will notify all personnel assigned to the Unit's teams that the Unit has been activated.*
 - 2) *Unit personnel will report to the secured underground parking garage at the Courthouse in Upper Marlboro.*
 - 3) *Unit personnel will be dressed in Class D uniforms or authorized BDU uniforms as appropriate.*
 - 4) *Command Post personnel will report to the Incident Command Room at the Office of the Sheriff Headquarters.*
 - 5) *If activated, the Sheriff or a representative authorized to commit all the resources of the Office of the Sheriff will respond to the EOC.*
 - 6) *A roster of the Civil Disturbance Unit and their commanders will be kept in the Office of the Sheriff's Teletype Section and the Office of the Sheriff's Incident Command Center. The Civil Disturbance Unit roster will be reviewed semi-annually and updated accordingly.*

CDU-21.1

**Office of the Sheriff
for
Prince George's, Maryland
V.I.P. / Witness Protection
Operations Manual**

Preface

This manual is intended for the exclusive use of the Prince George's County Sheriff's Office VIP/Witness Protection Team. Neither it nor its contents may be reproduced, photocopied, or disseminated to unauthorized personnel or agencies without the written permission of the Sheriff or his representative.

Introduction

This manual has been prepared to provide a basic overview of the integral problems that are routinely encountered by members of the Prince George's County Sheriff's Office VIP/Witness Protection Team in conjunction with their duties. Thus, this manual advocates the development of a total systems approach of policy, planning, training and tactics required to successfully complete assigned missions.

Throughout this manual, the suggested protection programs and tactics have been developed from the point of view of historical terrorist and assassin techniques in planning and implementing their strategies. Although emphasis in the manual is that of proactive security planning, reactive strategies, including crisis management, are also presented. It can be anticipated that judges, states attorneys, state's witnesses will be targeted by individuals or terrorists that may, from verbal harassment to kidnapping and/or assassination, attempt to influence the judicial process.

This manual is intended to provide the reader with the basic theories of protection and their field application during any protective operation. The format of this manual combines narrative, checklists and questionnaires. Narrative is used to stimulate the member's thoughts so as to promote the application of the manual's contents to specific situations. Checklists and questionnaires are designed to assist the member in the implementation of various protective tactics. Some sections of the manual are intentionally redundant, as to allow for usage in security planning and evaluation either in its entirety or by individual section. Security problems and tactics are presented in varying degrees of depth in different sections for quick reference to a specific security problem and to highlight critical topics.

A key objective of this manual is to provide the deputy with a general framework of the various aspects involved in missions assigned to the VIP/Witness Protection Team.

It should be noted that this manual contains only a compilation of security recommendations and checklists, and deputies are encouraged to analyze each circumstance to determine the necessary precautions ensuring the safety of their protectee. As it is impossible to create a definitive listing of security recommendations for each conceivable situation, elements of risk assessment should be combined with all other available information sources to arrive at an accurate evaluation of the perceived threat in each circumstance. Deputies are encouraged to utilize this manual to assist in identifying and evaluating potential security risks, and developing their own plan for each situation.

Organization

The VIP/Witness Protection Team may have the working title of "VIPER" or "VIPER Team." It shall consist of a Commander, an Operations Section, and an Intelligence Section. The Operations Section shall have a personnel compliment not to exceed 15. The Intelligence Section shall have a personnel compliment not to exceed three.

Mission

Primary: To provide the direct personal protection assets of the Office of the Sheriff

Secondary: To provide inner perimeter reinforcement to the Specialized Services Team (SST).

Motto

“Faithful to the Law. Always Prepared.”

Goals

To provide witness, judicial, executive, or dignitary protection in a competent, professional, and effective manner that engenders confidence in those whom we serve and protect.

To acquire, develop, and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate in contemporary protective operations.

To acquire, develop, and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate as an adjunct to the Specialized Services Team.

Values

Professionalism

Competence

Discretion

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Access List: The names of individuals who are authorized to come into a designated area for a specific period of time.

Advance: All security activities, plans, and/or arrangements made prior to and in conjunction with the visit of a protectee to a given area.

Advance Survey: The inspection of each area to be visited by a principal, and the resultant plan of security for each area.

Advance Team: A group of agency representatives headed by the Lead Advance Person. This group is usually comprised of representatives of the Protective Detail and the Intelligence deputy.

After Action Report: A report completed subsequent to the protectee's visit, which includes any changes or problems that occurred during the visit and a complete analysis.

AIC: Agent-in-Charge. The deputy directly responsible for the protection of the principal.

Arms Reach: A protective term associated with action to be taken in an assault situation, e.g., (Is the perpetrator within "arms reach of security personnel")? A relative term used to determine if a security officer should attempt to neutralize the source of the threat or cover and evacuate the protectee.

Arrival: The arrival of the principal at a designated location.

Checkpoint: A control point through which persons and things must pass to gain admittance to a restricted area.

Choke Point: A geographical or man-made feature that restricts, fixes, or slows the movement of a Protective Detail's route.

Command Post: A communications center utilized to insure all pertinent information is received, catalogued, and disseminated to affected personnel in an accurate and timely manner.

Cover: The encompassing of the protectee by security personnel during an assault or threatening situation.

Covert Operations: Operations, which are so planned and executed, as to conceal the identity of or permits plausible denial by the sponsor. Emphasis is placed on concealment of identity or sponsor.

Curbside: The position of the deputy at the precise arrival point of a motorcade. The deputy indicating, to the principal's driver, the precise location for the principal's door to be placed when the vehicle stops upon arrival.

Delusion: An abnormal mental state characterized by the occurrence of delusions. A false belief regarding the self, or persons or objects outside of the self that persists despite the facts and is common in some psychotic states. Something accepted as true that is actually false or unreal.

Depression: A psychoneurotic or psychotic disorder marked by sadness, inactivity, difficulty in thinking and concentration, and feelings of dejection.

Departure: The departure of the principal from a designated location.

D/L: Detail Leader. The designated individual in charge of the detail during a protective operation.

EMT.: Emergency Medical Technician.

EOD: Explosive Ordinance Disposal. A team of bomb technician experts who render explosive devices safe. Currently this term is accepted in both the civilian and military community as anyone certified as an explosive expert.

ER: A hospital or medical facility emergency room.

Evacuate: To move the principal away from a location. Usually associated with a threatening situation.

Follow-up Vehicle: An unmarked support vehicle, which follows immediately behind the principal's vehicle.

Greeter: The person assigned as the official receiver of the principal at the arrival point.

Holding Room: A designated secure area at the visit site, usually a private room set aside for the principal's convenience and privacy.

Hostage-Taking: Holding person(s) against their will to enforce demands. It has great publicity value and is used to arrange escape. May fall in four basic categories: (1) criminals, (2) mentally deranged, (3) terrorists, and (4) prison situations.

Inner Perimeter: The secure, innermost area where access will be limited.

Intelligence Advance: A representative of the Intelligence Section responsible for establishing liaison with the other law enforcement agencies involved in the principal's visit. The Intelligence Advance Person ensures that all intelligence information is coordinated with the advance team.

Improvised: Anything "made up" or devised. Not of standard use or manufacture, commonly associated with clandestine explosive devices.

Kidnapping: Abduction of a person against his/her will. May be done for financial, propaganda or recruitment purposes.

Lead Advance: The person responsible for all security measures to be established regarding the visit of a protectee.

Lead Vehicle: The lead vehicle, usually a marked vehicle, immediately preceding the principal's vehicle during official, or "on the record" movements.

Line of Sight: The visual line of sight from a determined point to the protectee.

Motorcade: A formally organized group of motor vehicles traveling along a specific route in a controlled formation.

Movement: 1) Any movement made by the principal or the principal's party. 2) A communication term usually used as an indication of impending departure.

Operations Commander: That individual having overall responsibility for the Protective Operation.

Panic Alarm: An electronic device carried by the principal capable of emitting a receivable signal indicative of an emergency or other situation requiring immediate response from protective personnel.

Pilot Vehicle: A marked vehicle that precedes the motorcade or principal's vehicle by approximately one block. This vehicle scans the designated route for dangers, obstructions, and potential problem areas.

Preliminary Survey: All written plans resulting from the "Advance Survey". This report must be completed and made available to the advance team no later than 24 hours prior to the visit by the protectee.

Principal: The individual being protected.

Protectee : The individual being protected, synonymous with "principal" above.

Principal Briefing: A briefing of the principal by security personnel regarding all security arrangements to be established during the protective operation.

Protective Intel.: All information affecting the security of persons and property under the responsibility of the Prince George's County Office of the Sheriff VIP/Witness Protection Team.

Route Vehicle: Usually an unmarked vehicle canvassing the route to be traveled by the principal. The primary responsibility of the route vehicle is to detect traffic, crowd, or building problems, or any obstruction that might impede the progress of the principal. The route vehicle usually precedes the principal's vehicle by approximately 10 to 15 minutes.

Route Survey: The selection of primary and secondary routes of travel for the principal, and measures taken to make the route secure for travel.

Safe Room: A designated secure room to be used by the principal during a threatening situation.

An immediately secure environment where the security personnel can regroup and develop the next plan of action.

Secure Area: Any location that has been surveyed, cleared of unauthorized persons, technically swept, and continuously secured by established post assignments prior to use by the principal.

Security Perimeter: A protection strategy that involves the placement and utilization of security personnel, barricades, and other devices to provide physical protection, surveillance and intelligence.

Security Post: An area of responsibility established to form a part of the security network. Generally, there are three types of security posts: Surveillance, Checkpoint, and Special Assignments.

Security Room: The immediate control center for a specific detail located near the principal. The security room may be temporary or permanent and used as a squad room for deputies not on post. It is sometimes assigned a code name and is at times referred to as a command post because of its similar functions on a smaller scale.

Site Survey: The investigation and resultant plans of security for a given area. The site survey involves all of the security measures taken at each location to be visited by the principal. Examples would be hotels, banquet halls, speech sites, etc.

SMG: A submachine gun. Firearm capable of fully automatic fire, usually designed to fire pistol caliber, rather than rifle caliber ammunition.

Sound-Off: A vocalized warning issued by security personnel in the event of a threatening situation, e.g., ("gun!" "knife!", etc.). This warning is issued to ensure that all security personnel are aware of the threatening situation.

Special Posting: Any activity involving specific duties that are not covered under checkpoint or surveillance posts. Examples would be ambulance post, command post, security room, or counter sniper post.

Stash Car: An automobile concealed at a predetermined location for use in the event of an emergency departure.

Surveillance Post: A security post (generally mobile) that has the responsibility for a specific area, and observes persons and things within that given area

CONDUCTING PRELIMINARY ROUTE SURVEYS

Prior to the movement of the principal it is essential that a preliminary survey be completed of the primary and alternate routes to be utilized. This serves to familiarize Deputies with the surrounding terrain, traffic patterns, and helps to predict the timetable of the movement and identify potential problem areas. Whenever possible, conduct the route survey during the time of day of the anticipated movement. As discussed below, it is important to attempt to identify potential problem areas and take appropriate precautions. Anticipate and prepare for the unexpected.

Consult with the local law enforcement support regarding any major industrial sites along the route where a shift change could impact on your movement. Other concerns would include railroad service across the route, major sporting events, etc., that may cause traffic congestion.

When utilizing rural two-lane highways, keep in mind the potential for farm implements, etc. that may affect the timetable of the motorcade.

During high threat or multi-principal movements, consider the need for local law enforcement response teams for each building or block along the route the motorcade will pass (especially high-crime areas). This could greatly reduce the response time required to neutralize a specific threat or to investigate perceived problem areas. Whenever possible, arrange for a route, or 5 minute car to precede the motorcade on all movements.

Have you:

1. Determined if the movement is public knowledge?
2. Determined the distance to be traveled in miles and minutes?
3. Described the route in detail from point of origin of the event site using direction (left to right) and compass directions for all routes to be utilized?
4. Determined the approximate total of separate buildings along the route (buildings that are physically separated or appear to be separated by occupancy, usage or construction)?
5. Determined the number and location of Government buildings?
6. Determined post requirements and identification for rooftops? Recommended that all support agency personnel assigned to rooftops are in uniform?
7. Determined the location and number of intersections the motorcade/vehicle will pass?
8. Determined the number of manhole covers along the route?
9. Determined the approximate number of parked vehicles the motorcade/vehicle will pass? (Consider the time of day).
10. Located any trash receptacles, storage areas, mail boxes, etc., along the route where an explosive device(s) could be concealed?
11. Determined the approximate number of pedestrians that will be along the route? (Consider the time of day).
12. Determined the number and location(s) of all overpasses along the route?
13. Determined the number and location(s) of all underpasses along the route?
14. Identified all parks, recreational and/or wooded areas along the route?
15. Interviewed building owners, managers, security officers in charge of the building, or portion thereof, overlooking the route of the motorcade in order to advise them of the activity, and to request that he/she assist by keeping the windows closed and occupants off window ledges and advising the Office of the Sheriff of any suspicious or unusual activity in or near the area?
16. Verified the legitimacy of the business as a means of evaluating their assistance and information?
17. Determined if any buildings along the route have previously been targeted by any subversive or activist group or is a known residence or center of such activity?
18. Obtained hospital locations, telephone numbers, and determined emergency routes to be utilized?
19. Determined the most dangerous buildings along the route of the motorcade/vehicle?
20. Arranged for a joint radio communications network with local law enforcement support along the route?

21. Checked with local and/or state highway departments regarding any scheduled maintenance or repairs that may interfere with the movement? Verified any repairs in progress as legitimate by contacting appropriate office(s)?
22. Briefed local law enforcement regarding post assignments and planned emergency evacuation routes and procedures?
23. Met with local press contact person?
24. Arranged for local press identification?
25. Established press areas along route?
26. Ensured copies of all routes to be utilized are on file in the command post?

LIMIT OF REVISION AS OF 7/14/06

Field Trauma Management (For the First Responder)

Assessing the Situation:

1. Don't Panic! You will be able to render assistance more effectively if you can calmly evaluate the situation and establish a prioritized treatment plan.

2. Remember the ABC's of Life Support.

A Airway open. Open and maintain the victim's airway.

B Breathing restored. If the victim is not breathing, begin rescue breathing techniques immediately.

C Circulation maintained. If no pulse is present, immediately administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).

3. Check for Bleeding.

a. Apply direct pressure.

b. Elevate injured limb only if it does not cause further pain or injury. Apply pressure on supplying artery; **do not use a tourniquet.**

4. Look for Signs of Shock.

Symptoms may include restlessness and anxiety, unusual weakness or faintness, cold, pale, clammy skin, rapid, weak pulse, profuse sweating, shallow, irregular breathing, chills, dull and lusterless eyes with dilated pupils, nausea and/or unconsciousness.

5. Look for Emergency Medical Identification Tag.

Usually placed on the victim's wrist or around the neck. Check the wallet for an identification card with further instructions. Another alerting device may be a sticker on

the victim's automobile.

6. Loosen any Clothing.

Loosen clothing that may restrict the victim's breathing or interfere with circulation.

7. Never Give An Unconscious Person Anything By Mouth.

8. DO NOT Move an Injured Person.

Do not move unless further injury is imminent. Keep victim motionless, quiet and warm (except heat exhaustion and/or sunstroke). A victim with broken bones (fractures) should not be moved until a splint has been properly applied.

VITAL SIGNS:

1. Listening for a Heartbeat:

For a male and/or child, place your ear below and slightly to the left of the left nipple.

For a female, place your ear just below the left breast. The normal adult heart rate is between 60 and 100 beats/minute and is slightly faster for a child.

2. Feeling for a Pulse:

Place the tips of your index and middle fingers on the thumb side of the victim's wrist to feel for a pulse. Do not use your thumb, as this will confuse the victim's pulse with your own. If a pulse cannot be found at the wrist, check the carotid pulse (located to the side of the airway deep in the neck) or the femoral pulse (deep in the groin). Once a pulse has been located, count the number of beats in 15 seconds and multiply by four, or if the pulse is very slow or irregular, count for 60 seconds. A pulse rate may vary by the victim's condition. The normal adult pulse is 60 to 100 beats/minute. A young child's rate ranges between 60 and 140 beats/minute.

SURFACE WOUNDS:

1. Control Wounds:

Controlling wounds is applying a dry sterile compression dressing to the entire wound.

2. Apply Direct Pressure:

To control bleeding, you must apply direct pressure. For deep wounds or serious burns, treat for shock.

3. Protect Against Contamination.

4. Cover the Wound With Sterile Pads or Dressing.

Handle only the edges of the sterile pads or dressing to prevent further contamination.

EXTERNAL BLEEDING:

Treatment:

1. Act Quickly.

Have victim lie down. Elevate injured limb higher than the heart unless you suspect a broken bone (fracture).

2. Control Bleeding:

Apply direct pressure with a sterile pad or clean cloth.

3. Cover the Wound:

If the bleeding is controlled by direct pressure, bandage firmly with clean cloth strips or bandages to protect the wound from contamination and/or infection. Check pulse to be sure bandage is not too tight.

4. Direct Pressure on Main Artery:

If direct pressure is ineffective, applying strong finger pressure on the nearest main artery supplying blood to the affected area can usually control bleeding. First locate the pulsating artery at a point close to the bony structure where it passes near the skin surface, and then use direct pressure on the artery between skin and bony surface.

NOSEBLEED TREATMENT:

1. Apply pressure by pinching the nostrils together or by placing a rolled 4x4-gauze bandage between the upper lip and the gum and pressing against it with the fingers. The patient can sometimes apply enough pressure to stop the bleeding by stretching the upper lip tightly against the rolled bandage.

2. Keep the patient in a sitting position with the head tilted forward whenever possible so that the blood trickling down the back of the throat will not be aspirated into the lungs.
3. Keep the patient quiet. This rule is particularly important if the patient suffers from high blood pressure or is anxious. Anxiety will tend to increase the blood pressure, and the nosebleed will worsen.
4. Apply ice over the nose. Local cooling treatment is helpful in controlling hemorrhage.

Wounds:

Caution: Some wounds such as small cuts or minor scrapes require only simple first aid measures; others however, require immediate first aid followed by professional medical treatment. Before treating any serious incision, abrasion or laceration with extensive bleeding, act quickly to control bleeding. Get professional medical help immediately. Any wound can become contaminated and infected. Therefore, the step-by-step wound care method should be followed.

Abdominal-Breaks in Tissue of Abdominal Cavity:

Symptoms:

Profuse bleeding; swelling and redness surrounding the affected area.

Treatment:

1. Do not attempt to put intestines or other protruding body organs back into the abdominal cavity.
5. If the rescue is delayed, cover the wound and organs with a nonadhering material like aluminum foil, plastic wrap or clean moistened towel. Secure the dressing with firm (not tight) bandage. If patient's legs and knees are uninjured, flex them to relieve pressure on the abdomen.
6. Do not give anything by mouth.
7. If breathing difficulties occur, elevate head and shoulders on pillow, rolled towel, or clothing. Start rescue breathing efforts (CPR) immediately.
8. Get professional help immediately.

Chest Wound (Serious):

Symptoms:

Profuse bleeding; swelling and redness of injured tissue.

Treatment:

1. Cover the wound with an airtight dressing made from sterile pads, clean cloths, plastic wrap or aluminum foil. Seal wound completely while victim forcefully exhales. DO NOT use elastic or any other binding material to secure bandage in place; use first aid tape, a belt or a bandage. If necessary, the palm of the hand may be used until a bandage is obtained. Tape three sides of the dressing to the chest wall. Leave one edge free to allow air to escape so that pressure does not build up in the chest cavity.
2. Elevate head and shoulders.
3. If breathing problems develop; place victim on injured side. If breathing problems continue; begin rescue-breathing techniques (CPR) immediately.
4. Treat for shock.
5. Get professional help immediately. Transport victim with injured side down.

Impaled-Victim is Pierced by an Object i.e., Spike or Stake:

Treatment:

1. Do not move or remove the object.
2. Use a bulky dressing to stabilize the object.
3. Be alert for signs of infection.
4. Consult professional medical help if necessary.

Victim is Impaled on Object

Caution: DO NOT REMOVE PENETRATING OBJECT!

Treatment:

1. If victim is fixed to object (impaled), cut it off at a safe distance from the skin.

Immobilize object with thick dressings made from sterile pads or clean cloths secured in place with first aid tape, a belt or a bandage.

2. If object is protruding from the victim, **DO NOT** move it. Immobilize object with thick dressings made from sterile pads or clean cloths secured in place with first aid tape, a belt or bandage. Do not apply bandage so tightly that breathing is restricted.

3. If the object penetrates chest and the victim complains of discomfort or pressure, quickly loosen bandage on one side and reseal. Watch carefully for recurrence. Repeat procedure if necessary.

4. Treat for shock.

5. Get professional medical assistance immediately.

Internal Bleeding:

Symptoms:

Pale, cold, clammy skin, particularly hands and feet; dilated pupils; weak, rapid, irregular pulse rate; swelling; possible black and blue discoloration around the affected area, pale or white gums (symptoms of dangerously low blood pressure).

Treatment:

1. **DO NOT** give victim anything by mouth if abdominal bleeding is suspected.

2. Treat for shock.

3. Get victim to a hospital immediately. Transport in a horizontal position. In case of a chest injury, move victim in a sitting or half-sitting position.

Breathing Problems:

Symptoms:

Shortness of breath, dizziness, chest pains, rapid pulse, rapid pulse, bluish-purple skin color, dilated pupils, unconsciousness.

Treatment:

If victim has stopped breathing:

1. Lay victim on his/her back. Shout at and shake victim to make sure victim is unconscious. Place one hand under the victim's neck and lift, tilting head back as far as possible with the other hand used to open the airway (avoid exaggerated head tilts on infants, small children, neck and back injuries).

2. Look, listen and feel for respiratory movement. If breathing is absent, pinch the victim's nostrils closed, take a deep breath, completely cover victim's mouth, give two slow, full breaths (if chest does not rise, check for airway obstruction).

3. Clear airway, using your fingers in a hooked fashion to remove any solid or liquid obstructions.

4. Check for pulse or pulselessness at the carotid pulse in the neck and for signs of breathing.

5. If pulse is present:

a. For Adult: Continue rescue breathing at a rate of one strong breath every five seconds or 12 per minute.

b. For Infants and Small Children: Breathe shallow breaths at a rate of one every three seconds or 20 per minute.

BROKEN BONES (FRACTURES):

Symptoms:

The victim hearing or feeling the bone break; area is tender to touch with pain in one spot; swelling is noted around suspected fracture; limb may be in an unnatural position; painful movement; abnormal motion; loss of function; grating sensation, discoloration of the affected area.

Treatment:

1. Keep victim warm, still, treat for shock if necessary, and **DO NOT** move the victim until a splint can be applied unless an additional injury is imminent.

2. If bone is suspected to be broken but does not pierce the skin (closed fracture),

splint the limb before the victim is moved, immobilizing the joint above and below the suspected fracture site.

3. If broken bone pierces the skin (open or compound fracture), apply pressure to appropriate pressure point to control bleeding. **DO NOT** try to straighten the limb, return it to a natural position or replace bone fragments. **DO NOT** touch or clean the wound. Secure a sterile pad or clean cloth firmly in place over the wound; tie with strong bandages or cloth strips.

4. If victim must be moved, apply a splint to prevent further damage. Use anything that will keep the broken bones from moving, including broomsticks, boards or rolled magazines. Pad splints with cotton, clothes tied firmly (but not tightly) in place. If victim complains of numbness, loosen the splint.

5. Transport as soon as possible to an emergency medical facility.

BROKEN BACK OR SPINAL CORD INJURY:

Symptoms:

Inability to move fingers; tingling or numbness around the shoulders; complete paralysis. History of severe head and/or neck trauma should alert one to the possibility of neck fracture.

Treatment:

1. DO NOT allow the victim to move his/her head. Place rolled-up clothing or blankets around the head, neck and shoulders to prevent movement. Loosen clothing around the neck and waist.

2. Keep the victim warm and still.

3. If breathing difficulties occur; maintain airway with a minimal tilt of the head. Call for professional help if available.

FRACTURED SKULL:

Symptoms:

Victim is in an unconscious or semi conscious state, lacking full awareness of surroundings.

Treatment:

1. Place victim flat on back, moving head as little as possible. **DO NOT** move victim unless additional injury is imminent.

2. If victim is vomiting or bleeding from the mouth, gently turn head to the side.

3. Maintain an open airway.

4. Keep the victim warm; loosen tight clothing.

5. Control bleeding by applying gentle pressure.

6. If necessary, begin rescue-breathing techniques (CPR).

7. Treat for shock.

8. Seek professional help immediately.

BURNS AND SCALDS:

Symptoms:

First Degree Burn: Involves superficial layers of the skin and characterized by redness or discoloration, mild swelling and pain.

Second Degree Burn: Deep burn with red or mottled appearance; blisters; considerable pain and swelling; surface of the skin appears to be wet.

Third Degree Burn: Deep tissue destruction with a white or charred appearance (complete loss of all layers of the skin); no pain.

Treatment:

First Degree Burn: Apply cool, wet cloths or immerse in cool water (Do Not Use Ice). Blot gently; apply a dry, nonstick sterile pad or clean cloth if necessary. Usually medical treatment is not necessary; however, if severe or extensive symptoms are

present, consult professional medical help immediately. Be alert for signs of shock.

Second Degree Burn: See treatment for first degree burns. If arms or legs are affected, keep above heart level. Medical treatment may be necessary depending upon the location and extent of the burn. Be alert for signs of shock and infection.

Third Degree Burns: Treat for shock if necessary. **DO NOT** touch or cough over the burned areas. Victims with facial burns should be sat or propped up and kept under continuous observation for breathing difficulties. An open airway must be maintained. If arms or legs are affected, keep above heart level. Apply a cold pack **ONLY** to the face, hands or feet. Cover burns with nonstick sterile pads or clean cloths. Arrange for transport to an emergency medical facility as soon as possible.

BURNS (Chemicals, Alkalis or Sprays)

Symptoms:

Classified according to extent and location.

CAUTION: Be sure to remove contact lens if present, or move

Treatment:

1. Remove the contaminated clothing from the affected area.
2. Flood the burned area with cool water from the nearest available source (sink, shower, hose) for at least 5 minutes.
3. Cover the burn area with a dry, sterile dressing.
4. Treat as you would any other major or minor burn.
5. If eye is burned by a chemical, acid, gas or spray:
 - a. Immediately flood the face, eyelids and eye in cool, running water for at least 5 minutes, turning the head so that water does not drain into the other eye. Lift the eyelid away from the eye so the inside of the lid can also be washed.
 - b. Cover both eyes with a dry, sterile pad, clean and consult professional medical help immediately.
6. If eye has been burned by an alkali (drain cleaner, detergent, cleaning solution, etc.):
 - a. Immediately flood the face, eyelids and eye in cool, running water for at least fifteen minutes, turning the head so that the water does not drain into the other eye. Lift the eyelid away from the eye so that the inside of the eyelid can also be washed.
 - b. Gently lift any loose particles of dry chemicals on the eye with the corner of a sterile pad or clean cloth.
 - c. Cover both eyes with dry, sterile pads, clean cloths or eye pads; bandage in place.
 - d. Consult professional medical help immediately.

ELECTRICAL BURNS:

Symptoms:

Small discolored areas at the current's entry and exit points, difficulty in breathing.

Treatment:

1. **DO NOT TOUCH THE VICTIM WHO IS STILL IN CONTACT WITH CURRENT.**
2. Separate the victim from source of electricity by using a dry, nonmetallic pole, rope, or cloth to disconnect the power source from the victim. Be sure your hands

are dry and you are standing on a dry surface. Turn off the main electrical power switch whenever possible.

3. Look for breathing difficulties; begin rescue breathing efforts (CPR), or treat for shock if necessary.

4. Get professional medical help immediately.

CHOKING/AIRWAY OBSTRUCTION:

Partial Obstruction with Good Air Exchange:

Symptoms:

May include forceful cough with wheezing sounds between coughs.

Treatment:

1. Encourage the victim to cough as long as good air exchange continues. **DO NOT** interfere with the attempts to expel the object.

Partial Or Complete Obstruction In Conscious Victim With Poor Air Exchange:

Symptoms:

Weak cough; high-pitched crowing noises during inhalation; inability to breathe, cough or speak; gesture of clutching neck between thumb and index finger; exaggerated breathing efforts; dusky or bluish skin tone.

Treatment:

1. Stand to the side of, and slightly behind the victim.

2. Lower the victim's head below the chest, if possible. Give five sharp blows in rapid succession with the heel of the hand between the victim's shoulder blades. Place your other hand on the victim's chest for support.

3. If the victim continues to choke....stand behind the victim with your arms around the individual's waist; place your fist, thumb side in, against the victim's abdomen, slightly above the navel and below the rib margins. Grasp fist with the other hand and exert a quick upward thrust. Repeat until foreign body is expelled or victim becomes unconscious.

If victim is lying down:

1. Roll victim onto back. Place your hands one on top of the other, slightly above the navel and below the rib cage. Use the heel of the bottom hand to press toward the bottom of the diaphragm with a quick upward thrust. Repeat until the victim expels the foreign body or becomes unconscious.

For infants and small children:

1. Place child with face down on your forearm. Head should be lower than body. Give five sharp blows in rapid succession but with less pressure.

2. Place victim face up on your forearm. Head should be lower than body. Place 2 or 3 fingers on the child's abdomen slightly above the navel but below the rib cage. Press fingertips into victim's abdomen with a quick upward thrust. Repeat until foreign body is expelled or victim becomes unconscious.

Complete Airway Obstruction in an Unconscious Person:

1. Open airway and try to ventilate; if still obstructed, reposition the head and try to ventilate again

2. Give up to 5 abdominal thrusts.

3. Perform a tongue-jaw lift followed by a finger sweep to remove the object.

4. Repeat steps 2 through 4 until effective.

HYPOTHERMIA:

Symptoms:

Victim becoming uncooperative, dreamy, slow, and apathetic. Weakness, stumbling, repeated falling might precede collapse and unconsciousness. Muscle cramps, loss of sensation in legs or convulsions may occur. Body temperature drops below 98.6 degrees.

Treatment:

1. Remove wet clothing, replace with warm, dry clothing.
2. Warm victim's torso, not extremities, with blankets or clothing.
3. Place victim in the first available shelter, even if it delays transport to the hospital.
4. If victim is conscious, give warm drinks.
5. Get professional medical assistance immediately.

FROSTBITE:

Symptoms:

Crystals forming on skin; pale, glossy skin may be white, yellow-white, or bluewhite in color; itching sensation; intense cold and numbness. Victim may develop pain, and/or blisters.

Caution: **DO NOT** break blisters; rub affected area or apply heat lamps or hot water bottles. **DO NOT** attempt rapid thawing if freezing is a possibility.

Treatment:

1. Remove the victim from further exposure to the cold.
2. Protect the frostbitten part from further injury. **NEVER RUB FROSTBITTEN TISSUE.** Rubbing the frostbitten tissue will cause further damage to the cells from the sharp ice crystals. Similarly, the victim should not be allowed to stand or walk on a frostbitten foot. Always protect the part by gently handling it.
3. Remove any wet or restricting clothing and cover the injured part loosely with a dry, sterile dressing.
4. Evaluate the victim's general condition for signs or symptoms of systemic hypothermia.
5. Obtain professional medical assistance immediately.

CONVULSIONS:

Symptoms:

Body muscles become rigid followed by spasms; eyes may roll upward; face and lips may turn blue; victim may stop breathing, jaw muscles contract, which may lead to biting of the tongue or lips. Loss of bowel or bladder control, with involuntary urination or defecation.

Treatment:

1. **DO NOT** try to stop or try to restrain victim.
2. Protect victim from injury; remove furniture or objects from the vicinity.
3. Loosen any restrictive clothing.
4. When the seizure is over, be alert for breathing difficulties or lack of pulse. Start rescue breathing techniques (CPR) if necessary.
5. Check for medical identification.
6. If convulsions recur or cause is unknown, get professional medical help immediately or take victim to an emergency room.

DISLOCATIONS:

Symptoms:

Pain, swelling, loss of motion, temporary paralysis of involved joint.

Treatment:

1. Treat as a fracture. **DO NOT** try to slip bone back into place.
2. Apply an ice pack to the affected area.
3. **DO NOT** move the victim with a hip dislocation until a splint is properly applied.
4. Get professional medical help immediately

DROWNING:

Ice Rescue:

1. **DO NOT** step onto the ice. Rescue the victim with a limb from a tree or an object such as a pole, ladder, rope or clothing. If necessary, form a human chain to reach the victim by having each person lie spread eagled on the ice, holding the ankles of each other.

2. Slide victim across the ice to safety. **DO NOT** carry.
3. Warm the victim as quickly as possible by wrapping in a blanket and after removing the wet clothing.
4. Start rescue breathing techniques (CPR) if necessary.
5. Treat for shock if necessary.
6. If victim is conscious, give warm drinks.
7. Follow frostbite treatment.
8. Consult professional medical help.

Water Rescue:

1. Attempt to reach victim from land with your hand, leg. Clothing, pole rope, life preserver or anything that floats. Always hold onto something secure with your other hand.
2. If victim is out of reach, wade or swim to the last spot victim was seen. If possible, bring an object for the victim to hold onto. If the victim is struggling, do not allow the victim to grab you.
3. If necessary, begin rescue-breathing techniques (CPR) while in the water. Lower the victim's head briefly, turn to side to allow fluid to drain. Clear the airway; start mouth-to-mouth or mouth to nose rescue breathing immediately.
4. Transport to the hospital as soon as possible.

ELECTRICAL SHOCK:

Symptoms:

Small discolored areas at the current's entry and exit points; breathing difficulties, and shock symptoms.

Caution: Underlying tissue damage may be extensive. **DO NOT** touch the victim if still in contact with live current. If current can not be turned off, stand on something dry (blanket, board or mat); push victim away from current contact with a dry, nonmetallic pole, broomstick or board or pull victim away from the contact by looping a dry pole around victim's leg or arm.

Treatment:

1. **Turn off the electrical power if possible.**
2. As soon as the victim is separated from the electrical source, check breathing and pulse. If breathing difficulties develop or are present, start rescue breathing techniques (CPR) immediately.
3. Treat for shock.
4. Treat electrical burns.
5. Get professional medical help immediately.
6. Victim may be nervous or hysterical for 24 hours. Consult a physician.

HEAD INJURIES:

Symptoms:

Brief periods of unconsciousness or semiconsciousness where the victim lacks full awareness of the surroundings.

Treatment:

1. Consult professional medical help immediately.

Scalp injury, injury to the skin covering of the head:

Treatment:

1. **DO NOT** clean a deep wound.
2. Control bleeding by raising the victim's head and shoulders, but do not bend the neck.
3. Apply a sterile pad or clean cloth over the wound and continue to apply pressure. (Excessive pressure should not be applied).
4. Seek professional medical assistance immediately.

HEART ATTACK:

Symptoms:

Extreme shortness of breath; crushing or burning pain in the center of the chest that may radiate into the arms, neck or upper abdomen; sweating; unconsciousness.

Treatment:

1. Get professional medical help immediately.
2. Allow the victim to remain in a comfortable position. Keep the victim warm; loosen tight clothing.
3. If breathing difficulties develop, start rescue breathing techniques (CPR) immediately.

HEAT EXHAUSTION:**Symptoms:**

Fatigue; irritability; headache; faintness; weak, rapid pulse; shallow breathing; cold, clammy skin; profuse perspiration.

Treatment:

1. Instruct the victim to lie down in a cool, shaded area or air-conditioned room. Elevate the victim's feet.
2. Massage legs toward the heart.
3. Give cold salt water (1/2 teaspoon salt to 1/2 glass of water) or cool, sweetened drinks, every 15 minutes until victim recovers.
4. **DO NOT** let victim sit up, even after feeling recovered. Victim should rest for a while longer.

POISONING:**Symptoms:**

Vary greatly. Ask the victim or observer for information; look for the presence of a container known to have contained a poisonous substance. Other symptoms may include burns around the lips or mouth; sudden onset of pain or illness; a chemical breath or odor; unusually contracted or dilated pupils.

Treatment:

1. If poisoning is suspected, encourage the victim to drink water or milk immediately to dilute the poison. If the victim is unconscious, having convulsions or becomes nauseated or vomits, do not force fluids. At the same time call Poison Control Center or professional medical help. Describe the substance and the victim's condition. Ask for additional instructions.
2. **DO NOT** give any other first aid if the victim is unconscious or is having convulsions. Get professional medical assistance. Start rescue breathing techniques (CPR) if necessary. Loosen tight clothing.
3. If the victim is convulsing, protect from further injury.
4. If the victim is conscious, administer antidote recommended by the Poison Control Center as soon as possible. Instructions for treatment on product labels may be wrong.

IF PROFESSIONAL HELP CANNOT BE REACHED IMMEDIATELY:

1. Do not induce vomiting if poison is unknown.
2. Induce vomiting if poison is known. To induce vomiting: Give adult one ounce of syrup of Ipecac (or 1/2 oz. for a child). If vomiting does not occur, repeat procedure in 20 minutes. After victim has vomited, follow with one ounce of powdered, activated charcoal in water, if available.
3. Take poison container (or vomitus if poison is unknown) with victim to the hospital.

Poisonous Gases including Carbon Monoxide:**Symptoms:**

May include lips and skin that are bright cherry red.

Caution:

Victim may lose consciousness with no symptoms other than slight dizziness, weakness and headache.

Treatment:

1. Move the victim to fresh air if possible; loosen tight clothing.
2. Maintain an open airway; begin rescue-breathing techniques (CPR) if necessary.
3. Call for professional medical help.

FOOD POISONING:**Staphylococcal:**

A common type of food poisoning due to bacterial contamination of foods, especially meats, dairy products, cream or crusted baked goods not freshly made, properly covered or kept under refrigeration.

Symptoms:

Occur within a few hours after ingestion and may include: pain or tenderness of the abdomen, nausea, vomiting, painful spasms, diarrhea, and weakness.

Mushroom: Food poisoning caused by the ingestion of poisonous mushrooms.

Symptoms:

Dimmed vision; drunken/intoxicated behavior.

Treatment:

1. Induce vomiting.
2. Keep victim warm.
3. Get professional medical help as soon as possible.

Botulism: The most serious and possibly fatal type of food poisoning caused by contamination of improperly canned foods.

Symptoms:

Occur about 2 days after ingestion and may include: dimness of vision; double vision; drooping eyelids; difficulty in talking, swallowing and breathing.

Treatment:

1. As soon as symptoms are recognized, call for professional medical help or the Poison Control Center immediately for further instructions.

Salmonella: Bacterial contamination of cooked and uncooked foods, usually due to poor sanitary conditions (especially poultry and meats).

Symptoms:

Occur after 8 or more hours and may include: nausea, chills, fever, abdominal cramps, severe diarrhea and localized infections.

Treatment:

1. Consult professional medical assistance immediately.

SHOCK:**Symptoms:**

Unusual weakness or faintness; cold, pale, clammy skin; rapid and weak pulse; shallow, irregular breathing; chills; nausea; unconsciousness.

Treatment:

1. Treat known cause of shock as quickly as possible, e.g., (breathing difficulties, bleeding, severe pain).
2. Maintain an open airway. If victim vomits, gently turn head to side.
3. Keep victim warm and lying flat. In cases of head and chest injuries, elevate head and shoulders ten inches higher than the feet if possible.
4. Get professional medical help immediately.
5. **DO NOT** give anything by mouth.

UNCONSCIOUSNESS:**Treatment:**

1. Call for professional medical assistance.

2. **DO NOT** move the victim or give anything by mouth.
3. Keep victim warm; loosen any tight clothing.
4. Maintain an open airway. If breathing difficulties develop; begin rescue breathing techniques (CPR) immediately.
5. Check for an emergency medical identification tag to help determine the cause of unconsciousness.

STROKE:

Symptoms:

Headache, dizziness, confusion, breathing difficulties, inability to speak, loss of bowel and bladder control, unconsciousness, paralysis, red face.

Treatment:

1. **DO NOT PANIC.** Call for professional medical help immediately.
2. Maintain an open airway. Begin rescue breathing (CPR) efforts if necessary.
3. Keep victim comfortable; place the victim in a half-sitting position if possible.
4. Loosen clothing; apply cool compresses to the forehead and face.
5. If the victim vomits, turn the victim's head gently to the side.
6. If the victim convulses, prevent further injury.

JUDICIAL AND JUROR THREATS

A. JUDICIAL THREATS

By the very nature of their occupation, judges are frequent recipients of threats. These are often directed against his person or family members. As a rule, the concern of the individual judges in these matters tends to decline with repetition of the threat process during their judicial tenure. However, a received threat to the judge may possibly be viewed more seriously. Should a situation of this nature occur, protective security directed toward the judge will probably be based upon his request and his/her desires. He/she should be apprised of the availability of these services and the extent to which they can be applied.

A threat shall be any declaration, whether explicit or implied, of an intention to assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any member of the judiciary, including their staffs and families. A threat may be written, oral, telephonic, or relayed through third parties.

The VIP/Witness Protection Team is authorized to provide for personal protection of judges, court officers, witnesses, and other threatened persons in the interests of justice where criminal intimidation impedes on the functioning of the judicial process or any other official proceeding.

VIP/Witness Protect Team details are a means of providing temporary protection. The need for and extent of their services will be based on the following:

1. The likelihood that an individual's life will be endangered because of that individual's participation in a judicial proceeding.
2. An individual's willingness to forfeit a degree of personal freedom in order for the protection to be effective.
3. When determining the extent of protective services necessary to provide effective protection, consideration will be given to the minimum manpower necessary to provide effective protection. If the degree of danger increases, or if the original threat is exceptionally severe, additional VIP/Witness Protection Team personnel will be provided.
4. Vehicle security may be necessary to provide security for the trial judge during travel periods to and from the facility, and certainly for his vehicle while parked. A car guard easily accomplishes the latter while the vehicle is parked. This will prevent possible incidents ranging in scope from simple intimidative acts of malicious mischief to planted explosives. Security during travel may be established by the assignment of a deputy as the judge's driver, a chase car procedure or a combination of both.
5. Residential security can be extended to the judge's residence and housed residents if deemed necessary. This operation can be conducted in various manner, as dictated by the situation and circumstances, and should be the responsibility of the VIP/Witness Protection Team who are trained and experienced in activity of this type.

A protectee may, at his or her determination, decide to withdraw from protective service. Should this occur, proper documentation recording the time, date and reason for declination of protective services will be made at the time of termination of the detail.

B. JUROR THREATS

Security problems related to jurors in a major trial should be anticipated. These may be classed into areas of (1) court facility, (2) individual residences, and (3) sequestration.

1. Court Facility

Hazards to jury members in this area will probably be limited to acts of intimidation and/or treats. This can be eliminated for the most part by proper escort and surveillance techniques. Efforts should be made to obtain a specified parking area for the jury panel and a car guard given responsibility for the parked vehicles. The jury should then be escorted into the

court building, preferably by a route not frequented by the general public. This escort should remain in effect while the jurors are in the building and the process reversed at the conclusion of the court working day.

2. Individual Residences

Security problems which may be encountered at the residences of the individual jurors could conceivably range from threats to intimidation, to actual acts of violence against persons or property. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the incident and jurisdictional location, preventative action may range from local police patrol checks to a protective security operation. Criminal activity in this area would probably result in immediate sequestration of the entire panel once brought to the attention of the judge.

3. Sequestration

It may be anticipated that a trial activity of this nature will eventually result in sequestration of the jury panel. Care of the jury members and regulation of their conduct while in sequestration will be the responsibility of the Bailiff personnel assigned the duty. This responsibility will be limited to the routine functions involved and not be extended into areas pertaining to security matters. Past difficulties indicate a need for a clear delineation of responsibility.

Jury sequestration will necessitate the assignment of security personnel to ensure the personal safety of the individual members, maintain integrity, and provide a barrier against outside interference, whether intention or accidental.

The person in charge of the location selected must be contacted prior to sequestration and apprised of desired security restrictions to be imposed upon the jury during in-house period. Also at this time, a security survey will be conducted of the location indicating possible security hazards. It will also contain diagrams/floor plans of concerned areas, and all information pertinent to the location and its operation.

BRIEFING THE PRINCIPAL

The person (s) responsible for conducting the briefing should be fully aware of any preconditions set on the impending operation by the Executive Command Staff. In other words, the person conducting the briefing should know precisely what security arrangements have, or will be approved by the Executive Command prior to meeting with the principal. Additionally, it should be clear as to any limitations or authority the person conducting the briefing has regarding unexpected requests made by the Protectee. Should there be any uncertainty regarding requests from the Protectee, politely inform the Protectee that the Executive Command Staff must be contacted before any additional security arrangements are agreed to, or if appropriate, politely inform the Protectee that his/her specific request would have to be made to the respective Commander

It is important to recognize that the principal may be extremely concerned regarding any threat received, and this may impact on his/her interaction with Agency personnel both during the briefing and subsequent protective detail. Anxiety may be displayed in forms of anger, fear, impatience, or general short tempers with the Deputy's and/or personal staff. Personnel should always use tact and diplomacy when dealing with the Protectee, and recognize and anticipate the above behavioral factors.

Protectee's typically will express concern for the welfare of their spouse and/or children and ask Agency personnel for information regarding briefing family members in an effort to reduce apprehension or alleviate fear.

When establishing a plan for briefing the principal's family, one method commonly used is that of a "broad brush" approach, for example, the children are told only that several VIP's have received threats, and that the "Sheriff's Office wants to be on the safe side". This will minimize the specificity of the threat against a singular person, thus reducing a child's anxiety. Deputies can anticipate family members, including spouses to discreetly ask for specific information regarding the threat or subsequent investigation. All such requests for information

should be politely declined and referred to the OIC of the detail to ensure that the most timely and accurate information is forwarded. Personnel should recognize that the Principal may have given the family limited information regarding the threat to minimize fear or anxiety, and providing family members with specific information may enlighten family members to aspects of the investigation the Principal, whatever the reason, wished to conceal.

During the briefing, establish a simple code word to be utilized by the Principal in the event he/she wishes to remove himself from a situation for any reason. This could be simply by asking the Deputy for the time of day. Deputies may then respond with a reminder that the Protectee is “late for another appointment”, or “has a plane to catch”, etc., thus providing the Protectee with an understandable excuse for departing without offending anyone.

Guidelines :

1. Be Prepared. Obtain copies of all relevant reports, e.g., summary of the investigation, threat assessment, and copies of all reports that were initiated. Be prepared to answer the following questions from the Principal :
 - a. How serious do you think the threat is?
 - b. What kind of protection do you normally provide?
 - c. How often does this type of thing happen?
 - d. What should I tell my family?
 - e. What should I tell my children?
 - f. What can I tell my family/children so as not to unnecessarily alarm them?
 - g. What is the latest information on the investigation?
 - h. Is anyone trying to locate the source of the threat?
 - i. Do you think this person is really dangerous?
2. Whenever possible make all initial security arrangements directly with the Principal.
3. Advise the Principal that the threat assessment is based solely on the available evidence, and that your primary concern is for his/her safety. In threat situations, explain that every effort including coordination with other agencies is being made to locate the source of the threat.
4. Stress the function of detail personnel is security and not a convenience to the Principal.
5. Explain what the Principal is to expect from the Sheriff's office personnel in an emergency situation, to include clutching the clothing or body of the Protectee, and covering the Principal's body in an assault situation.
6. Explain the importance of notifying the Deputy- in- Charge of the detail immediately of any changes in the itinerary.
7. Make arrangements to access the Principal's residence to conduct a security survey and diagram the interior.
8. Notify the Principal each time security is to be removed.
9. If security is to be at the residence, obtain the exact address, description and directions to the residence.
10. Ask about any unusual incidents or occurrences.
11. Objectively consider the Principal's concerns and requests.
12. Brief the Principal on availability of special equipment i.e., body armor, communications, alarms, etc.
13. Brief the Principal on the availability of countermeasures and E.O.D. sweep capabilities.
14. Stress to the Principal that all personal information will be held strictly confidential.
15. Determine if the Principal's spouse or family members are involved in any activity that may impact on security. Do any family members have a high profile with the general public?

Information to Obtain :

1. Whenever possible, have the Protectee complete the Protectee Personal Data Report (**See Attachment**). **This information is confidential**. If the completion of the report is not feasible, at a minimum, obtain the following information as soon as possible:

2. Ask about the Principal's general health, any medications to be taken, allergies, etc. Obtain a complete listing of all medications including dosage.
3. Obtain a copy of the Principal's itinerary, and determine what is public knowledge.
4. Obtain family itinerary.
5. Obtain all necessary personal information on family members.
 - a. Name;
 - b. Age;
 - c. Physical description;
 - d. General health, medications, etc.;
 - e. Itinerary.
6. Obtain descriptions of all vehicles.
 - a. Make;
 - b. Model;
 - c. Year;
 - d. Color;
 - e. Tag number;
 - f. Location where vehicle is to be parked.
7. Obtain a listing of any anticipated guests at the Principal's residence, to include:
 - a. Names;
 - b. Physical description;
 - c. Time of arrival;
 - d. Estimated duration of visit;
 - e. Vehicle information;
 - f. Location where vehicles are to be parked.

OFFICE OF SHERIFF
 VIP/WITNESS PROTECTION
 PROTECTEE PERSONAL DATA REPORT
 (For Official Use Only)

PROTECTEE NAME: Race Sex: DOB: Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

RESIDENCE ADDRESS: Telephone:

DIRECTIONS TO RESIDENCE:

Work Location: Phone: Secretary's Name: Pager: Cellular:

SPOUSE NAME: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

DEPENDENT#1 NAME: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

School/University: Address: Telephone:

DEPENDENT#2 NAME: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

School/University: Address: Telephone:

DEPENDENT#3 NAME: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

School/University: Address: Telephone:

DEPENDENT#4 NAME: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

School/University: Address: Telephone:

OTHER: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

OTHER: Race Sex: DOB Hgt: Wgt: Eyes: Hair:

Medications/Relevant Medical History: Blood Type:

RESIDENCE DESCRIPTION:

Style: Levels: Color: Basement: Pool: Gas: Electric:

Alarm System: Yes No Describe:

Pet(s): Yes No Type: Name:

Sprinkler System: Yes No Timer: Yes No

Vehicle #1 Year: Make: Model: Color: Tag/State/Year:

Vehicle #2 Year: Make: Model: Color: Tag/State/Year:

Vehicle #3 Year: Make: Model: Color: Tag/State/Year:

Vehicle #4 Year: Make: Model: Color: Tag/State/Year:

Anticipated Deliveries to Residence:

Newspaper: Yes No Time: Description of Deliverer:

U.S. Mail: Yes No Time: Description of Deliverer:

Other: Yes No Time: Description of Deliverer:

Anticipated Guests:

Name:

1.

Name:

2.

Name:

3.

Vehicle Description:

Vehicle Description:

Vehicle Description:

Notes/Additional Information:

Prepared by:

WORKING THE PRINCIPAL

The process of establishing a safe environment for the principal begins with the principal briefing (for details, see briefing the principal). The principal should be aware of the anticipated response to a threatening situation by security personnel. Explain the holds utilized, e.g., (grasping the waistband, bending the principal at the waist to enter a vehicle head first, etc.). The principal should be aware of the importance of following instructions given by security personnel without hesitation during any emergency situation.

The use of code words established beforehand can be useful in alerting the principal to a potential dangerous situation without alarming the general public or the press. Code words spoken by the principal may also alert security personnel to a problem they (security personnel) may not be aware of. These can also be beneficial in allowing the principal to exit an area or situation he/she may wish to leave, but are reluctant to do so for political or other reasons.

The basic theory of physical security protection is the creation of three perimeters of defense (outer, middle, inner), and a 360 degree coverage of the protectee. The outer perimeter consists primarily of specialty assignments such as protective intelligence teams, traffic and pedestrian posts, etc. The middle perimeter consists of manned security posts, and the function of the inner perimeter is the actual physical protection of the principal.

Whenever possible, create a 360 degree coverage of the principal. For example, a principal giving a speech on a public street may necessitate the following procedures: the inspection of storm drains, man hole covers beneath the event site, inspection of the platform, etc. Additionally, all vehicles in the immediate area should be technically swept along with mail boxes, traffic control boxes, and any other items incapable of being visually screened. In addition to established measures for the inner perimeter, attention should be paid to surrounding buildings, roof tops, and all areas with a direct line of sight to the principal. Pay special attention to arrival and departure security arrangements as historically it has been at this time that the principal has proven most vulnerable. Make sure the principal has a clear, unimpeded path to the vehicle, even during arrivals, as the vehicle can provide some protection during an assault and

should always be immediately available for use during an evacuation. When in doubt of procedures to take, always attempt to provide the safest environment possible commensurate with the perceived threat.

While there is no way of knowing the number of assaults deterred by protective security measures, it is reasonable to assume that assailants will take a path of least resistance. For example, if an assailant not ideologically centered on a specific figure wished to make a political statement by assaulting a public figure, and Principal A has extensive physical protection whereas Principal B has none, it can be deduced that the most advantageous target for the assailant would be Principal B.

Another important aspect of the advance is protective intelligence. Name checks, police and staff interviews often provide valuable information regarding potential assailants. It is important that the arrival site be secured prior to the arrival of the principal. Pre-posting of security personnel is paramount for placement of the press, general public, demonstrators, etc., in areas that are advantageous to any security plan. Whenever possible, attempt to place the public in a way that allows for optimum viewing of their hands. Personnel assigned to pre-post the site should utilize this time to surveil all persons arriving for suspicious activity. This could include earlier than normal arrivals, those dressing inappropriately, e.g., long, heavy coat in warm weather, etc., or those asking an excessive amount of questions regarding the principal or specifics of the event, or other suspicious activity.

There is probably no situation that poses more concern to security personnel than an unplanned movement into an unscreened crowd. This situation poses various obvious problems, especially evacuating the principal during an emergency situation. In extremely crowded situations, there are several tactics that can be utilized to address bulges in clothing, such as “inadvertently” brushing against the person, quick, unnoticeable squeezes of pockets, etc. Ask politely but firmly, those persons in close proximity to the principal to keep their hands out of their pockets. Keep your eyes on the hands of the public. Remember danger to the principal can come from sources not in the immediate vicinity of the principal. Be alert for thrown objects. Your hands or a notebook can be utilized to deflect thrown objects and an umbrella or coat if available, can be used to cover and provide some protection to the principal.

Impromptu movements by the principal pose an obvious concern because of the lack of personnel pre-posting the event site. It is important to note however, that if the principal and accompanying security personnel did not know they were going to attend a specific event, any potential assailant would not know either.

1. OVERALL MISSION WHILE WORKING THE PRINCIPAL:

The following is a prioritized goal system regarding working the principal:

- a. Prevention of assassination or intentional injury.
- b. Prevention of unintentional injury.
- c. Prevention of kidnapping.
- d. Prevention of embarrassment.
- e. Keeping the principal on schedule.

2. INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE INNER PERIMETER:

- a. Team Concept. It is essential that the protective team work as a unit. All personnel should make every effort to assist other members of the team in accomplishing the goals and objectives of the protective assignment.
- b. Training of Personnel. All personnel should receive training in conducting advances, cover and evacuation techniques, and holds that involve clutching the clothing of the principal.
- c. What officers should know about the principal. What are the preferences of the principal? Does he/she prefer to walk stairs or use elevators etc.? Does the principal suffer from any ailments that may interfere with or make an evacuation difficult? Is the principal under the care of a physician or taking any prescribed medications?

d. Principal's personal recognition of security personnel. Does the principal possess personal recognition of the protective team? This is very important in the event of an emergency evacuation or threatening situation.

e. Who belongs in the inner perimeter? Does the protective team personally recognize staff personnel or acquaintances of the principal?

f. Team work. Make every effort to ensure that success of each other's protective assignment. This is especially important during operations involving a limited number of security personnel completing various assignments. Personnel should "fill the gap" in those situations in which an officer has to break from the formation to deal with a problem.

3. FOUR PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS DURING A THREATENING SITUATION:

a. Sound off. During any threatening situation (real or perceived), ensure all security personnel are aware by shouting, i.e., gun, knife, etc. Do not take for granted that other members of the protective team have observed the threat.

b. Cover. Cover the principal and immediately prepare for step c below. This may include using the body or any available protective cover. It is important to recognize the difference between cover and concealment. Keep the principal on his/her feet if at all possible.

c. Evacuate. Evaluate all available information and determine the direction of evacuation. The location of the perceived threat, protection sources, and other factors will determine the direction of evacuation.

d. Arms-reach. Do not attempt to neutralize the source of the threat unless the source is within "arms-reach." "Arms-reach" is a figurative term that does not limit personnel from responding to a threatening source literally within their arm's reach, but rather should only act as guide for response. Ask yourself: Am I more useful in covering and evacuating the protectee, or can I effectively neutralize the source of the danger? This is also especially important during small detail situations. How much additional law enforcement support is available? What is their anticipated response? If there is no law enforcement support available, immediate action will have to be taken to neutralize the danger source.

4. THE FIVE BASIC CLOSE PROXIMITY FORMATIONS

a. Diamond formation.

b. Box formation.

c. Wedge formation.

d. Defensive circle.

e. Fence line formation.

The following are some recommendations regarding positioning of security personnel for various circumstances. Officers should be reminded to establish those posts deemed most appropriate for each unique situation.

PROTECTIVE COURTESIES

The following is a list of desired characteristics of Dignitary Protection Division personnel while manning posts in close proximity to a protectee:

1. All personnel should advise their supervisor immediately of any circumstances that may tend to effect security.

2. Personnel should not eat, drink, chew gum, or smoke in the presence of protectees, staff, or the general public unless authorized by the official in charge of the detail.

3. When it becomes obvious that protectee is having a private conversation; personnel should provide this privacy without jeopardizing security.

4. All conversations with, or comments by, the protectee should be considered confidential in nature. Personnel should refrain from discussing anything they have heard the protectee say, anything they might have seen or overheard regarding the protectee, staff members, family, or friends. This may later be the subject of an article or news story that may be

incorrectly quoted, or misunderstood.

5. Unless requested otherwise, the protectee should always be addressed formally.

Personnel should refrain from addressing the protectee by their first name. When speaking with the protectee about a staff member, personnel should use both the first and last name of the staff member and know their title and responsibilities.

6. Personnel should refrain from making any special contracts with, or requests from, the protectee, their family, members of the press and/or staff.

7. All personnel should be considerate of others on the detail in passing on all information relative to the protective assignment. Ensuring the proper information is relayed in a timely manner may assist the protectee in performing his/her duties without embarrassment.

8. There should be no congregating in front of the protectee's office or suite, and certainly no loud talking, yellowing, or loud radio communications. Congregations should be kept to a minimum.

9. It is essential that the area immediately surrounding the protectee's office or suit be kept quiet, neat, and clean at all times.

10. Personnel posed at checkpoints should be observant of what rooms persons in the protectee's party are entering, so this information is available if requested by the command center.

11. Personnel should direct all information requests regarding security measures or threat assessments made by the protectee, his staff, family, etc., to the official in charge of the protective detail.

12. Personnel should refrain from speculating what actions may, or may not be taken regarding any threats received by the protectee, and direct any requests for information to the official in charge of the detail.

13. Personnel (including all shifts) should always dress in a contemporary, conservative manner, unless directed otherwise by the official in charge of the detail.

14. The designated security pin should be the only lapel pin displayed and should be worn on the left lapel of the outermost garment.

15. Personnel should extend proper speaking courtesies (e.g., yes sir, no sir, etc.) when conversing with protectees, VIPs, family, staff, and the general public.

16. Personnel manning a post are responsible for the appearance of their posts. If your post needs cleaning arrange to have the areas cleaned, or clean the area yourself.

17. All vehicles utilized by the protectee and personnel should be kept clean and free of litter at all times.

18. Personnel should use radios at all times and attempt to keep them out of sight.

19. Personnel manning a security post or checkpoint should be cordial, professional, courteous but firm. Personnel should develop pleasant mannerisms and establish a friendly but firm contact with the public.

20. Personnel should at all times, make every attempt to enhance the teamwork with the rest of the detail and other security support personnel, and promote a positive image of the team and the Department.

21. Personnel should remember that they are guests in the support agency's jurisdiction. Any requests for assistance or information should be made in a professional manner. Don't demand, **ask**.

22. Personnel should remain attentive and alert on posts at all times.

23. Personnel should stand erect when on post unless directed otherwise by the official in charge of the detail.

24. Personnel should be cautious of providing specific security information to staff, general public, and law enforcement support agencies. Personnel should politely refer requests for information such as manpower, cost, etc., to the official in charge of the detail.

25. All press inquiries should be referred to the Public Information Officer.

26. Keep good records of all persons who have been particularly helpful, and send

letters of appreciation. This is helpful for the next visit and identifies you as a courteous professional.

27. Above all, personnel are expected to use good judgment and be guided by common sense at all times.

ORGANIZATION OF A PROTECTIVE DETAIL

It is very easy to have an unorganized security detail of individuals running around, duplicating efforts, with no sense of structure, supervision or management. Unfortunately, when this occurs, mistakes are made and a potential attack can slip through the cracks. We will define the purposes of protective security and identify the duties of deputy sheriff as well as available support units. Once you have become familiar with each duty and responsibility in the overall organization of a detail, the following will expand your newly, gained knowledge of protectee protection and will enable you to perform a successful formation and motorcade.

OBJECTIVE 1: PURPOSE OF A PROTECTIVE DETAIL

A. Primary – **Safeguard the protectee from harm** and from situations likely to endanger his or her person or liberty (i.e., murder, manslaughter, willful threats to kill, extortion, kidnapping and/or assault).

B. Secondary – **Protection from harassment/embarrassment.** Most likely this will involve prevent of undue heckling, soiling of clothes, or bodily injury. At no time, must the level of protection diminish.

Many times the protectee will find himself in a difficult situation. If the protectee wishes to be shielded from public view, the detail must honor his wishes.

OBJECTIVE II: DUTIES OF PROTECTIVE DEPUTY SHERIFF

The deputy sheriff's responsibilities become more specific with a large detail. On small details, a deputy sheriff performs the tasks of numerous protective positions on a regular basis.

A. **Deputy Sheriff in Charge ("DSIC")** – has to be expert in protective security.

1. DSIC plans, administers and supervises the protective detail.
2. Maintains liaison with the protectee's staff to ensure the timely exchange of information regarding schedule, threat, unscheduled moves, etc.
3. Assigns Deputy Sheriff to specific shifts and supervisory positions (i.e., close-in body cover), prior to the onset of detail.
4. Relations with the protectee (i) establishes a rapport with the protectee (explained role of security); (ii) maintains formal demeanor, adaptable to the protectee's style; and (iii) provides close-in body cover.
5. Relations with detail (i) uses discretion in assignments – considers grade, experience, attitude, knowledge, and demeanor; (ii) displays no favoritism; (iii) accepts responsibility for the conduct of the deputy sheriff assigned and the conduct of the detail in general; and (iv) delegates if appropriate.
6. Ultimately responsible for all equipment (i) radio/communications equipment; (ii) vehicles; (iii) shoulder weapons and ammunition; (iv) special protective equipment; (v) medical equipment; and (vi) support equipment (flashlights, parkas, rain gear, maps, pry bar, automatic equipment, etc.).
7. Rides right in front of vehicle with protectee.

B. **Shift Leader ("SL")**

1. First line supervisor of the detail. Normally, there is one shift leader who is experienced in all facets of protective security.
2. Tactical Commander of Detail. Provides Deputy Sheriff with all tactical instructions and guidance. Maintains the primary radio link with command post and working deputy sheriffs. Rides right front in follow vehicle. Posts deputy sheriff at a site based on advance deputy sheriff

recommendations. Makes corrections in protective tactics as needed. Supervises all detail agents. Updates DSIC regarding SL actions and tactical situation.

3. Administrative duties – reports to DSIC; regulations assignments of deputy sheriff; supervises maintenance of command post log; prepare daily schedules (push schedule) and handles disciplinary problems within his or her shift.

C. Deputy Sheriff in the Follow Car (Left Rear, Right Rear). Visual coverage of deputy sheriffs' area of responsibility.

1. Remember the rear area as well as looking ahead (glancing).

2. Assign various shoulder weapons for use in each area of responsibility.

Be aware of appropriate fields of fire. Use proper carry position for weapon. Keep weapons below window line and out of sight unless needed. Ensure all weapons are accounted for and operational before getting into the follow vehicle. Do not bluff with the weapon. If you bolt back, you should intend to fire. **FIRING IS THE LAST RESORT TO PROTECT YOU OR THE PROTECTEE.**

3. Advise/update the driver of the follow car on traffic conditions around the vehicle and within area of responsibility. When safe to make lane changes and turns use terms CLEAR and STANDBY. Form protective formation around vehicle when stopped. Form protective diamond around protectee on all movements outside of vehicle. Stand at the security perimeter posts of a site as assigned. Report to SL.

D. Driver (“DR”)

1. Prepares to move at a moment's notice. Ensures safe and comfortable transport. Knows the vehicle.

2. Reacts to any security threat on instructions from the DSIC or the SL.

3. Knows all primary and secondary routes and all REACT routes such as hospitals and safehavens. Has driven all the routes and is aware that landmarks look different at night.

4. Ensures the vehicle is clean inside and out, checks the vehicle's mechanical condition, i.e., its oil, tires, power steering fluid, belts, radiator fluid, wipers, brake lights, flashers, headlights and horn.

5. Accounts for all emergency equipment and verifies it is functioning.

Ensures all weapons are accounted for, loaded and in the proper carry position. Tests all doors and automatic locks. Asks if unfamiliar with an item or its use.

6. Ensures vehicle log is present and filled out, notes any problems with vehicle.

7. Sets vehicle up 30 minutes prior to scheduled departure. Starts the vehicle's engine 15 minutes prior to scheduled departure.

8. Knows the motorcade route (even if there is a lead vehicle) so that the motorcade may continue if the lead car is lost. There must be NO surprises. The driver cannot react to danger if he or she does not know what is right and wrong.

9. Safeguard car keys. When the vehicle is not in use, it should be locked and its keys kept inside the command post. A spare set should be kept in the follow car.

F. Follow Car Driver (“FCD”)

1. Same vehicle responsibilities as lead driver.

2. Same driving responsibilities as lead driver.

3. Operates tactical radio during SL's absence from vehicle.

4. Keeps tactical radio "ON" while at a site.

5. Tactical driving responsibilities around lead car.

G. Command Post ("CP")/Residence Watch ("RW")

1. Responsible for the operation of the command post.

2. Monitors tactical radio and telephone communications.

3. If the protective details need assistance in an emergency/non-emergency situation, (i) notifies the appropriate authorities; (ii) continues to monitor the situation via radio; and (iii) ALWAYS monitors detail's radio traffic and ANTICIPATES the assistance detail may require.

4. Maintains the security integrity of the residence when the principal is not present.

H. Advance Deputy Sheriff(s)

1. The advance agent has vast and varied responsibilities with regard to the planning and establishment of security measures at a site to be visited by the protectee.

2. When the advance deputy sheriff is involved in working the detail he/she is assigned the following duties:

(a) Guides the detail into the site via radio and telephone communications;

(b) Updates the motorcade on the situation at the site as it approaches his or her location;

(c) Invites the protectee to follow, once the detail arrives, because he or she is the most knowledgeable about the site. This deputy sheriff leads the formation at all times while at the site.

**OBJECTIVE III: PRE-POSTED DEPUTY SHERIFF,
COUNTERSURVEILLANCE,
PROTECTIVE INTELIGENCE AND
PILOT CAR**

A. Pre-Posted Deputy Sheriff

1. Assigned to critical stationary observation/access points as designated by the advance party.

2. Will remain at post until property relieved.

3. The advance deputy sheriff will determine post instructions. It is the responsibility of pre-post deputy sheriff to make certain they understand these instructions. Either the advance or the shift leader will resolve questions. When in doubt, ask.

4. Will normally not function as part of the moving diamond unless instructed by the supervisor.

5. Usually placed at checkpoint or surveillance posts.

B. Counter-Surveillance Deputy Sheriff

1. They are part of very high threat detail.

2. Two deputy sheriffs who know the geography/culture of a city/location.

3. Placed primarily at choke points and attack sites.

4. They establish surveillance at a choke point 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the detail.

5. Through surveillance they determine if an ambush is set up by (i) inspecting suspicious vehicles, and (ii) investigating suspicious activity.

6. Notify detail, via radio/land line, of suspicious activity occurring before detail arrives.

7. To neutralize suspicious activity: (i) first use local police; (ii) if local police are not available, consider intervention by your own people; and

- (iii) if necessary, make your presence obvious to those present.
- 8. A secondary function is to provide counter-surveillance for motorcades and/or publicized departures. Determine if the detail is being watched. Surveillance must be from discreet distance, yet close enough to see.
- 9. Report to and take commands from the SL.
- 10. Remember to watch above for snipers.

SECURITY POST GUIDELINES

- 1. Dress neatly and conservatively (e.g., wear a dark suit, no bright colored ties, shirts, socks, shoes, personalized belts, etc.).
- 2. Only the designated security pin should be worn and always on the outermost garment.
- 3. Don't eat, smoke, drink coffee, chew gum, etc., on post unless authorized by a supervisor.
- 4. Don't display weapons, handcuffs, communications or other equipment.
- 5. Always stand erect while on post, unless directed otherwise by your supervisor. No leaning, sitting, feet against walls, chairs, etc. Hands should be at the side, folded across the chest, in front, or behind the back. Never place hands in trouser or jacket pockets. Regardless of prior established procedures, always stand when other persons or when anyone approaches your post.
- 6. Don't leave your post unless advised to secure by your supervisor, communications, or the command post. Be cautious of any "medical" emergencies by civilian personnel. Always ensure your post is secured before providing any medical assistance. Whenever possible prearrange with uniformed personnel to provide medical assistance in the event of an emergency. Be alert for possible diversions. Should any emergency necessitate the above, notify communications or the command post immediately.
- 7. Keep the area free of litter at all times. If the area needs cleaning arrange to have it cleaned or clean the area yourself.
- 8. Be able to access and operate all communications equipment. Ensure all radios, telephones, intercoms, etc., are in proper working order. If an operational problem exists or develops, arrange to have the item repaired or replaced.
- 9. Be able to access and operate all weapons.
- 10. Be able to access and operate all emergency equipment.
- 11. Be able to identify all security personnel and/or the authorized identification.
- 12. Be able to recognize staff support personnel and know their responsibilities.
- 13. Know the principal's schedule/location and keep it confidential.
- 14. Know all specific instructions for your post.
- 15. Know the locations of other security personnel.
- 16. Know the radio codes and frequencies to be utilized.
- 17. Know the activities planned adjacent to your post.
- 18. If relieved, fully brief officer on post of coverage and responsibilities.
- 19. Always be courteous but firm with the general public.

QUESTIONS TO ANSWER CONCERNING YOUR POST

- 1. Who is the principal?
- 2. What is the primary nature of this visit?
- 3. What is he/she visiting?
- 4. What time does he/she arrive?
- 5. What is the location of the arrival?
- 6. What time is the departure scheduled?
- 7. Where is the scheduled departure location?
- 8. Where is my post assignment?
- 9. What is the location of the closest law enforcement support personnel?
- 10. What are my responsibilities on this post?

11. Who is my supervisor?
12. What time am I scheduled to be on post?
13. What time am I to be relieved?
14. What form of ID is to be utilized?
15. What transportation is to be utilized?
16. What types of communications are available (e.g., radios, frequencies, telephones, etc.)?
17. Where is the location of the nearest telephone?
18. What are the relief arrangements for water, restroom, food, etc.?
19. Where is the location of the nearest restroom?
20. Where is the holding room in relation to my post?
21. What are the press arrangements?
22. Where is the nearest fire extinguisher?
23. How large (length x width in yards) do I feel is my effective surveillance area whereby I could identify persons, groups, automobiles, etc.?
24. What is the approximate number of persons normally occupying my area of responsibility?
25. What do I consider to be the normal activities of persons I observe from this post?
26. How many methods of access or egress are there from my area of responsibility?
27. How many other buildings can I observe from my area?
28. How many ways are there for me to access my post?
29. How near is the closest security post to mine?
30. Are there any flammable or noxious liquids in my area that could pose a potential fire or health hazard, such as gasoline, fuel oil, chemicals, etc.?
31. Are there any ducts or controls for utilities (e.g., heating, air conditioning, lighting, water supplies, etc.) in my area that if tampered with could disrupt the activities of the principal or be of danger to anyone else?
32. Are there any storage crates, boxes, trunks, suitcases, lockers, etc., in which weapons, explosives, or other destructive devices could be concealed?
33. Is there any furniture in my area where a weapon, destructive device, or a listening device could be concealed?
34. Are there any loose boards, flooring, ceiling tiles, etc., or other evidence of recent repairs where a dangerous device could be concealed?
35. When was the fire extinguisher last inspected?
36. Is the seal intact?
37. What types of fires can it extinguish?
38. What additional responsibilities do I have in the event of an emergency evacuation?
39. Have I visually surveyed those areas with a line of sight to the protectee from the vantage point of my post?

ADVANCE DEPUTY SITE SURVEY AND “QUICK ADVANCES”

One or more advance deputy sheriffs will conduct a physical site survey for each location the protectee will visit prior to his arrival. The advance deputy sheriff will identify areas requiring security upgrades so that the visit of the protectee progresses smoothly and safely. The purpose of a written site survey is to ensure that members of the detail are aware of all security arrangements prior to the actual visit.

I. THE DUTIES OF ADVANCE DEPUTY SHERIFFS

A. Advance deputy sheriff plans security arrangements for:

1. the protectee's residence, whether
 - (a) private, i.e., personal residence; or
 - (b) rented, i.e., hotel room or house.
2. restaurants;
3. convention centers;

4. government buildings;
5. museums;
6. airports;
7. recreational facilities, i.e., golf courses; and
8. all other locations the protectee will visit.

B. Advance deputy sheriff should survey sites *one to two days prior* to scheduled activities.

C. Deputy sheriff assigned as part of the pre-advance team used on details classified as high threat or where there is a need for large scale security measures (i.e., numerous public appearances by the protectee) may begin their work weeks or months in advance.

D. When an advance team of three or more deputy sheriffs is used, one deputy sheriff will be designated as the *Lead Advance*, the other deputy sheriffs on the team will be designated as *Site Advance Deputy Sheriffs*.

1. *Lead Advance Deputy Sheriff*

- (a) Coordinates all activities of the team and is responsible for all sites to be visited.
- (b) Supervises the deputy sheriff on the advance team.
- (c) Liaisons with various police and civic officials regarding the arrangements for the visit.
- (d) Submits a "Trip Plan" or packet of site surveys prior to the arrival of the protectee.
- (e) Rides in the motorcade during the visit as opposed to waiting at the individual sites.
- (f) Sets up the command post.

2. *Site Advance Deputy Sheriff*

- (a) Coordinates all security arrangements particular to an individual site.
- (b) Submits written site survey for the site advanced to the lead advance/DIC.
- (c) Meets the detail curbside on arrival and leads the detail through the site.

E. The site advance deputy sheriff(s) should be at the site *at least one hour prior to the protectee's arrival* and remain until the protectee departs. Circumstances may dictate that an advance deputy sheriff proceed to the next site to be visited by a protectee shortly after the arrival of the detail. *It is essential the advance deputy sheriff briefs members of the detail on site information prior to departing.*

II. ELEMENTS OF AN ADVANCE AND INDIVIDUAL SITE CONSIDERATIONS

At each site, the advance deputy sheriff must balance the level of security against the protectee's desire to conduct his business unimpeded. Given time to conduct a thorough advance, the advance deputy sheriff has questions to answer and details to consider in order to plan for appropriate security arrangements. The advance deputy sheriff's responsibility for a given site begins when the protectee departs his/her previous location enroute to the site. That responsibility does not end until the protectee leaves the site.

A. Preparing to Conduct the Advance.

1. The advance deputy sheriff will be briefed by and work closely with the DIC in the initial planning before the protectee's arrival.
2. The advance deputy sheriff should examine the files for recent surveys on the sites the protectee will visit.

B. The Approach to the Site.

1. Geographical location (address of the site).
2. Primary and secondary routes to and from the site including emergency

departure.

3. Travel time and distances to and from site.
4. Practice run of chosen route if time permits.
5. Coordination with other law enforcement for possible assistance.
 - (a) motorcade escort (marked police car)
 - (b) crowd control
 - (c) traffic control
 - (d) additional manpower for outer and middle perimeters of security
 - (e) protective intelligence
 - (1) employee record checks
 - (2) NCIC checks on vehicles
 - (f) assistance in scouting the motorcade routes
 - (g) expedition of motorcade through toll booths.
6. Scheduled arrival and departure times of the protectee (duration of stay).
7. Location, routes, and telephone numbers of the nearest police and fire stations for use as a safe haven, and the nearest hospital in the event of a medical emergency.
8. Information on interference from other scheduled events (e.g., rush hour traffic, parades, demonstrations).

C. External Considerations at the Site.

1. Primary and secondary routes of access and egress.
2. Location of motorcade arrival and departure area.
3. The staging area for motorcade.
4. Barricade requirements.
5. Restriction of access of the public to the entrances.
6. Removal of parked cars in immediate vicinity.
7. Outside posts for security.
8. Location of "*stash car*".

D. Internal Considerations

When meeting with the officials at a given site (whether security or management) the advance deputy sheriff should remember that regardless of how important the request for assistance may seem to him/her it is essential that he/she never demand anything. A prudent advance deputy sheriff will know when to "give in" for the good of the visit.

1. What will the protectee do once he/she arrives at the site? (What is planned by/planned for the protectee at the site?)
 - (a) Will there be a meet and greet at the curbside?
 - (b) What path will the protectee take from curbside to destination?
 - (c) What is the purpose of the protectee's visit?
 - (d) Where else within the site might the protectee visit?
2. The deputy sheriff should be familiar with floor plans (entrances, exists, elevators, roof access, basement, fire escape).
3. The detail should have keys to all rooms the protectee will use and to any exits the detail might need to use.
4. The advance deputy sheriff should be versed on elevators (capacity, last inspection, operator key).
5. If the protectee's path will bring him/her up or down several stories, the advance should try to procure an elevator(s) exclusively for the detail's use.
6. The advance should be familiar with seating arrangements (protectee, deputy sheriffs).
7. The advance should preview food and drink to be served.
 - (a) Record checks on the food preparers.

- (b) Possibility of food testing.
8. The advance should be familiar with guest list (number, identification, screening procedure and by whom).
 9. An area should be set apart for explosive ordinances disposal (EOD) to inspect deliveries.
 10. Room lists and list of scheduled activities on the floors above and below should be obtained.
 11. A master key should be obtained.
 12. The advance must be familiar with fire fighting equipment/emergency egress (i.e., fire plan).
 13. The advance should know location of all rest rooms.
 14. Location of holding room with telephone should be established in addition to the location of command post and telephone.
 15. The number of deputy sheriffs entering the site should be determined.
 - (a) Will all deputy sheriffs entering the site fit onto the elevator?
 - (b) Once the deputy sheriffs enter, where can they be best posted?
 16. Deputy sheriffs should know location of down room.

E. The Establishment of "CONCENTRIC RIGHTS OF SECURITY"

Security implementations the advance deputy sheriff should consider.

1. Have the times for security posting and the number and location of posts been established?
2. What is the role of local security?
3. Are there times set for EOD and technical sweeps?
4. Are rope stanchions necessary for crowd control?
5. Will an identification system be used?
 - (a) Who will distribute the identification pins?
 - (b) When will they be distributed?
6. What information (i.e., guest list) will be needed by person, staff members or deputy sheriffs manning a checkpoint post?
7. Is there a need for magnetometers or walk-through-detectors?
8. Will there be name checks of regular employees and outside hires?
9. Are there plans for traffic control around building?
10. Will there be coverage of high points around building?
11. Has the detail been informed of ***any adverse intelligence or any credible threat*** and what action to take?

F. Establishing Emergency Reaction Plans

1. Hospitals/Medical React

Identify the location of hospitals in the area. Thoroughly survey each hospital to establish which will be closest and best equipped to handle a particular medical emergency.

- (a) A thorough hospital survey should determine the following:
 - (1) routes, travel times, distances, location of emergency room;
 - (2) choice of hospitals at any site;
 - (3) availability of twenty-four hour emergency facility;
 - (4) emergency ambulance service, medical technician capabilities, and response time in both normal and rush hour;
 - (5) neurosurgical, cardiac, shock/trauma capabilities; and
 - (6) location of emergency entrance.
- (b) The advance deputy sheriff should know emergency room phone number and a contact name.
- (c) A hospital survey check list for each facility should be completed.

- (d) Medical profiles (blood types and unusual medical problems) of protectee and spouse should be submitted to the chief resident physician.
- (e) A request should be made to have blood available for protectee and spouse.
- (f) Current surveys of the hospitals in all major cities should be on file in the local field office. However, the advance agent is responsible for ensuring that the information in the survey is accurate and that he/she is familiar with the location of the hospital.

2. *Reaction for an Attack*

- (a) A safe haven within the site should be chosen.
- (b) The best route to the safe haven from various areas within the site should be established.
- (c) The advance deputy sheriff should decide on the best route to the stash car from various areas within the site.
- (d) The advance should examine possible repositioning of the limousine at the site to make it a viable option as a safe haven.
- (e) Primary and secondary evacuation routes should be established and located on map.
- (f) All types of attacks should be considered and a react plan instituted.

3. *Reaction to Fire Emergency*

- (a) Where is the nearest fire extinguisher? For what types of fire is it intended?
- (b) What is the location of all fire exits and are the exits operable?
- (c) Does the building have a local fire alarm system?
- (d) Where is the nearest fire station and what is its telephone number?

G. *Additional Site Considerations*

1. Have reservations for the protectee (restaurants, airline and theater) been made?
2. Where are the restrooms for the protectee located?
3. Where is the closest telephone which the protectee could use for a private call?
4. Where is the nearest room for the protectee to have a private meeting?
5. How many persons will each elevator hold?
6. Who should be called to have the elevator inspected prior to use?
7. What is the number capacity of the room(s) to be visited?
8. Has the building been recently inspected for fire safety?
9. Has the electrical system been inspected for fire safety?
10. Is there a back-up generator in the event of a power failure?
11. Will an EOD team be available for inspection of public areas?
12. Where is the nearest police station and what is its telephone number?
13. What is the total amount of time to be spent at the site?

III. *ADVANCE PROCEDURES USED FOR PARTICULAR TYPE OF LOCATIONS*

Similar to a hospital, certain sites call for particular security arrangements. Two locations that a protectee will frequently visit are an *airport* and a *hotel*.

A. *Hotel Advance*

A hotel like any other site, requires the careful consideration of all previously mentioned security concerns and security arrangements. In addition there are other considerations an advance deputy sheriff needs to consider.

1. There should be a meeting with the hotel manager and the chief of hotel security to discuss mutual security concerns.

2. A list of hotel employees should be obtained.
3. Where the protectee's suite will be located and if it is in a position where he/she can best be protected.
4. Where the command post will be located.
5. If deputy sheriffs/personnel require rooms:
 - (a) they should be positioned around, above and below the protectee's room; and
 - (b) billing procedures should be established.
6. Which hotel employees will have access to come in close contact with the protectee?
7. What is hotel policy regarding demonstrations?
8. What is the policy of the hotel concerns security?
 - (a) Are the hotel security officers armed?
 - (b) To what degree will they be available to assist the detail?
 - (c) Will hotel security assist in securing the motorcade arrival site?
 - (d) Will hotel security be willing to hold an elevator when the detail arrives and departs?
9. All calls to the protectee's room should be routed through a staff room or the command post.
10. Keys to the protectee's room should be obtained and kept in the command post.
11. An EOD sweep of the room should be made followed by commencement of posting the room.
12. There should be an area/room where packages delivered for the protectee can be EOD swept.

B. Airport Advance

An airport provides a security challenge to a protective security detail. It is a location that terrorists are certain the protectee will have to visit. Additionally, it is quite possible that the protectee could be at the wrong place at the right time. Airports, in the past, have been the sites of numerous terrorist incidents and their value to terrorists should not be underestimated.

An airport, like any other site, requires careful consideration of all previously mentioned security concerns and security arrangements. In addition, to the usual security concerns there will be other considerations:

1. ***The Airport Police*** should be contacted for assistance and coordinating.
2. ***An airport representative should be contacted to:***
 - (a) ensure reservations have been made;
 - (b) confirm flight number and time of flight;
 - (c) make arrangements for jet way access;
 - (d) arrange for a holding room (usually the airline courtesy lounge);
 - (e) ensure the protectee may board the aircraft last and deplane first.
3. ***Coordination with airport security/police should be established to assist in providing security.***
 - (a) Where is motorcade drop off/waiting point?
 - (b) Will airport police provide motorcade escort into and out of airport?
 - (c) Is there possibility for ramp side boarding/departure?
 - (d) Is there provision for a remote area of tarmac for arrival/departure?
 - (e) Provision should be made for EOD sweep of luggage.
 - (f) Preparation should be made for EOD sweep of taxi way and runway.
4. ***FAA representative should be contacted to arrange for***

- (a) possible ramp side boarding/departure,
- (b) freezes on tarmac prior to arrival/departure, and
- (c) expedition through magnetometers.

5. Considerations of the *unique security procedures that are at an airport.*

- (a) The advance deputy sheriff has to be aware of the FAA needed to maintain tight security.
- (b) At most airports the protectee will have to either go through the walk-thru-magnetometer or be searched with a hand held magnetometer.
- (c) Deputy sheriff who will be taking weapons past the magnetometers will have to be pre-registered with the security at the magnetometers by the advance deputy sheriff.
- (d) The advance deputy sheriff should complete the appropriate forms for boarding an aircraft, with a weapon, for any deputy sheriffs that will accompany the protectee on to the aircraft. This should be done well in advance.
- (e) The advance deputy sheriff must remember that the security forces working the magnetometers are contract guards and that arrangements made with their supervisors or with the FAA may not have been passed on to the individual working the magnetometers at the time that the detail arrives.

IV. THE ADVANCE DEPUTY SHERIFF'S RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SECURITY

- A. On some details, an EOD detail may be used to sweep vehicles and the protectee's room/residence. The advance deputy sheriff should not arrange for an EOD sweep unless he has the resources to post the area immediately upon completion of the sweep.
- B. When an EOD teams arrives at the site, the advance deputy sheriff should:
 - 1. meet them and offer assistance;
 - 2. brief the team to include updates and threat assessment;
 - 3. advise them as to arrangements made for the package control room, and
 - 4. not allow the EOD to sweep anything that cannot be posted.
 - 5. If necessary, provide security for EOD at a specific site.

V. DEPUTY SHERIFF CONSIDERATIONS

Needs of the deputy sheriff are the last on the list of priorities yet they must be addressed.

- A. The advance deputy sheriff should arrange for a down room.
- B. There should be arrangements for refreshments and dining facilities.
- C. Information should be provided on the location of restrooms.
- D. Plans should be made for relief of pre-posters.
- E. Advance deputy sheriffs should relieve, when possible, the deputy sheriff at the command post and the protectee's room.
- F. The advance deputy sheriff should meet with the shift leader and discuss elements that should be considered when establishing the push schedule.

VI. RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN ADVANCE DEPUTY SHERIFF

The advance deputy sheriff has specific duties, prior to, and when the protectee arrives on site.

- A. The site deputy sheriff must make a final inspection of the site, inside and out, to ensure that his/her security plan has been implemented approximately ten minutes prior to the detail's arrival.
- B. The site deputy sheriff will be constantly monitoring the radio for information regarding the detail's departure from its previous location.
- C. When the detail advises that they are less than three minutes from the site, he/she should make a last minute check of the site.

1. He/she should ensure the “meet and greet” is aware that the protectee is about to arrive.
2. Doors to the building should be propped open in anticipation of protectee’s arrival.
3. The arrival point should be cleared of taxis and other vehicles.
4. The site agent will tell the detail to abort the arrival ***unless he is sure the site is clear.***
5. Site deputy sheriff will be at the curb for the detail’s arrival.
6. Site deputy sheriff will motion/advise the protectee to follow.
7. The DIC will have briefed the protectee on the role of the advance deputy sheriff.
8. Site deputy sheriff will lead the walking formation.
9. Site deputy sheriff will brief the DIC (deputy-in-charge), SL (shift leader) and deputy sheriffs on the security plan he/she has prepared for the visit.
10. Site deputy sheriff will remain on site until the protectee has departed.

Note: The threat against the detail will determine the comprehensiveness of the advance.

VII. “LAST MINUTE” ADVANCE REQUIREMENTS

As mentioned, an advance deputy sheriff should visit a site prior to a scheduled visit in order to cover all security arrangements, however, unscheduled changes may not give an advance deputy sheriff the time necessary to perform a complete site advance. Therefore, the advance deputy sheriff has to prioritize the numerous arrangements he must make and the many questions he must answer before the detail and the protectee arrive in order to ensure a safe and smooth visit.

A. Elements essential to an advance when time is limited.

1. What time is the protectee scheduled to arrive?
2. Where will the protectee go once he arrives and what route will he/she take through the site?
3. How long will the protectee stay?
4. Will someone be present to greet the protectee? Who will it be?

B. Even with limited time the advance deputy sheriff should:

1. Meet with security on site and enlist their help (i.e., holding elevators).
2. Have the drop-off site cleared for the arrival of the protectee.
3. Arrange for an area to stage the vehicles.
4. Meet with supervisory personnel for liaison purposes.
5. The advance deputy sheriff should locate
 - (a) primary and secondary exits,
 - (b) a holding room,
 - (c) restrooms, and
 - (d) telephone.
6. The advance deputy sheriff should know who will be allowed access to site.
7. An advance deputy sheriff should be familiar with the route from the last site to the site at which he/she is located.
8. The command post should be informed of where the deputy sheriff can be reached.
9. In the time available, the deputy sheriff should find out everything possible about the site.
10. ***The advance deputy sheriff should NEVER ASSUME ANYTHING. The site must be clear before the detail is permitted to arrive.***

VIII. COMPLETING A SITE SURVEY FORMAT

Name and Address of Site:

Time of Event:

Date:

Advance Deputy:

Contacts:

Site Description:

Scenario (what the protectee will do at site):

Press handling/site security considerations:

Deputy Instructions:

React Plans:

Medical:

Fire:

Attack:

CONCLUSION:

The purpose and use of advance deputy sheriff(s) and site surveys is to ensure the safety and security of the protectee and to inform all members of the detail of the security arrangements prior to the actual visit. There is always the possibility of the unexpected occurring, but with adequate planning the unforeseen does not need to lead to disaster.

BASIC ADVANCE SECURITY CHECKLIST

1. ___ Meet with site contact and/or security official and discuss the event. Include such topics as:

___ known threats associated with visit,

___ possibility of press attendance,

___ security hazards inherent with site.

2. ___ Determine routes/chokepoints/traffic patterns to the site.

3. ___ Establish the “meet and greet” scenario and physically walk through the scheduled program with the site contact.

4. ___ Determine arrival and departure points and motorcade staging areas.

5. ___ Locate holding room/safe haven with telephone.

6. ___ Determine location of bathrooms.

7. ___ Location of stash car and emergency evacuation routes from within the site.

8. ___ Establish how, when, and by whom the elevators will be held. Know alternate stairways.

9. ___ Determine physical barrier requirements and establish screening points.

10. ___ Determine deputy sheriff/support personnel posting.

11. ___ Arrange for technical and bomb sweeps to include package and gift inspection.

12. ___ Prepare attack, medical, and fire reaction plans for the site.

13. ___ Establish security arrangements as they pertain to the press.

14. ___ Conduct records check on employees at the site.

VEHICLE SEARCH PROCEDURES FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

INTRODUCTION

Recent history has shown that terrorists have effectively used explosive devices in vehicles to carry out assassinations. To counter this threat, a simple vehicle search can dramatically increase the survivability of an intended target.

I. EXTERNAL VEHICLE SEARCH FOR IEDs

A. When, how often, and to what extent a search is conducted is dependent on the following factors.

1. Intelligence: Who is doing what to whom, and how are they doing it?

2. Threat Level: Are we targeted?

3. Vehicle Security: Was the vehicle unsecured and, if so, who had access to it, and for how long?

B. Externally, search as much of the vehicle as possible before having to *touch* it. When opening doors and hoods, do so *slowly*, looking for wires or devices at all times.

C. There is no correct sequence to follow when externally searching a vehicle. The key is to develop a consistent, comprehensive checklist that is easily remembered.

D. You are looking for signs of tampering, an indication that something is wrong, as well as a device itself. If a device is found *or* you notice indications that something is wrong, **DO NOT TOUCH!** Evacuate the area and notify the property authorities.

E. You want to keep the vehicle as sterile as possible. Leave the interior clean and empty including the trunk. If you leave trash, boxes and bags in the vehicle, it makes it easier for the terrorist to hide a device.

F. The following steps are a recommended guide. You should tailor the checklist to your particular vehicle search and situation.

1. Check the area around and under the car for:

(a) obvious devices or packages;

(b) bits of tape, wire, string, safety pins, or clumps of dirt; and

(c) footprints or other indications of tampering.

2. Look inside the vehicle through its windows for any items that may not belong there. Look under its dash, on the floor, and under seats for partially hidden parcels.

3. Look for signs of forced entry around the doors, hood, windows and trunk. Fingerprints are a good indication of tampering.

4. Look into the exhaust pipe.

5. Check the gas cap for signs of tampering.

6. Check inside the neck of the gas tank for foreign material.

7. Look for fingerprints on the hood, trunk and hubcaps.

8. Look under, around, and on top of all four tires.

9. Look under bumpers, wheel wells, and around the gas tank and engine.

Note: A blocking pin may be installed in an exhaust pipe to prevent placement of a device.

Note: A flashlight and mirror device will facilitate searching under the vehicle. They can be purchased or easily fabricated.

II. ENTERING A VEHICLE AND CONDUCTING AN INTERNAL IED SEARCH

The internal search is conducted in three phases: the engine compartment, trunk or storage compartment, and the driver/passenger compartment.

Note: When opening doors and hoods, do so slowly, looking for wires or devices at all times.

A. The Engine Compartment - Check:

1. Wires or devices attached to the hood.

2. Packages or containers that might contain explosives or incendiaries.

3. Activating devices attached to the engine, fan or linkage.

4. Devices in the air cleaner or equipment mounted to the fire wall.

5. Electrically initiated devices attached to battery operated equipment such as the air conditioner and windshield wipers.

6. Suspicious wires or alligator clips located around the battery.

B. The Trunk or Storage Compartment - Check:

1. Wires or devices attached to the trunk lid.

2. Extra wiring attached to brakes and rear signal lights;

3. Under the floor mats.

4. Under and behind the spare tire.

5. The area behind the rear seat.

C. The Driver/Passenger Compartment - Check:

Note: *The interior search of the driver/passenger compartment should start with the floor and under the seat, then work up.*

1. Wires or devices attached to the doors or wedged between the door and the seat.
2. Door panels for signs of tampering.
3. Under seats and dashboard.
4. Floor mats.
5. Ashtrays, speakers, cigarette lighters, vanity and dome lights.
6. Under headrests.
7. Sun visor.
8. Glove compartment.
9. All electronic equipment, and then run the motor for about five minutes.

CONCLUSION

In almost any situation a systematic and comprehensive vehicle search can be conducted in a short period of time.

REMEMBER IF YOU FIND A DEVICE “DO NOT TOUCH.”

DISPOSAL OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IS THE JOB OF TRAINED BOMB DISPOSAL TECHNICIANS.

CONDUCTING MEDICAL FACILITY SURVEYS

A major aspect of any protective operation is the advance planning stage which includes selecting optimum medical facilities for the protectee(s) should the need arise. Medical facilities should be located for each site to be visited by the protectee, including the various routes to and from each site.

Should events necessitate the admission of a protectee to a medical facility during a protective operation it should be noted that the primary concern of the Office of the Sheriff is the medical well-being of the protectee.

On each protective operation, the Emergency Medical Facility Survey Form should be completed by VIP/Witness Protection Team personnel conducting the advance for the protectee's visit.

It is important to note that the closest medical facility to your site may not be the most optimum for use in an emergency situation. Services provided by facilities vary greatly and it is important that a trauma unit capable of treating a variety of trauma-related injuries or illnesses be designated.

Should an emergency admission occur, it is imperative that all affected parties coordinate their efforts. This could include medical staff, hospital security, VIP/Witness Protection Team, local law enforcement and investigative support agencies such as the FBI should events necessitate. Coordination during the advance stage will help reduce chaos and duplication of tasks during this initial phase of admission.

Hospital staff and security personnel can anticipate the following:

a. ***Confusion***. A certain amount of confusion is inevitable due to a large number of persons responding to a relatively confined area. An increase in telephone calls, police radio transmissions, in-house intercom announcements, etc., will further add to an increased anxiety level among employees.

b. ***Adrenaline Factor***. An increased adrenaline level can also be anticipated as in any critical emergency situation. This can also be expected to be magnified significantly by multiple admissions, and a certain amount of pressure to perform can be anticipated by hospital personnel and may effect their interaction with police and other personnel. Who are all these people with guns?

c. ***Curiosity Factor***. Considering the notoriety of the protectee, a certain amount of curiosity can be anticipated by hospital staff, other patients, and the general

public. A huge influx of press personnel can be anticipated, especially if the admission is a result of a physical assault. Coordination in securing the treatment and recovery area and coordination with the public information officer can reduce information requests to hospital staff and facilitate the dissemination of accurate information in a timely manner.

d. ***Problems in Coordination.*** Dual objectives and priorities by medical staff and security personnel representing various jurisdictions are to be anticipated, but can be reduced with the development of a comprehensive proactive contingency plan. During the admission of any protectee of a detail, the VIP/Witness Protection Team Commander will request that the hospital security personnel assist in the following:

a. Securing the emergency room. This would include screening medical personnel admitted to attending area to ensure that only required attending physicians are present.

b. Securing the entire facility should events necessitate.

c. Screening all employees for proper staff credentials.

d. Establishing various perimeters as required to secure the area of the protectee prior to, during, and subsequent to treatment.

e. Coordinating the presence of Sheriff personnel within the treatment area to recover and secure evidence should events require.

g. Assist in developing and coordinating a prolonged security plan should an extended recovery period be required to include:

1. the screening of all packages, mail, flowers, etc. delivered during any subsequent recovery period; and

2. the installation of secure telephones as required.

VIP/Witness Protection Team personnel given the hospital security assignment are recommended to facilitate the orderly admission and treatment of a protectee by making the following arrangements:

a. Survey of the emergency room area to determine the posts necessary to secure the treatment area.

b. Survey of the hospital to determine the posts and manpower requirements necessary to secure the facility.

c. Designate a room to be utilized as an interagency command post for security personnel. This should include:

1. facility floor plans;

2. telephone with outline line capabilities;

3. hospital and local telephone directory, including any necessary dialing information;

4. sample hospital identification;

5. complete listing of hospital employees to include name, race, date of birth, and social security number;

6. copy of facility internal disaster plan, i.e., power outages, bomb threats, etc., and

7. portable radio or monitor affixed with the hospital security frequency or frequencies.

d. The designation of a press room to be utilized by the public information officer, to facilitate the timely dissemination of accurate information.

e. The development of a hospital security personnel recall plan.

Completing the Medical Facility Survey Form:

1. Make arrangements to meet with the highest ranking hospital official available to arrange for completion of the Medical Survey Form.

2. Advise the hospital representative that you are involved in a protective operation (don't give protectee name) and express appreciation for their assistance. Explain

that the survey is part of a routine security plan, and is for the exclusive use of the Office of the Sheriff/VIP/Witness Protection Team only.

Block #:

1. List whether the facility is to be utilized for the event site, while the principal is in route, both, or other.
2. Indicate the status of the facility indicated on the form as that of a primary, secondary, or other facility.
- 3-6. List the name of the facility followed by the street address to include city, state, and zip code, telephone number, emergency room telephone number, and information telephone number.
7. Give precise street directions to the facility from the event site. Include street names and compass directions. List total mileage and minutes required to reach the facility.
8. List the full name and telephone number of the hospital administrator.
9. List the full name and telephone number of the medical chief of staff.
10. Indicate whether the facility is public, private, government, military, or religious.
11. Determine if the emergency or trauma unit is available 24 hours.
12. Determine if the facility deploys a Med-Evac unit. If so, list name, telephone number and estimated ETA to the event site.
13. List additional entrances to the emergency room if other than the main entrance.
- 14-23. Check applicable blocks on the form for services provided by the facility.
24. Determine a room(s) to be utilized for VIPs.
25. Determine a room to be utilized by security personnel.
26. Determine a room to be utilized for staff personnel.
27. Determine a room to be utilized by the protectee's family.
28. List the full name of the facility's Public Information Officer and obtain office and home telephone numbers.
29. Determine an area to be utilized by press personnel or for the facility to conduct a press briefing.
30. Identify the locations to park police vehicles.
31. List full name of the hospital director of security and obtain office and home telephone numbers.
32. Diagram the facility to include adjacent streets and emergency room location/access area. Indicate the number of personnel required to secure the emergency room area.
33. Indicate the availability of a 24 hour pharmacy near the event site. Include name of pharmacist, business name, address, telephone, and home telephone number of the pharmacist. Indicate directions to include mileage and minutes to treatment site from the event site.
34. Determine the availability of emergency dental care, and note name, address, telephone number, etc. as indicated in Block #33 above.
35. List the name, address, directions to, telephone numbers and specifics of any referral facilities should the victim require a specialized care not available at this facility.
36. Use this block for any notes or additional information.
37. Print the full name of the person preparing the report, to include office and date.
38. Print the full name, and office of the site supervisor of the person completing the form, sign and date.

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD

VIP/WITNESS PROTECTION

EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE SURVEY

1. Site: [] Arrival Route: [] Departure Route: [] Other: []
2. Facility Designation: Primary: [] Secondary: [] Other: []
3. NAME OF FACILITY:

4. Street Address:
5. City/State/Zip:
6. Telephone: Emergency Room: Info:
7. Directions to Facility:
Miles: _____ Minutes: _____
8. Administrator: Telephone:
9. Chief of Medical Staff: Telephone:
10. Type of Facility:
Public: Private: Government: Military: Religious:
11. 24 Hour Emergency room or Shock Trauma: Yes No
12. 24 Hour Med-Evac: Yes No
Name: Telephone: ETA:
13. Emergency Room Entrance Location(s):
14. Packed Red Blood Cells: Yes No Units Available:
15. Burn Care Center: Yes No Total Patient Capacity:
16. Poison Control: Yes No Total Patient Capacity:
17. Cardiologist: Yes No On Call Availability: Yes No
18. Neurologist: Yes No On Call Availability: Yes No
19. Ob/Gyn: Yes No On Call Availability: Yes No
20. Ophthalmologist: Yes No On Call Availability: Yes No
21. Pediatrician: Yes No On Call Availability: Yes No
22. Radiologist: Yes No On Call Availability: Yes No
23. Helipad: Yes No
24. Designated VIP Room(s): Yes No
Location(s)
25. Designated Security Room(s): Yes No
Location(s)
26. Designated Staff Room(s): Yes No
Location(s)
27. Designated Family Room(s): Yes No
Location(s)
28. Public Information Officers: Telephone:
29. Designated Press Area: Yes No
Location(s)
30. Parking for Security: Yes No
Location(s)
31. Director of Security: Telephone:
32. Diagram Facility (include ER location and indicate required posts to secure same):
33. 24 Hour Pharmacy available: Yes No
Name of Pharmacist:
Name of Business:
Street:
Telephone: Pharmacist (Home):
Directions to Pharmacy:
Miles: _____ Minutes: _____
34. Emergency Dental Care Available: Yes No
Name of Dentist:
Street:
Telephone: Dentist (Home):
Directions to Dentist:
Miles: _____ Minutes: _____
35. Name of Referral Medical Facility: Yes No
Street:
City: State: Zip:
ER Telephone: Information:
Med/Evac Yes No ETA:
Directions to ER:
Miles: _____ Minutes: _____
36. Notes/Additional Information:

37. Prepared by: Office: Date:

38. Supervisor: Office: Date:

CONCENTRIC RINGS OF SECURITY

(SECURITY PERIMETERS)

I. INTRODUCTION

Protective security is composed of many elements. In order to protect an individual, secure areas, bordered by a security perimeter, must be established and therefore, during this lecture we will consider security perimeters and their role in the function of protective security.

II. SECURITY PERIMETER

A. Three secure areas should be established around a protectee at each site. The perimeters are then broken down into three concentric rings of security:

1. Inner perimeter;
2. Middle perimeter; and
3. Outer perimeter.

B. Each perimeter allows a progressively smaller number of people through it.

C. These rings allow for effective filtering. If someone slips through the outer ring, detection occurs at either the middle or inner ring.

D. Formation of the perimeter is dependent upon the threat, manpower, and resources available to a protective detail.

III. ACCESS INTO SECURITY PERIMETERS

A. The *inner perimeter* is directly around the protectee. Only protective detail deputy sheriffs should staff it. This is the most restrictive of the three rings and should always be staffed first. Only those individuals with a personal need for access to the protectee are allowed inside (i.e., a protocol official, staff aid, or family member).

B. The *middle perimeter* is around the inner perimeter and is staffed by detail deputy sheriffs not information or local, plain clothes security or police officers. Only those people who need to be in the same proximity, as the protectee should be permitted access (i.e., deputy sheriffs in the lead car, protective intelligence deputy sheriffs, EOD technicians, or protectee's staff). The middle ring should be staffed after provision is made for the inner ring. Do not spread the detail thin.

C. The *outer perimeter* is the first line of defense. Farthest from the protectee, it is usually staffed by deputy sheriffs, police or security officials. Only those people who need to be at the site are given access (i.e., SST, staff, drivers, and uniformed

IV. PROPER ACCESS

A. At each security perimeter, a checkpoint should be established to ensure proper access.

B. Screening at the check point can be as restrict as requiring a person to (i) provide positive identification; (ii) submit to a name check through police records or a visitors list; and (iii) undergo a search by a walk-through or hand-held metal detector.

C. At each site the advance deputy sheriff determines both where the security perimeter should be and its screening process. He determines this based upon (i) manpower available; (ii) the threat to the protectee; (iii) the number of persons or press expected at the function; and (iv) protocol considerations.

D. At each site, the advance deputy sheriff should strive to staff all three rings. However, when manpower resources are thin, staff PSA's could be used to check names or invitations to outer perimeter.

E. It is important for everyone working in security perimeters, as well as those specifically assigned to the protectee's security detail, to know whose work necessitates his or her involvement with the protectee.

F. Identification media are used to assist a protective detail in recognizing those who

have access to the area where the protectee will be. The identification media can be either permanent or temporary and should be controlled by a member of the protective detail.

1. Permanent media (label pins) are worn by members of the protective security detail.
 2. Temporary lapel pins or photo IDs have other security features, i.e., being different colors or shapes to identify those persons having access to the respective rings.
 3. Other types of identification media may be issued for (i) the press corps; (ii) motor vehicles; and (iii) protectee's staff traveling with him or her.
 4. All forms of identification should be backed up with a formal guest list, and a member of the security detail should check off names.
- G. Pins and identification should be used only once.
- H. Identification media psychologically affect unauthorized persons wishing access to the protectee.
- I. The advance deputy sheriff should be responsible for the issuance of ID systems and have an exact amount of who has been issued appropriate ID. When in doubt, request additional identification or have someone verify a person's presence in the security ring. Checkpoint personnel should be briefed on identifications systems for access control.

V. SECURITY PERIMETER POSTS

There are common physical barriers surrounding us whose functions are often taken for granted in everyday life, but they provide integrity to our three rings of protective security.

- A. Permanent barricades include walls, fences, landscapes, water, buildings and planters-bollards.
- B. Temporary barricades include stanchions, ropes, chains, tape, room dividers, drapes, furniture and vehicles.

VI. SECURITY FOR THE PROTECTEE IN RESIDENCE

- A. The protectee should be most secure when in residence. There the protective detail has the greatest opportunity to control the environment. This is accomplished through the use of security rings, combined with deputy sheriffs posted physical security hardware, electronic alarms and a general familiarity with the area surrounding the residence.
- B. While the protectee is in residence, posing needs to be assigned so that all avenues of access to the protectee are secured by the detail.
- C. It is at the residence that the protective detail may be supplemented with physical barriers, alarm systems, and electronic equipment on a permanent basis.
 1. The systems deployed should be unobtrusive to allow the protectee privacy as well as security.
 2. There should always be one member of the protective detail at the residence on a 24-hour basis to monitor alarms and ensure authorized personnel access while preventing unauthorized delivery of goods or services.
 3. This posting is called the **command post** or **residence watch** and should be maintained even when the protectee is away.

VII. THE COMMAND POST

- A. The command post or residence watch is a self-contained room in the protectee's residence, which serves as the inner perimeter ring.
- B. This room should be close enough to the protectee's living area to allow a deputy sheriff the ability to monitor effectively the residence and to respond to an emergency on a moment's notice.
- C. Consideration should be given to placing the command post near an avenue most

likely to bring danger, yet far enough away to provide some privacy to the protectee.

D. If the residence does not allow for a command post due to space considerations, then an alternate command post could be set up in the garage, a motor home or a camper trailer located next to the residence.

E. Wherever located, the command post can act also as a down room for detail members not standing post.

F. The command post/residence watch has dual responsibilities.

1. It acts as the communications and operations center for the protective detail.

(a) Maintains communications with the protective detail and keeps a log of all events that occur.

(b) Monitors radio and telephone traffic continuously and knows the protectee's exact location in an emergency.

(c) Provides emergency assistance by telephoning police or security headquarters and, in the event of an injury, medical personnel.

(d) Serves as a clearinghouse for information that needs to be passed to the detail or protectee.

(e) Maintains all reserve equipment in good working order (i.e., shoulder weapons, radios and other communications equipment).

2. Agents at the command post maintain the security of the protectee's residence.

(a) Monitors alarms and electronic equipment if so equipped.

(b) Investigates breaches of security.

(c) Maintains liaison with police.

(d) Screens all visitors to the residence by (i) verifying names, either through an access list or the protectee's staff, (ii) logging all names; (iii) escorting all visitors to the residence; and (iv) screening all packages or deliveries to the residence and verify the sender.

(e) Check perimeter of the residence with CCTV or roving patrol.

G. Command post equipment includes CCTV, cellular telephones, log book, maps of the area, picture of the protectee and ID systems, weapons, fire extinguisher, battery chargers and batteries and portable magnetometers (hand-held metal detectors).

VIII. THE SAFE HAVEN

Another room in the residence in the inner perimeter of security is the safe haven. This room provides temporary refuge to the protectee and family when additional time is needed for deputy sheriffs or police to respond to the residence under attack. When identifying a room in the residence as a safe haven, the following factors should be considered.

A. **Accessibility.** The protectee should not be exposed to additional danger while moving to the safe haven. If possible, this room should be the master bedroom.

B. **Ability to Secure.** This applies to both the safe haven and its route.

C. **Ability to Defend.** The safe haven should be within an established realistic perimeter, which the protective detail can defend. It also should have a tactical advantage, i.e., high ground.

D. **Ability to Command.** The command post or headquarters must be accessible.

E. **Ability to Escape.** If perimeter rings are compromised, there must be an escape route.

F. **Ability to Hold.** With appropriate equipment and supplies, the safe haven should be able to hold for 16 to 60 minutes while under siege.

G. The safe haven may possibly be reinforced with physical security hardware and have

an alternate emergency exist.

H. The safe haven should contain emergency communications, cellular telephone and radio, a fire extinguisher, water, and emergency lighting.

I. The safe haven is considered to be the core of the inner perimeter ring.

IX. THE MIDDLE AND OUTER PERIMETERS

A. The **middle perimeter** is the space between the residence and the outer perimeter wall known as the standoff zone. This area gives the protectee detail a margin of safety to work in if an attack is made on the residence. It also provides a clear area of fire if under attack. Usually protected by deputy sheriffs standing at posts located at opposite corners of the residence, it provides 360-degree coverage. Protective lighting can also protect this area.

1. The protective detail should conduct a physical security survey of the residence to reinforce it.
2. The deputy sheriff-in-charge of the detail should (i) meet with the protectee; (ii) discuss the physical security of the residence; (iii) provide a written report describing the current security status of the resident; and (iv) provide a list of recommendations to upgrade residential security.
3. The cost of security upgrades to the residence may be paid by the county or possibly the protectee.

B. The **outer perimeter** is the area outside the protectee's residence.

1. This wall should have an access point for vehicles and visitors where a member of the protective security detail should conduct screening.
2. The perimeter post should have radio and telephone communications with the detail in order to ensure the gates are opened for arrivals and departures of the protective security motorcade.
3. There should also be an alternate gate in the perimeter for emergencies.
4. The outer post provides eyes and ears to the protective security detail outside the perimeter. Suspicious persons, vehicles or incidents outside the outer perimeter wall should be reported to the detail.
5. Other security-related considerations of the outer perimeter include (i) surveys of buildings whose occupants have a view of the protectee's resident; (ii) counter-surveillance of the neighborhood and routes taken from the residence; (iii) identities of neighbors and a list of their vehicles and license plates; and (iv) supporting deputy sheriff or police perimeter patrols (before arrivals and departures).

X. SECURITY PERIMETERS AT AN OFFICE

The next location where a protectee should feel secure is at the office, which may be located in a government or privately-owned building. To ensure proper security procedures are in effect at this location, establish three concentric rings of security. Create a command post and safe haven.

A. In the **inner perimeter** area, there should be a post manned by members of the protective security detail to screen visitors and secure all avenues of access to the protectee. Again, the staff of the protectee, screened visitors, and co-workers are the only ones considered having access to the inner perimeter.

B. At the protectee's office, the **middle perimeter** is the area between other offices, both adjacent and above and below. Also, if a garage exists under the office space, the protectee's motorcade should be secured in that area while the protectee is in the office.

C. The **outer perimeter** is the building's lobby where both the elevator banks and steps to the protectee are located. All persons having access to the buildings should be properly identified and screened before being allowed into the building.

1. A permanent photograph identification system may be implemented for

- building employees to ensure unauthorized persons are not allowed inside.
2. A deputy sheriff or PSA should be posted at the entrance into the building and have communications with the protective security command post.
 3. All suspicious persons, packages or vehicles in the area should be reported.
 4. Patrols, both in vehicles and on foot, should be implemented around the protectee's building.
 5. Patrol the area before the protectee's motorcade arrives or departs the office building.
 6. If possible, different entry and exit doors to the protectee's office should be used by the detail.
 7. On an irregular basis, a counter surveillance team should be assigned to check the area of the protectee's office.

XI. HOTEL SECURITY

When the protectee is traveling, the advance deputy sheriff should ensure that the three rings of security are established at hotels where the protectee is temporarily residing.

A. The **inner perimeter** is the room, suite or floor where your protectee is residing.

The inner perimeter should also extend to the hotel rooms adjacent above and below the protectee's, in which staff or other detail members would reside.

1. Access to the protectee's room should be granted to staff members, screened visitors and cleared hotel personnel who are escorted by either a member of the staff or protective security.
2. A temporary identification system must be employed, and the advance deputy sheriff should obtain an approved list of hotel employees who have access to the protectee.
3. Depending on the circumstances and location of the protectee, there should be a post that allows the detail to screen visitors and to prevent unauthorized access to the protectee's floor.
4. The advance deputy sheriff should conduct a survey, prior to the protectee's arrival, to ensure all stairwells and elevators are controlled and all avenues of access are secured.

B. At a hotel, the **middle perimeter** is the area beyond the inner perimeter rooms and floors. The temporary command post should be set up near the protectee's room. (This will be covered in the advance portion of this course in more detail.)

C. The **outer perimeter** could be either the lobby of the hotel or hotel property if located on a compound where security is provided. The area around the hotel could be secured by deputy sheriff or police officials during the protectee's stay, depending upon the threat directed at the protectee. Hotel security will be further discussed under the advance section of this course.

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY

PERIMETER ALARM SYSTEM

Barriers

1. passive walls or
2. fences nine feet in height, or

Active perimeter entrances with

1. active vehicle barriers
2. gatehouses

Does the area have a standoff zone?

Building's exterior

1. façade
2. windows
 - a. grills on ground floor windows

- b. grills for an emergency release
- c. are accessible from trees or balconies
- d. has sliding doors
- e. or commercial, with an area office building
- 3. exterior doors of the building:
 - a. solid wood core
 - b. door viewer
- 4. The neighborhood is residential,
 - a. with detached single family homes
 - b. high rise structures,
 - c. garden apartments

Alarms on the buildings

- 1. doors
- 2. windows

Is alarm system equipped for:

- 1. local annunciator
- 2. centrally monitored
- 3. is there a fire alarm
- 4. do all alarms have a battery backup
- 5. what are the maintenance procedures
- 6. does the building have a panic alarm

Lights Located

- 1. outside
- 2. entrance

Door Locks

- 1. deadbolt
- 2. double cylinder (if within 40 inches of ungrilled window).

Window Locks

- 1. Are non-ventilating windows screwed shut?
- 2. Are ventilating windows, keyed to permit locking when the window is partially opened?

Smoke Detectors

- 1. one or more (#_____)
- 2. battery operated

Window Film

Recommended when bombs or missiles are a possibility

Mobile Response

When an alarm system is activated, a mobile response is recommended.

Radio is required

Safe Haven

- 1. reinforced door
- 2. door viewer
- 3. radio
- 4. second egress

PROTECTIVE SECURITY PRS POSTING PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION: "Protective Security Is Preventive Security"

A protective detail must eliminate any and all threats to the protectee as well as unexpected events. The detail must establish security zones around the protectee to ensure his/her safety. To accomplish these goals a protective detail uses various security posts. All

have different functions, yet are related, and each must perform its mission for the detail to perform effectively.

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I. The Most Commonly Used Protective Security Posts

A. Pre-Posted Deputy Sheriff. Deputy sheriff's are pre-posted to secure a particular area or observe a particular event prior to the protectee's arrival. They are most often used for two purposes.

1. Deputy sheriff's are posed in a room or area that has been swept by EOD technicians or deputy sheriff to maintain its security integrity.
2. Deputy sheriff's are pre-posted strategically as part of a security perimeter around a departure or arrival site or around the protectee's final location.

B. Press Deputy Sheriff. A deputy sheriff may also be pre-posted to monitor the press and ensure they do not present any security risks.

C. Checkpoint Post.

1. Controls access to a given area as part of the concentric rings of security that filter people or things through a given point.
2. Denies access to unauthorized individuals.
 - a) Point where ID system is enforced.
 - b) Works as a backup to on site personnel in checking ID's or working from a guest list.
 - c) Security personnel will always work as a backup, never as the primary checker (when possible).
3. Allows the screening of individuals to check for weapons.
4. Permits the screening to occur at a safe distance from the protectee.
5. Deputy sheriff assigned must have specific instructions regarding access.
6. The checkpoint post is flexible.
 - a) Posted in street for vehicle access.
 - b) Posted at building entrance for vehicles and pedestrians.
 - c) Posted inside a building to allow access to specific persons.

Those posts are established at determined choke points and/or pre-determined possible attack sites. Those posts report all pertinent information to the command post and agent-in-charge.

D. Surveillance Posts. Surveillance posts are an effective way to cover a large area with limited manpower. Surveillance posts are at varied locations.

1. Rooftops.
2. Among crowds.
3. Hotel lobbies.
4. Street side (along a motorcade route).
5. Underground garages.
6. These posts are assigned the responsibility for
 - a) observing a specific area or occurrence (i.e., demonstration);
 - b) watching for activity which may result in harm to the protectee;
 - c) looking for specific “*red flags*” from individuals and attempting to spot trouble before it occurs; and
 - d) use against a specific individual, group, or occurrence such as
 - (1) suspicious person,

- (2) demonstration, and
- (3) delivery truck arriving in front of site before protectee departure.

E. Special Assignment Post. Anything, anyone or any event, which will be in close proximity to the protectee, may require posting to ensure that it is secure. These posts are usually short-term or site-specific in nature.

EXAMPLES:

1. Luggage deputy sheriff.
2. Pre-posters with the advance (to direct the motorcade).
3. Car post (securing vehicles).
4. Counter-surveillance (who is watching the detail?)

F. Command Post or Residence Watch. As discussed previously in the security perimeters class, one or two deputy sheriffs are posted in a command post to maintain security at the protectee's residence and to serve as a communications' hub for the detail.

II. Post Functions.

A. Questions to answer when assuming a post.

1. What are the specific post instructions?
2. What is to be observed?
3. What area encompasses the post?
4. Is access restricted? If so how?
5. What ID systems are in force at the post?
6. What people normally occupy the post?
7. How many buildings and/or windows have free fields of vision on the post?
8. How many ways are there to the post?
9. Where are the other deputy sheriff posts in the proximity located? Can the deputy sheriff see/communicate with them. Are there other law enforcement posts around (i.e., is there a SST team deployed)?
10. Are there obvious dangers to the deputy sheriff or protectee such as flammable liquids, explosives, loose flooring, weapons, speaker wire across the floor? If so, this information should be communicated to the advance deputy sheriff to ensure the threats are removed or fixed
11. Are there any heating or air conditioning ducts leading to the area? Are they secured?
12. Are there utility controls in the area?
13. Where is the fire extinguisher, fire alarm? What type is it?
14. What are a deputy sheriff's duties for REACT (terrorist, fire, medical)?
15. What is the best cover/concealment at the post?
16. Is there a telephone at the post?
17. Can the deputy sheriff communicate with the command post by radio?
18. Is the protectee expected at the post? If so where?
19. Have explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or bug sweeps been performed?
20. Are there any special instructions?

B. General Guidelines for the Posted Deputy Sheriff.

1. When relieving another posted deputy sheriff, a briefing should be requested from his/her.
2. In most cases posted deputy sheriffs will stand not sit on post (within reason).
3. The deputy sheriff should know the protectee's schedule.
4. Deputy sheriff remain at post until relieved, *except when it is necessary to escort the protectee.*

5. The deputy sheriff should know the push schedule and push on time.
(Five to three minutes early.)
6. There is no eating on post nor smoking on post.
7. Posted deputy sheriffs must remain alert at all times.
8. If unsure of the specific duties of the post or equipment at assigned post, the deputy sheriff must “*ask someone.*”

CONCLUSION

Establishing a secure area is essential for the security of the protectee. By means of security perimeters, the detail is able to control access to the protectee and thus attempt to ensure his or her safety.

Security posts are critical to protective security. Without security posting there would be no guarantee of security for the protectee. It is essential that all deputy sheriffs understand what type of post they are being assigned and what their specific duties are at that post. This information will enable deputy sheriffs to define the actions required and to determine post specific questions. With this knowledge, all posts will function efficiently and effectively in the pursuit of protective security.

TERRORIST OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

I want you to think like a terrorist. Why? Because in order for a protective detail to operate effectively, it must know the enemy. Studies of terrorist incidents worldwide by varied law enforcement threat analysis divisions have revealed the same common threads throughout most terrorist attacks. Although the terrorist has a definite advantage, they do have weaknesses that can be exploited. If a protective detail is aware of these weaknesses, it can use them to its advantage and possibly prevent an attack or, at least, be more prepared to react in the event that it does occur.

In order to prevent a terrorist attack, the detail must begin with understanding how a terrorist operation is implemented. First, we will discuss the five phases of a terrorist operation and specific elements that apply to each phase. Every organized terrorist group goes through these five phases and, chronologically, most attacks follow the same basic order.

I. PHASES OF A TERRORIST OPERATION

A. Target Selection.

This phase is simply the group or individual selecting its target. The target could be an individual such as an ambassador, a military person, a president or it could be a location such as an embassy, a capitol headquarters, a police station or a hotel. *Target selection is based on the objectives and capabilities of the terrorist group.*

If a terrorist group is opposed to the military presence of another country in its territory, it is likely to attack military personnel or military installations that represent its perceived outrage. These targets are sought in hopes of sending the group’s message to the world for public support or, possibly, attempting to alter the future actions of a country’s leaders.

Indications are that a number of potential targets may be identified prior to the selection of the actual victim. The objective is to select the victim who will product the greatest results with the least amount of risk. Terrorist groups will always strive to select the highest profiled individual or location that has the weakest security preparations intact.

B. Target Intelligence.

Once the group has selected its target, it proceeds to gather target intelligence. All terrorist assassination attacks have included some form of target intelligence prior to an attack, even the mentally deranged, lone attacker needs information. This is the *one and only time* terrorists might reveal their intentions prior to an attack through their use of *surveillance*.

1. Protective details must be alert to intelligence gathering, remembering that an intelligence gathering mission is not an attack. Instead, the group is exposing itself and its intentions before any action takes place.

2. Surveillance of the target is necessary to gather all information and intelligence for successful completion of the operation. It will always occur, even if only immediately prior to the attack because you cannot attack without it.
3. Terrorists are continually looking for intelligence information about the protectee. They are interested in gathering information about his/her habits, itinerary, routine, medical condition, likes and dislikes, the routes used to and from site locations, those with whom he travels, etc. They are also interested in information regarding the security team if one exists. For example, how much manpower per shift, the type of weaponry used, tactics, level of professionalism, members' training experience, habits, etc. Is the security detail comprised of military officers, local police or specially trained antiterrorism personnel?
4. There are illegitimate avenues in obtaining target intelligence, such as through the use of an unknown informant. However, most target intelligence information gathered by a terrorist group is acquired through the numerous legitimate resources available. Examples of these sources of information include: television, radio, newspapers, telephone books, libraries, unclassified government directories, etc. The media's capabilities have expanded tremendously over the years and offer a vast amount of background and itinerary information regarding protected governmental officials. This is an excellent, easily accessible, public means of obtaining information by the terrorists.
5. Most terrorist groups operate in small, unsophisticated teams when gathering target intelligence. There are a few known groups who gather intelligence information without even having a target selected. These more sophisticated groups continually update intelligence reports on target locations such as airports, government buildings, theaters, etc., for the purpose of assessing a location's vulnerability. The terrorists will then simply update their information just prior to a planned attack. Some groups use personal computers to store their intelligence information.

C. Operational Planning.

One a group has selected its target and gather sufficient intelligence information, it moves on to the operational planning phase. This phase is essentially the same as that of police officers preparing to make an arrest or executive a raid.

1. In dealings with the more sophisticated terrorist groups, it has been found that some perform *rehearsals* and *dry runs*. For example, a few European terrorist groups test security details through dry runs to predetermine their chances of success. A classic example of this was the set up of a bogus construction site during the Herrhausen attack by the RAF.
2. During the operational planning phase the group's main prior is to assess its *tactical advantage points*. Terrorists look for the following elements before every attack and require a sufficient probable number in order to complete their plan successfully.
 - (a) Surprise.
 - (b) High ground. To be on site without being seen is preferable to using a crowd situation to avoid being suspected or detected by the target or detail.
 - (c) Field of Fire. The group needs to be able to reach its target successfully with the assault device it is using.
 - (d) Field of vision.
 - (e) Superiority in numbers and weaponry.
 - (f) Choice of time, place and conditions of attack.
 - (g) Diversions, secondary or follow-up attack.
 - (h) Training capability to carry out the planned attack, i.e., technical

knowledge in the uses of sophisticated explosive devices or weaponry. This lack of technical knowledge has saved the life of many Americans overseas.

- (i) Sufficient logistics to carry out the attack, i.e., money, vehicles, fake IDs, disguises, etc.
- (j) Proper planning capability, i.e., a kidnapping involves hundreds of details such as a safehaven, food and water, 24 hour manpower coverage of kidnapped individual, an escape route, etc.
- (k) Ability to be on the attack site prior to attack without arousing suspicion (minimum on site time required is 20 minutes).
- (l) Escape route and plan which will be discussed in detail later in the lecture.

D. Attack

The actual execution of the plan.

1. Initiation of the attack phase sometimes includes “*Target Identification*.” Just prior to attack, the terrorist, whether working alone or within a group, wants to confirm that the target is present. Before initiating the actual act, the terrorist wants to verify the target is in the location at the exact time for which the attack was planned.
2. The target identification person will be located just outside the kill zone. It could be as simple as looking on the stage to see if the intended victim is in his/her place at the podium or a passing motorcycle rider pulling alongside the limousine to verify the victim’s position in the car.
3. With today’s increased sophistication in explosive capabilities, many terrorist groups have lessened the need for a target ID person, although there are those who will still use them. If the group is unsuccessful in its first attack plan, a second attempt would be more dangerous and costly once the police authorities have been alerted to the threat.
4. The target identification person is not part of the attack team when working within a group planned attack. The target identification person’s main responsibility is to verify the target’s location and relay a signal back to the attack team to proceed or disengage the attack. This may involve the target identification person physically to enter the immediate kill zone and exit the area before the attack is initiated. Examples of ways in which a signal can be relayed back to the attack team: radio or telephone; visual signal (flashing headlights or waving hand).
5. The detail must be alert to the target identification. If spotted, you are only seconds from an attack. The target identification is an attack initiator similar to the lighting of the fuse on a stick of dynamite.

E. Escape and Exploit.

Evasion from attack site and police authorities and possible exploitation of act for political reasons.

1. It is a myth that all terrorists are willing to die for their cause. Suicide missions are not as common as many people believe. Very few terrorist groups plan suicidal attacks. An exception to this rule are the members of the Hizballah terrorist organization.
2. The terrorist during the operational planning phase, will meticulously plan for his/her escape route and safehaven location. The group needs an attack site that will allow it the ability to withdraw. The terrorist does not want to be boxed in or trapped. He/she wants to have the ability to retreat if the attack fails, to possess as great a distance as possible from the target without losing field of fire or vision capability or to disappear among a crowd quickly and successfully evade detection so as to attack again.

3. Exploitation by some terrorist groups occurs when the group is attempting to generate notoriety or public support for political or personal gain. During the operational planning phase if a group desires exploitation of a kidnapped victim, logistical requirements such as camera or video tape equipment, safehaven security, a list of demands, the way in which the commands will be communicated, etc., will be necessary logistical concerns.

II. VARYING DIGNITARY ROUTES AND TIMES OF DEPARTURE

A. It is essential that a security detail be aware of and able to recognize the five phases of a terrorist operation. Terrorists require all five phases before carrying out an attack. (Differentiate between terrorist assassination attacks by an organized group and a general publicity seeking terrorist incident, i.e., mentally deranged individual.)

B. One of the objectives of the detail is to deny any one of the phases and try to force the terrorist to look at a softer, less secure target. By denying the terrorist any one of these phases, it will reduce the likelihood of an attack by making the attack more difficult and thus more dangerous for the terrorist.

C. Research studies of terrorist incidents worldwide have repeatedly shown that if a security detail attempted to alter its routes to and from routine locations and/or changed its departure and arrival time by at least 30 minutes (recommended 60 minutes), the detail could have possibly prevented the terrorist group from ever selecting the protectee as a target.

D. The phase that can be most influenced by the protective detail is the target intelligence phase during which the terrorist group is gathering its intelligence information through surveillance. This is the only time the detail can either identify the group's plan prior to the attack or dissuade the group from selecting its protectee as a target because of the detail's continual unpredictability.

E. As a security detail deputy sheriff it is our responsibility to recommend alternate routes and changes in time schedules to the protectee. Changes in these two areas have proven to be the most effective options in prevent attacks.

III. CHOKE POINTS AND IDEAL ATTACK SITES

A. Based in part on the above terrorist operational phases, you can predict where an attack may occur. After understanding the phases of a terrorist operation, the detail deputy sheriff can identify the probable attack site locations by comparing the VIPs daily itinerary to a street map of the area in which they are located and analyzing the routes they must travel.

B. Essentially, the analysis of routes (vehicular or pedestrian) will determine **choke points** (also referred to as place predictable).

1. **Choke Point.** Any location that the protectee must travel through when traveling from point A to point B. A choke point is not limited in its length proportion by any standards.

2. If alternate routes are available, but in fact never used, and a protectee continues to travel from point A to point B on the same route and within the same time frame, the group has subsequently created a choke point that did not exist previously.

3. Most choke points are near the residence or office because the VIP has to travel through these locations every day. But, it can be any other location that the protectee must attend on a continual basis, i.e., church, school, weekly meetings at other government facilities, etc.

4. The two most common choke points are located from **home** to **work** and **work** to **home**.

5. The Terrorist looks for these locations when planning an attack. The application of these principles to past terrorist attacks have proven that the majority of terrorist incidents occurred within choke point locations that could have been easily predicted.

C. After determining the choke points, the detail deputy sheriff must then apply all

the tactical advantage points discussed during the operational planning phase such as surprise, high ground, field of fire, field of vision, escape path, etc. to the choke point area. At any specific site location within the choke point where a majority of the tactical advantage points apply successfully, you have a located called an ideal attack site (IAS).

D. Ideal attack site locations, within the choke points, are where the terrorists will conduct their surveillance during their target intelligence gathering mission.

E. Detail deputy sheriffs must apply the tactical advantage points as though they were the terrorists. The detail must deny the terrorist ideal attack site locations. The terrorist has consistently attacked in IAS locations that could have been predicted by applying these rules.

F. The ideal attack site is where you want to concentrate your forces and where the detail must be at its highest level of alertness.

IV. PHASES, CHOKE POINTS AND IDEAL ATTACK SITES AS RELATED TO ACTUAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS

A. Red Brigade kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro in Rome, Italy on March 16, 1978 at 0820.

B. Red Army Faction attack on U.S. General Kroesen in Heidelberg, Germany on September 15, 1981 at 0722.

C. Simon Bolivia Command attack on Secretary of State's motorcade in La Paz, Bolivia on August 8, 1988.

D. RAF attack on Alfred Herrhausen in Bad Hamburg, West German on November 30, 1989 at 0830.

E. The assassination attempt of Jak Kamhi, Chairman of the Turkish Economic Development Foundation in Istanbul, Turkey on January 28, 1993.

F. The assassination of the Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers, Mr. Leamon R. Hunt in Rome, Italy on February 15, 1984.

G. The attack on Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on June 26, 1995.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have identified the phases of a terrorist operation when planning a group organized terrorist attack. We have also identified those locations where the attacks are most likely to occur by predetermining the choke points and ideal attack sites according to the protectee's schedule.

One we understand how terrorists operate and where they are most likely to attack, then we can move to the next section and learn how to organize protection security details in order to provide the best security possible for ourselves and our protectees.

Causes Of Assassinations And Methods Of Attack

INTRODUCTION:

Throughout history almost every nation has experienced an assassination or an attempted assassination against its leaders or world figures

- 1. President John F. Kennedy, USA**
- 2. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, United Kingdom**
- 3. Pope John Paul, Vatican**
- 4. Prime Minister Olaf Palme, Sweden**
- 5. President Ronald Reagan, USA**
- 6. President Augusto Pinochet, Chile**
- 7. First Lady Imelda Marcos, Philippines**
- 8. President Anwar Sadat, Egypt**
- 9. President Elect Bashir Gemayel, Lebanon**
- 10. President Mohammad Zia Ul-Haq, Pakistan**
- 11. President Jung Hee Park, Korea**
- 12. President Anastasio Somoza, Nicaragua**

- 13. President Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi**
- 14. Presidential Candidate Rajiv Gandhi, India**
- 15. President Ranasinghe Premadasa, Sri Lanka**
- 16. President Cyprien Ntaryamira, Burundi**
- 17. President Juvenal Habyarimana, Rwanda**
- 18. Presidential Candidate Luis Donaldo Colisio, Mexico**

Before we can begin to protect people from assassination, we need a basic understanding as to why people carry out assassinations and what general methods are used.

We will identify the six main causes of assassinations and outline the four methods in which they are carried out. We will see how these causes and methods can be of great importance to protective security in determining how to protect an individual.

I: Significance of Assassination

Throughout history students of “assassination” often are tempted to ask the question “Why?” In the majority of cases, assassination attempts do not achieve what the assassin had in mind.

- A. Society, as a whole, is seldom in sympathy with the assassin.
- B. The political situation is rarely changed by the assassination.
- C. An assassination attributable to a political organization often brings such severe repercussions that the event often harms the terrorist group irrevocably and causes suppression of its members, thus driving it further underground.
- D. In the case of single assassins, they seldom receive the publicity and the glory they seek. In the last few years, both terrorism and assassination have received intense coverage by the press. Although the event receives considerable publicity, the individual performing the deed seems to fade rapidly from public view.

II: History of Assassination

- A. The opening of the Judeo-Christian Bible records history’s first assassination. Since that first recorded killing, assassinations have been linked with history of mankind.
- B. Man has continued to use the act as a tool to relieve his frustrations, obtain his goals, or avenge his grievances, whether they were real or imagined.
- C. From the time early man first began to form into groups and accept leadership, there has always been someone, for whatever reason, who wants the leadership replaced. The act of political assassination is so tightly interwoven in history it is hard to tell whether assassination shapes history or vice versa.
- D. In several cases, assassination has changed the course of history. The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BC was a catalyst in the decline of the Roman Empire.
- E. During the early years of modern history, almost every ruler lived with the knowledge that he was a target.
- F. Since every conceivable means of killing was attempted, security of the ruler became tighter, and in turn, inspired new methods of killing, which could circumvent the ring of security around the ruler.
- G. For instance, in 1560, Charles II of France was assassinated by coating the pages of a book with poison. The poison made the pages of the book stick together. When Charles wet his fingertips with his tongue to turn the pages he slowly poisoned himself. Subsequently thereafter, practically every court had a royal food taster whose responsibility was to oversee the preparation of the monarch’s meals.
- H. Assassination often became a family affair. In many cases, it became necessary for the elder son of a family to dispose of all his younger brothers to ensure his right to the throne.

I. In 1595 during the days of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Murad died leaving twenty sons. His eldest son, Mohammed II, immediately killed his nineteen brothers.

J. Although the use of assassination as a means of solving political problems has generally been looked on with disfavor by most of the world, in times of war it almost takes on a cloak of respectability.

K. Assassination attempts against Adolf Hitler during World War II were looked upon favorably by the Allied Nations. In turn, Hitler had his own elite corps of trained killers to pave his rise to power. The death of the Austrian Chancellor, Dolfuss, in 1934, as well as other political figures was attributed to this elite corps.

III: Causes of Assassination

A. Revolutionary or Political Causes

1. Groups or individuals fanatical in their desire to change the existing government or to establish a new government often resort to assassination to accomplish their goals.
2. The targeted individuals represent the government, which the assassin believes is the cause of repression, unfairness, persecution, etc.
3. The assassin, in hopes of overthrowing the existing government to establish anew form of government, is a basic cause of assassination attempts.
4. At present, most governments of recognized countries have at least one dissident group that thinks it can save the nation from its current regimes' inadequacies.

The Attempted Assassination of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom in Brighton, England in 1984 The Irish Republican Army (IRA) attempted to assassinate PM Thatcher and members of the British Parliament at the Bristol Hotel in Brighton, England. An IED was placed in the hotel months before the actual attack. Mrs. Thatcher was attending a widely publicized event, which took place at the same hotel at the same time each year

The Assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel in Tel Aviv, Israel on November 4, 1995. Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated while departing a "peace" rally at City Hall in Tel Aviv. Yigal Amir shot him at close range; a member of a group (EYAL) vehemently opposed to the Middle East Peace Process. This was the first political assassination in the Jewish state's 47-year history

B. Economic Causes

1. An individual or a group is motivated by the belief the victim is responsible for poor economic conditions affecting a nation, group of people or the assassin directly.
2. Most people desire financial success in life and when an individual or group believes that person in power, whether through individual or government effort, causes conditions that threaten their financial security, the simple and logical solution is to remove that person.

EXAMPLES:

a. The attempted assassination of former Secretary of State George Schultz on August 8, 1988 in Bolivia was due to his involvement with the drug eradication program sponsored by both countries.

b. Numerous Colombian government officials were assassinated by narcotic terrorists because of their policies aimed at the eradication of drug trafficking.

C. Ideological Causes or Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

1. The assassin is convinced that the victim is endangering principles that the assassin believes to be of paramount importance.
2. An individual or group has strong, almost fanatical leanings.
3. Ideological causes of assassination can stem from religious and social beliefs. The assassin hopes to change the existing system by eliminating key figures in the religious or social systems or the assassin may wish to draw attention to his or her group through the use of terror.
4. Tribal rivalry causes of assassination are often due to ethnic fighting within groups trying to exert control over their homeland.

EXAMPLES:

a. President Elect Bashir Gemayal – Assassinated because he was compromising the Christian position of power in Lebanon with the Muslims.

b. President Anwar Sadat – Assassinated because he was cracking down on extremist/fundamentalist Islamic groups in Egypt. On 6 October 1981, Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, was killed while viewing a military parade held on the eighth anniversary of “The Crossing,” the beginning of the 1973 war. The two hour parade was nearing its conclusion when, just as a flyover of Mirage jets roared past at low level, an army truck left the line of parade and stopped in front of the reviewing stand. As a lieutenant dismounted and approached the stand, President Sadat stood as he evidently expected a salute. Three other gunmen stood up and fired rifle grenades from the back of the truck. The attackers charged the reviewing stands shooting for over a minute, the already wounded president. President Sadat and seven of his companions were killed and twenty-eight were wounded.

c. President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi – The assassination was most likely due to his efforts to balance the military ethnically between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes. Due to civil unrest and inaccurate reporting, only a few conclusions have been drawn from the information we have been able to obtain.

d. President Juvenal Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira at Kigali, Rwanda Airport – Assassinated because of tribal friction in both countries. President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda (age 57) who took power in a coup in 1973 and Cyprien Ntaryamira (age 38) president of neighboring Burundi were killed when a plane, bringing them back from regional peace talks in Tanzania, was hit by two surface to air missiles during a night rocket attack on April 6, 1994. Both presidents were Hutus whose countries were racked by tribal friction.

D. Personal Causes

1. This generated by a slight or a wrong, real or imagined perceived to be caused by the protected principal and demands revenge.
2. Other motivations for this cause are jealousy, hate, rage or other strictly personal drives.

EXAMPLES:

a. The Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968 in Memphis, Tennessee.

b. Numerous Turkish government officials (i.e., Consulate General Aricon in Los Angeles, 1982) were assassinated worldwide by Armenian nationals in revenge for the widely reported massacre of Armenians by Turks in 1905.

E. Psychological Causes

1. Mental derangement, fanaticism or emotional instability are factors in most, if not all, actual attacks.

2. **Triggermen** almost always exhibit psychological problems even if the real reasons for assassination are revolutionary, economic, etc.

3. It is not at all unusual to find more than one cause of assassination; however, **psychological causes are the most common.**

In the United States we think of individuals attempting to kill our presidents.

EXAMPLES:

a. John Hinkley Jr. – Attempted assassination of President Reagan.

b. Lee Harvey Oswald – Assassination of Kennedy by a triggerman possibly and with power behind him, wanting the assassination for ideological causes.

c. Sarah Jane Moore, Squeaky Fromme – Attempted assassination of President Ford.

F. Mercenary

Throughout history, assassins have killed for money.

EXAMPLES:

a. In 1932 an assassination attempt was made on Benito Mussolini. The attacker later admitted that he had been offered \$50,000 by the antifascist faction in Italy if he succeeded in killing Mussolini.

b. Pope John Paul II. May 13, 1981 – Attempted assassination because he was a threat to the Socialist establishment.

IV: Attack Methods and Weapons Used in Assassinations

A. Weapons at Close Range

1. In most instances the close-in method is used by psychopaths and political fanatics, both of whom are determined to accomplish the job even if it means their own death. **In our work, it is easier to defend against this method with the exception of a suicidal body-bomb.**

2. This method differs between the two types in the following ways.

a. Usually, the **psychopath** is so personally involved with the attempt that his mind cannot rest unless the job is done by his own hand so he can look the victim in the eye.

b. A psychopath's thinking process differs from a political assassin in that, although his determination to get the job done stems from fanatical dedication to his particular cause, the fact that he might die in the attempt seldom enters his mind.

c. The **political fanatic** most likely goes into the act of assassination knowing full well he will die. His extreme dedication to his particular cause dictates that he wants no failures and close range is the only option to ensure that the target is killed.

d. In many cases the "**Crazy**" believes that he will be hailed as a hero for his act, which is one reason he generally offers no resistance to law enforcement after his attempt.

3. In the close range method there is **little skill involved.**

4. A **HANDGUN** or **KNIFE** are the weapons most used, although we are beginning to see an increase in suicide bombings at close range.

5. Some pre-attack intelligence gathering is necessary if only to learn the victim's itinerary. Historically, stalking has occurred.

EXAMPLES:

a. Governor George Wallace, May 15, 1972

b. Imelda Marcos, December 7, 1972

c. President Ronald Reagan, March 30, 1981

d. Presidential Candidate Colisio of Mexico, March 23, 1994

B. Weapons At A Distance

1. Assassinating someone at a distance, **more than twenty feet away**, is probably the most commonly used method in the world today.

2. Before gunpowder was first invented, the close-in method was the only resort. But improvements in weapons, technology, and explosives have given the potential assassin a chance to accomplish his mission and walk away unharmed. The methods of assassinating someone from a distance is limited only by the assassin's imagination.

3. The use of a high powered rifle, especially those equipped with telescopic sights, has been the principal means used in some of the more infamous cases.

4. Using weapons at a distance

a. Requires more sophisticated weapons in order to reach the intended target, i.e., rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG).

b. Demands more skill, knowledge and training with the weaponry used.

c. Requires judgment of distance/range capability of weaponry.

Large numbers of terrorists have missed their target due to the distance or unfamiliarity with the weapon.

5. Intelligence gathering is necessary to learn the itinerary and the proper attack site.

EXAMPLES:

φ **President Kennedy of U.S.**

φ **President Park of Korea**

φ **President Zia of Pakistan**

φ **President Ntaryamira of Burundi**

φ **President Habyarimana of Rwanda**

φ **Martin Luther King, Jr.**

C. Explosives

1. Require more sophistication and skill. Knowledge is needed to

a. build the bomb

b. place the device, and

c. detonate the device.

2. Logistics and intelligence support is usually required.

EXAMPLES:

φ **Alexander Haig the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in 1975.** There was an attempted bombing by a device placed in the roadway and command detonated.

φ **Rajiv Ghandi – political cause 1991**

φ **Ranasinghe Premadasa – political cause 1993**

φ **President Elect B. Gemayel, September 14, 1992.** An explosive was placed in a suitcase located in the room adjacent to where he was speaking.

φ **Secretary of State George P. Schultz, September 1988, La Paz Bolivia.** An explosion was command detonated during the Secretary's motorcade descent from the 11,000 foot altitude airport down the mountain on the only good vehicular route available from the airport into the city.

φ **Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 1984, Brighton, England.** An

attempt to kill Mrs. Thatcher and her Cabinet was made at the Bristol Hotel in Brighton, England by the Irish Republican Army. The device was set in place six months prior to the attack. This was a well known event scheduled at the same hotel and same time each year.

D. Kidnapping

1. It is not a form of assassination, but still involves an attack.
2. The immediate intention is not to kill the victim.
3. The kidnap victim is more valuable alive than dead; however, death often follows when demands are not met.
4. If a protective detail exists, they must be eliminated immediately.
5. Kidnapping is the most sophisticated of attack methods, usually conducted only by well organizing terrorist groups requiring (i) attack team, (ii) intelligence team, (iii) safe haven, (iv) logistical/surveillance team, and (v) money.
6. Meticulous planning is imperative to a successful kidnapping.

EXAMPLES

Kidnapping of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. This attack will be discussed in greater detail in the class on Terrorist Operations. For the purpose of understanding the method of kidnapping, I would like to emphasize a few methods.

- ☉ Ruses, false alarms were used.
- ☉ False police calls diverted police manpower.
- ☉ Sniper took out surviving security officer.
- ☉ Aldo Moro had five briefcases in his possession, but the terrorists knew which one contained his most important papers and medicine.
- ☉ Diplomatic plans on attack vehicle were stolen one year in advance.
- ☉ Flower vendor was late arriving at his stand because four of his car tires had been slashed on the morning of the attack. This allowed the terrorists to occupy the flower stand for target identification.
- ☉ Getaway car was the same model and color as police vehicles.

President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi in October 1993. Killed in a failed coup by elements of the Tutsi (tribe) dominated army. Ndadaye was the first Hutu to lead the country.

V. International and State Sponsored Terrorism

State sponsored terrorist groups are more sophisticated than other terrorist groups for the following reasons.

- A. They have access to training that will improve the groups' abilities and enhance chances of success in carrying out more complicated missions, such as kidnapping.
- B. They have access to funds for weapons and explosives.
- C. They have access to greater support systems to enhance groups' potential, flexibility and movement, i.e., passports, visas, disguises, etc.

EXAMPLES:

Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). The Group operates solely in Chile. Sponsors: Associated with the Chilean Communist Party and probably receives assistance from Cuba and other Communist countries, especially for training and weapons supply.

Abu Nmidal Organization (ANO). It operating headquarters are in Libya. Sponsors: Despite its support by a succession of state sponsors (first Iraq, then Syria, and more recently Libya), the group maintains its own political agenda. The ANO is financially sound and may be one of the most economically viable of all terrorist organizations. The group is believed to draw one-third of its income from patron states.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The external headquarters are

located near Managua, Nicaragua, but it maintains offices in Panama, Mexico and Europe. The FMLN receives external support from Communist countries that channel arms and supplies primarily through Nicaragua. FMLN members are routinely trained in Nicaragua and Cuba. Nicaragua and the border region between El Salvador and Honduras are the primary safehaven areas for the hardcore members.

Hizballah (Islamic Jihad). Its headquarters are located in West Beirut and Bekaa Valley, Lebanon. Hizballah elements receive training in the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon. Through this connection, Iran provides political indoctrination, financing and material support.

South American Drug Cartels. They receive state sponsorship by buying political influence. Receive support through general population by providing economic support, i.e., Columbia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, etc.

VI. Tactics to Counter Assassination Methods

A. We cannot possibly guarantee a person's security one hundred percent. The terrorist has all the advantages, but we can use what information we have to our advantage.

B. Protection is the attempt at eliminating any surprise; taking into account any and all possibilities and planning for them.

C. During an assassination attempt, there is total panic. There must be an island of calm to get anything accomplished. The island of calm must be the protective detail. Each member of the detail must react instinctively to the situation in order to foil the attempt and move the protectee to safety. We do this by eliminating the most dangerous first and working our way to the more sophisticated.

1. Protective formations for weapons at close range and at a distance.

2. Surveillance detection for picking up of intelligence teams as they gather intelligence on the protectee and the protective security detail.

3. Protective intelligence to determine if groups or individuals fit into any one of the assassination categories that would threaten the protectee.

4. Security perimeters established to deny access to the protectee as much as is possible and to ensure that those who do have access do not pose a threat.

5. Advance work that takes into account any potential danger points.

6. Motorcades to move the protectee quickly and safely through potential danger points.

CONCLUSION

Now that we have developed an understanding of the motivations and methods used in assassinations, we can move on to a further analysis of how terrorist groups operate and the most effective means of preventing an organized attacked by a terrorist group.

METROPOLITAN AREA HOSPITALS

Hospital Name Address Phone

Arlington Hospital 1701 N. George Mason Drive

Arlington, VA 22205

(703) 558-5000

Calvert Memorial Hospital 100 Hospital Road

Prince Frederick, MD 20678

(301) 855-1012

Capital Hill Group 700 Constitution Avenue, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 675-0400

Children's National Medical Center 111 Michigan Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20010

(202) 884-5000

Civista Medical Center 701 E. Charles Street
 LaPlata, MD 20646
 (301) 609-4200
 Columbia Hospital for Women 2425 L Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20037
 (202) 293-6540
 Doctors Hospital of PG County 8118 Good Luck Road
 Lanham, MD 20706
 (301) 552-8118
 Dominion Psychiatric Treatment Center 2960 Sleepy Hollow Road
 Falls Church, VA 22044
 (703) 536-2000
 Georgetown University Hospital 3800 Reservoir Road, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20037
 (202) 625-0100
 George Washington Uni. Hospital 901 23rd Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20037
 (202) 715-4975
 Greater Southeast Community Hospital 1310 Southern Avenue
 Washington, D.C. 20032
 (202) 574-6648
 Hadley Memorial Hospital 4601 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., SE
 Washington, D.C. 20032
 (202) 574-5716
 Holy Cross Hospital 1500 Forest Glen Road
 Silver Spring, MD 20910
 (301) 754-7000
 Hospital for Sick Children 1731 Bunker Hill Road, N.E.
 Washington, D.C. 20017
 (202) 832-4400
 Howard University Hospital 2041 Georgia Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20060
 (202) 238-2330
 Inova Alexandria Hospital 4320 Seminary Road
 Alexandria, VA 22304
 (703) 504-3000
 Inova Fairfax Hospital 3300 Gallows Road
 Falls Church, VA 22042
 (703) 698-1110
Hospital Name Address Phone
 Laurel Regional Hospital 7300 Van Dusen Road
 Laurel, MD 20707
 (301) 724-4300
 Loudoun Hospital Center 44045 Riverside Parkway
 Leesburg, VA 20176
 (703) 858-6000
 (888) 542-8477
 Malcolm Grove USAF Medical Center Camp Springs, MD
 Montgomery General Hospital 18101 Prince Phillip Drive
 Olney, MD 20832
 (301) 774-8950
 Mount Vernon Hospital 2501 Parker's Lane
 Alexandria, VA 22306
 (703) 664-7000
 National Institute of Health 9000 Rockville Pike
 Bethesda, MD 20205
 (301) 496-4000
 National Hospital for Ortho & Rehab 2455 Army Navy Drive
 Arlington, VA 22206

(703) 553-2427
 Northern Virginia Doctors Hospital 601 S. Carlin Spring Road
 Arlington, VA 22204
 (703) 671-1200
 Northern VA Mental Health Institute 3302 Gallows Road
 Falls Church, VA 22042
 (703) 560-7700
 Potomac Hospital 2300 Opitz Blvd.
 Woodbridge, VA 22191
 (703) 670-1313
 Prince Georges General Hospital Cheverly, MD 20765 (301) 618-2000
 Prince William Hospital 8700 Sudley Road
 Manassas, VA 22110
 (703) 369-8000
 Providence Hospital 1150 Varnum Street, N.E.
 Washington, D.C. 20017
 (202) 269-7000
 Psychiatric Institute of DC 4460 McArthur Blvd.
 Washington, D.C. 20007
 (202) 467-4600
 Saint Elizabeth's Hospital 2700 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
 Washington, D.C. 20032
 (202) 562-4000
 Saint Mary's Hospital Jefferson Street, Box 447
 Leonardtown, MD 20650
 (301) 863-9750
 Shady Grove Adventist Hospital 9901 Medical Center Drive
 Rockville, MD 20850
 (301) 279-6053
 Sibley Memorial Hospital 5255 Loughboro Road, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20016
 (202) 537-4000
 Springwood Psychiatric Hospital Route 4, Boxes 50
 Leesburg, VA 22075
 (703) 777-0800

Hospital Name Address Phone

Southern Maryland Hospital Center 7503 Surratts Road
 Clinton, MD 20735
 (301) 868-8000
 Suburban Hospital 8600 Old Georgetown Road
 Bethesda, MD 20814
 (301) 896-3100
 U.S. Naval Hospital Rockville Pike
 Bethesda, MD 20814
 (301) 545-6700
 U.S. Dewitt Army Hospital Fort Belvoir, VA 22060 (703) 664-1021
 Veterans Administration Hospital 50 Irving Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20422
 (202) 745-8000
 Walter Reed Army Medical Center 6900 Georgia Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20307
 (202) 782-3501
 (800) 433-3574
 Washington Adventist Hospital 7600 Carrol Avenue
 Takoma Park, MD 20912
 (302) 891-5322
 Washington University Hospital Center 110 Irving Street
 Washington, D.C. 20010
 (202) 877-7000

PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES AND SURVEILLANCE DETECTION

INTRODUCTION

Protective countermeasures must exploit the inherent weaknesses of the terrorist operation. Goals of protective countermeasures:

1. Detect an attack that is in the planning stage.
2. Prevent/deter the attack from occurring.
3. Make an attack difficult to conduct.

In protective security, proactive measures are more desirable than reactive measures. Just as in health maintenance, an ounce of preservation is worth a pound of cure. *Firearms proficiency and specialized driving skills are necessary; however, if one needs to use these skills, opportunities were missed in predicting and thus preventing the attack.*

As stated earlier, in order for a protective detail to predict and/or prevent an attack it must recognize the threat. This includes current as well as potential threats. For a protective detail, the acquisition, maintenance and analysis of threat information is called *protective intelligence*. Therefore, in this chapter, we will define protective intelligence and all its ramifications for predicting and preventing a terrorist attack.

I. GOALS OF PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES

- A. Maintain a comprehensive knowledge of the specific threats against the protectee.
- B. Establish a day to day liaison with local, state, national and military intelligence agencies.
- C. Analyze, assess, and inform the detail regarding the potential threat to the protectee based on available information.
- D. Recognize pre-incident indicators.
 1. Group specific (intelligence).
 2. Threat specific (surveillance).
 3. Incident specific (attack recognition).

II. THE DEPUTY SHERIFF IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

This responsibility is often delegated to the lead advance deputy sheriff. In the case of a high threat or high profile protectee, a protective intelligence team may be formed.

III. TYPES OF INFORMATION NEEDED BY PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Who, What, Where, When, Why, How

- A. Are there specific threats to protectee?
- B. Do the threats extend to country, region, ethnic origin, or religion of the protectee as related to the site of the visit?
- C. What terrorist groups have targeted protectee or his/her country/region in the past?
- D. Are any of these terrorist groups or sympathizers located in the city or region where you will be operating?
- E. What is the purpose of protectee's visit?
- F. Will protectee's visit cause individuals or groups to become agitated with protectee?
- G. Have there been any thefts of police department or utility company vehicles and uniforms?
- H. Have there been any demonstrations recently by groups who may perceive the protectee as a threat?
- I. Are there any local individuals with mental problems who have made threats against any/all individuals in authority. If so, where are these individuals?
- J. What is the threat level against individuals with whom the protectee is meeting? What groups have made the threats? What are their tactics? What information is available

regarding them (photos, addresses)?

K. What is the general political climate with regard to the protectee by local officials and the public?

L. Has the protectee's visit been receiving much coverage in the press?

M. Has the sponsoring agency or hotel advertised the visit? Are they going to and if so, when? What is the reaction to the announcement?

N. Are the groups that may be potentially threatening aware of the visit? Have any of them been seen at any of the sites the protectee will visit?

O. Have there been threats at any of the sites the protectee is visiting, particularly the hotel where he is residing?

P. Have any of the sites had recent labor problems? Have any employees been fired recently? Were ID cards and locks changed? Have any keys to the facility been lost or stolen?

Q. What type of criminal activity can be expected in the area where the protectee is visiting? What type of street crime is prevalent in the city? How does it operate?

R. Are there any groups operating in the area that are advocating the overthrow of the existing government? What are their numbers, equipment, tactics, addresses, photographs, names, sympathizers, safehouses?

IV. DUTIES OF PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE DEPUTY SHERIFF.

A. Maintain liaison with all potential sources of information. The flow of information goes both ways. Potential threat information obtained by the detail must immediately be passed on to appropriate intelligence agencies for analysis.

B. Gather the most critical information, giving it priority, then work through the list based on amount of time available.

C. Ensure the deputy sheriff is promptly and fully briefed regarding activities and information obtained. This information (photographs, descriptions, vehicle types, etc.) should be provided to all detail members.

D. On occasion, the protective intelligence deputy sheriff/team will coordinate "active" intelligence gathering activities. These activities include infiltrating crowds, the deployment of tactical response teams, and some measures of surveillance detection.

V. SURVEILLANCE, SURVEILLANCE DETECTION, AND COUNTERSURVEILLANCE

Of the seven phases common to all terrorist acts, the *surveillance phase* allows the protective detail the *best opportunity* to detect and/or prevent an attack by influencing the terrorist's decision. It is the first time that the terrorist is visible.

The terrorist group usually employs its newest members to conduct initial surveillance.

These individuals are often not trained in surveillance tactics and, as a result, the surveillance conducted is often easily detectable. Also, if one of these new operatives is captured, he/she will have little, if any, information about the inner cells of the terrorist structure.

Target specific indicators of a threat are based on known or suspected surveillance of an individual, group or facility. The information is assimilated and analyzed by the countersurveillance team members.

A. **Surveillance.** Defined by Webster's dictionary as "*watch kept over a person, especially one who is a suspect or a prisoner.*"

B. **Surveillance Detection.** Procedures by which to identify groups or individuals who may be monitoring the activities of an individual or protective detail.

C. Three Levels of Surveillance Detection.

1. From within the motorcade.

2. Mobile, from a separate vehicle.

3. From a fixed point.

D. **Counter-Surveillance.** Measures taken by groups or individuals, who are presently under surveillance, to monitor the activities of the persons watching them.

D. **Anti-Surveillance.** Procedures to neutralize surveillance that has been detected and verified.

VI. OBJECTIVES OF TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE

A. Raids on terrorist safehouses in Europe, America, Latin America, and the Far East have turned up extensive lists of potential targets. Detailed information pertaining to movements, vehicle descriptions, personal habits, family members and frequented locations had been collected by terrorists through surveillance of these targeted individuals.

B. The terrorist objective for conducting surveillance is to gather information in order to develop a precise plan of operation and, subsequently, to select the most vulnerable target.

C. Discovery of these documents provides details of the legal and sophistication of terrorist surveillance.

D. General information gathered by terrorist groups:

1. Information concerning residence and workplace.
2. Type of transportation and whether or not it is armed.
3. Travel routes going between residence, work, and other frequented locations, i.e., church, other offices, restaurants, etc. Do they vary?
4. The more predictable an individual is, the easier the operational planning will be. Is he/she predictable?
5. Does the detail follow good security practices and is it alert?
6. Are protective systems employed at the residence, work place (closedcircuit television, dogs, roving patrols, silent alarms) and by the protective detail.
7. Are there local police/security response forces in the area.

REVIEW OF TERRORIST STEPS OF ATTACK

Target selection.

Initial surveillance.

Final selection of target.

Plan (and final surveillance).

Deployment of attack team.

Target arrival.

ACTION

E. **THE TERRORIST ALWAYS NEEDS TO BE ONE STEP AHEAD OF**

SECURITY. If the target has an armored vehicle, the terrorist will need an armor defeating weapon such as a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) or a light anti-tank weapon (LAW). If the target has a protective detail, the terrorist needs to neutralize that detail.

F. A captured Red Army Faction training manual states that the terrorist needs to be lucky only once while the security forces must be lucky every day.

VII. METHODS USED BY TERRORIST SURVEILLANTS

There are five methods of surveillance: (i) fixed, (ii) moving, (iii) technical, (iv) combination, and (v) progressive.

A. **Fixed surveillance** - the surveillant remains in the same position to observe the activities of a particular subject or location. Examples: Telephone booths, bus stops, garages, parked vehicles, rented apartments, vendors, locations limited only by the terrorist's imagination. They attempt to blend in with the dress and mannerisms and time schedules of the local populace.

B. **Moving surveillance** - the subject is followed on foot or by vehicle. The terrorist may use any number of surveillants and types of vehicles.

C. **Technical surveillance** - equipment used to record conversations in rooms, automobiles, or from telephones.

D. **Combination surveillance** - use of any combination of fixed, moving, or technical surveillance.

E. **Progressive Surveillance** - this surveillance is time intensive involving observation of a subject along a route, in successive segments, and over an extended period of time.

We have discussed the objectives and methods used by terrorists in conducting surveillance. Now, we will discuss what the protective detail can do to detect, deter, and make the terrorist's job more difficult.

All surveillance should be immediately reported to the deputy sheriff. The deputy sheriff or protective intelligence deputy sheriff must coordinate with appropriate intelligence agencies in order to determine what the surveillance threat level represents.

VIII. THE ADVANTAGES OF BEING UNPREDICTABLE

Unpredictability is one of the most important aspects and challenges for the detail. An unpredictable target is hard to surveil and difficult to attack. Being unpredictable forces the terrorist, in his surveillance stage, to remain exposed for extended period of time. This exposure increases his risk of detection and makes planning an attack extremely difficult.

What can be changed or varied?

A. Route (as many different routes as possible).

B. Times of departure (recommend one hour minimum departure window)

C. Vehicles (stealth or dummy motorcades)

1. Stealth - transporting the protectee in vehicles not associated with him or her.

2. Dummy - running the protectee's vehicle or motorcade without the protectee on board.

D. Number of people in motorcade.

E. Number of vehicle in motorcade.

F. Configuration of motorcade.

IX. ROUTE SURVEY AND HOW IT IS USED IN PROTECTIVE SECURITY

Route surveys are a tool used by protective details and security conscious individuals.

A. Route Surveys.

1. Identify as many different routes as possible between the residence, work place and frequented locations.

Note: Regular routes should be coded to allow secure communications. This permits only those involved with the protectee to know his location.

2. Detect, limit, and rank in order the choke points, ideal attack sites, and other potentially dangerous locations on these routes.

3. Locate safehavens, medical facilities and most accessible route(s).

B. Initially, the route survey is examined using the most detailed map available.

Then the routes are actually driven to obtain additional detail information.

C. The surveys allow a detail to concentrate its attention and efforts on those areas of the routes (choke points, ideal attack sites) where surveillance and/or attacks are most likely to occur.

Note: Routes could be videotaped for review and briefing.

D. By maintaining a daily log of the routes used, the surveys provide a means of ensuring that no pattern is developed.

E. The detail must become familiar with every aspect of the route that will be taken, i.e., what is normal, in order to be able to determine what is out of the ordinary. The ideal route would have few choke points and many safehavens.

F. The protective detail must be able to identify attack potential as well as surveillance potential for each route.

Note: It is likely that the attack will occur in or around the same area where there is surveillance.

G. The protective detail is presented with its greatest challenge near the protectee's residence and work place since the potential attacker knows the target must be at either one of these two locations at some point during the day.

H. Surveillance detection route design.

1. Vary routes and/or time.
2. All actions must be consistent with normal security procedures.
3. Routes must narrow the opportunity for attack.
4. Areas chosen for detection must be attack site compatible.
5. Surveillance detection is possible in chosen area.
6. Use natural choke points if possible.
7. Response team assembly site(s) should be overlooking the chosen area.

I. Route analysis.

Analyze the following from the terrorist's point of view.

1. Control of victim(s)/vehicle(s).
2. Concealment of attack team.
3. Escape route(s).

The protective detail is responsible for familiarizing itself with all possible routes.

Safehavens and escape routes should be identified on a street map and their locations physically verified. Established what is normal in an area in order to identify suspicious activity. Know where and what type of attack could be used against your protectee for each route to be used.

Surveillance detection

90% Location

8% Correlation

2% Mistakes

X. A SURVEILLANCE DETECTION ROUTE (“SDR”) AND HOW IT IS USED BY A PROTECTIVE DETAIL

A. One method of detecting or confirming surveillance is through the use of a surveillance detection route (“SDR”). The SDR forces correlation between the surveillant and the targeted individual.

B. The SDR uses a logical detour in which the target doubles back on his route. This ***natural reverse*** should allow the target to observe anyone following into and out of the SDR. It would be unlikely that anyone would make the same combination of turns.

XI. SWEEP CAR AND HOW IT IS USED

Another tactic in surveillance detection is a tail or sweep car. The vehicle and its occupants must be inconspicuous and not be associated with the detail or protectee in any way.

A. The sweep car will follow the detail, at a distance, along the route in order to identify possible surveillance.

B. The sweep car is effective in identifying fixed or mobile surveillance because the terrorist surveillant is mainly concerned with the protectee and protective detail and not what is behind them.

XII. COMMON TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE MISTAKES

Now that it has been identified how and where to look for terrorist surveillance, how can suspected surveillance and actual surveillance be differentiated?

A. Good indicators:

1. correlated movement;
2. inappropriate or crude disguises;
3. communication equipment;
4. physical gestures coordinated with protectee's movement;
5. note taking;
6. excessive picture taking, perhaps with very sophisticated photographic equipment; and
7. interest in the protective detail rather than the protectee.

B. Correlation is necessary for terrorists to conduct proper surveillance. They must keep their intended victim in sight to become familiar with the person's movements. Also, the initial surveillance, conducted by newer, less trained terrorist members, may contain mistakes

that the detail can identify and neutralize.

C. Once a detail verifies surveillance detection, its security awareness is increased and it is normal to “see ghosts.” Everyone looks suspicious. This is not bad, it is better to suspect too much than too little.

D. If the detail verifies surveillance, it is not advisable to apprehend the surveillant.

Here, coordination with other outside intelligence and counter-terrorist agencies is very important. The detail’s focus should be on protection and allow the other groups to deal with the surveillance.

XIII. OBSERVATIONS AND TECHNIQUES USED TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION SKILLS

Observation is awareness of surroundings by an individual achieved through maximum employment of the senses. Expert observations enables one to recognize and recall any object or situation accurately and completely.

A. Accurate observation requires a great deal of mental effort since we normally perceive only that which interests us or is capable of being understood with a minimum effort.

1. Practice being alert and security conscious.

2. Replace casual observation of generalities with the study of detail.

3. Estimate accurately the passage of time, direction, and distance.

4. Be familiar with descriptive terms, including shades of color, makes and models of vehicles, and human characteristics.

B. Observing, remembering and accurately reporting descriptions of persons and vehicles should be learned and perfected prior to deployment.

C. There is a specific sequence which should be followed in observing people and vehicles.

1. Vehicles.

a. year, make and model;

b. general type, size and color;

c. license plate number, state and color;

d. identifying information on name plates, body parts, i.e., GTO, Turbo, Grand Prix; and

e. any distinguishing characteristics.

Become familiar with the most common makes and models of vehicles driven by the populace, including motorcycles, mopeds, and bicycles with frequently encountered license plates.

2. People

Unlike vehicles or objects, *people are difficult to describe accurately.*

Usually there is little time to observe a suspicious person because he or she will avoid a person’s gaze and has the ability to change his or her appearance.

When observing people, notice:

a. sex,

b. race - Caucasian, American Indian, Black, Mongolian or Malayan. Other terms, such as mestizo or Hispanic, may be more descriptive of the local populace and should be learned.

c. color of skin;

d. height - allow for two inch span, e.g., 5’11” - 6’1”. A good method for estimating height is to stare straight at the individual and estimate how far above or below your eyes the tip of his head is. For example, you are 5’10” tall and you estimate that you are looking two inches below his eyes, so he is about 6’ tall.

e. build - very heavy, heavy, stock, medium, slender, thin or emaciated;

f. age - estimated within a five year span;

*g. distinguishing physical characteristics, i.e., a limp, birthmark;
and*

*h. specific physical characteristics such as the shape of the head,
posture and gait.*

XIV THE “COOPER’S COLORS” SYSTEM AS IT RELATES TO PROTECTIVE SECURITY

This portion of the course is designed to provide you with techniques that will enable you to maintain a high level of awareness in order to react better to a critical situation. Research has shown simple mental preparation can minimize stress related trauma and at the same time maximize your chances of survival in a crisis situation.

A. Valley of Shock

1. If you are confronted by an attacker, it is important to remember your body will react instinctively sending you into what is commonly referred to as “*The Valley of Shock.*” Your ability to overcome this shock will be influenced by your prior mental preparation.
2. When exposed to a stressful stimulus (attack, shots fired, a person yelling, etc.) most people will initially drop into this valley of shock. An attacker will often try to keep the victim in this state of confusion, thus inhibiting the ability to react, by continuing to apply stress (more shots fired, slapping the victim, etc).
3. A person who is mentally prepared for the stress, however, will quickly recover from the initial shock, recognize the tactic being employed by the attacker and react with the action appropriate to the situation.

B. Physical Reactions to High Stress

1. If a threatening situation, your body is programmed to respond in a very effective manner. This response includes the following physical reactions to stress:
 - a. pupils dilate;
 - b. adrenaline is secreted causing increased heart rate, blood pressure, and perspiration;
 - c. muscles tighten; and
 - d. oxygen carrying capability of blood increases.
2. These reactions can be quite useful in preparing your body to deal with a threatening situation. The problem arises when you are unable to take physical action to deal with the stressful stimulus because you are not prepared mentally. Both mental and physical readiness must be coupled.

C. Denial Syndrome

For those who have difficulty “coming out” of the shock of a stressful situation, a typical response is denial. Because the mind cannot accommodate radical change quickly, it uses the automatic defense of denial to make the transition. This denial can take many forms including disbelief that the situation is actually happening, giving a feeling you are an observer watching a play unfold in front of you, or in severe cases, regressing into a childlike state.

D. Levels of Awareness

There are different levels of awareness by which we perceive our surroundings. Retired U.S. Marine Corps officer Jeff Cooper developed a system of mental preparation know as “Cooper’s Colors.” It is currently taught to many U.S. law enforcement and security officers. This system of colors is a mental awareness model which will allow a person to adjust one’s height of awareness depending on the circumstances of the surrounding environment.

LEVELS OF AWARENESS (Cooper’s Colors)

Condition ***White***

Condition ***Yellow***

Condition ***Orange***

Condition **Red**

Condition **Black**

1. **CONDITION WHITE - unaware of surroundings.** An attack on an individual in condition white will probably be successful.

2. **CONDITION YELLOW - general awareness of surroundings.** You perceive events and changing conditions going on around you. A person can remain in condition yellow twenty-four hours a day.

3. **CONDITION ORANGE - heightened state of awareness.** A possible threat is identified and contingency plans are made for dealing with the situation. The threat is monitored closely to determine if action is necessary. A person can only state in this condition for about three to four hours.

4. **CONDITION RED - state of action - "flight" or "flight."** A person in this state has either already gone into action or he/she is standing by ready and prepared to go into immediate action. A person can only stay in condition red for a few minutes.

Note: During this state a person will exhibit the systems of physical reaction to high stress that were covered earlier in this lecture.

5. **Condition Black - shock.** A person in this state is so overwhelmed by the situation he/she is shocked into an inability to react. It is as if the person has closed his or her eyes to the event, thus blocking out the entire event. An attack on a person in this state will probably be successful.

"Cooper's Colors" system of mental preparation is ideal for use by protective details.

Combined with the basic knowledge of terrorist operations (choke points, ideal attack sites) the system can raise a detail's overall awareness level and, specifically, raise it further in the most dangerous areas. A few seconds of reaction time saved by being mentally prepared could be the difference between life and death.

Scenario: The detail reports for duty and is briefed by the off-going shift.

This is a time when every member of the detail must focus on the job at hand - **protection.**

Yellow Generally, aware of its surroundings, ready to work no specific threat identified.

Routinely conducted weapon, vehicle, and security system checks can assist the detail to focus on security issues.

Scenario: The detail is prepared to depart via motorcade - resident enroute to work.

The compound gates are opening and the motorcade must pass through the first choke point of the route.

Orange Heightened state of awareness, possible threat is identified. The choke point has been identified as a possible attack site. This is a time when everyone needs to be particularly alert - ready to react.

Scenario: Having left the residence, but while still in the choke point, a disabled truck is observed blocking the road. Individuals appear to be working on the truck.

Red Standing by ready and prepared to go into immediate action.

Scenario: The disabled truck and individuals around it are identified as possible threats. The fact that it has occurred near the residence, on the way to work, in a choke point, are three factors that should increase your concern.

The truck and individuals are determined to be legitimate. The motorcade proceeds past the choke point and on through the route.

Yellow The potential threat has been found to be safe. You return to general awareness until another threat indicator is observed or a choke point is encountered.

The system is "Cooper's Colors" allows one to anticipate possible threats and to prepare mentally to deal with them. **Once again, seconds count** and in the field of protection we are aware of the importance of always being prepared.

CONCLUSION

The acquisition and analysis of threat information is essential to predicting and preventing a terrorist attack and the goal of protective countermeasures is to deter that attack from ever occurring.

BUILDING SEARCH PROCEDURES FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

INTRODUCTION

Recently, terrorists have demonstrated that the use of bombs create massive destruction to a building. To counter the threat and protect lives, standard bomb search procedures are necessary for property and facilities.

During this chapter we will discuss.

1. Requirements for development of a building bomb search plan and considerations that should be addressed.
2. The responsibilities of the four types of search teams.
3. Detailed room search procedures.

I. DEVELOPMENT OF A BUILDING BOMB SEARCH PLAN AND CONSIDERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED

A. ***Create a search plan.*** Be sure the plan is approved by whomever will have the final word. Decide who will initiate a bomb search and/or an evacuation and on what grounds they will do so.

B. ***Search systematically.*** Follow a pattern. Start somewhere and end somewhere and cover everything in between. This is just as important for buildings as it is for rooms.

C. ***Thoroughly search one area before going to another.*** Do not waste time but do a thorough job. This is where planning and training are essential.

D. ***Two-man search teams are preferable.*** The “buddy system” provides double coverage, decreases search time, offers a back-up and, should a suspect package be found, one member can secure the area while the other notifies the command post.

E. ***A one-man search is acceptable but adequate communication is vital.*** The team ***must*** be able to communicate with the command post. Using a radio may set off a device (RF energy). There are also risks in using unsecured radio nets. ***WEIGH THE OPTIONS.***

F. ***Modify the environment as little as possible.*** If the lights are on, leave them on; if they are off; leave them off. Always be aware of the risks of booby-traps. ***NEVER TOUCH*** a suspicious object.

G. ***Standardize markings for areas searched and objects found.*** When an area has been searched, it should be marked as such so that other members of the search team do not duplicate the effort. A standard, clear mark for suspicious packages will alert team members to the danger and identify the location to EOD personnel.

H. ***The decision to conduct a detailed room search should be based on the rationale analysis of a received threat.*** As a rule of thumb, the more detailed and specific the threat the more likely it is to be real.

I. ***While not a “search team” the command post is a critical element of the organization.*** All operations are controlled and coordinated from the command post or DIC. Whoever staffs this area must be in communication not only with the search teams but with the “decision makers” of the area being searched and with the local IED teams, fire and ambulance units.

J. ***Time is critical.*** If a time device is suspected, you should plan to evacuate the search teams at least half an hour before the expected detonation time. As well as watching the clock, the command center should keep a log of all significant events. This adds order to the process and anything you can do to organize and

rationale the search will save time and increase efficiency.

K. *Search teams should start simultaneously.* The teams should be sure to cover all the areas in their assigned location.

II. FOUR TYPES OF SEARCH TEAMS

External

Public Area

Lower Level

Individual Room

A. *External Search Team.* The area most frequently overlooked is that of “public access.

1. All possible areas of concealment near the building must be searched. A bomb does not always have to do great damage to be effective.
2. Fire escapes and roofs must also be checked.
3. In an era of car bombs, it would be wise to limit and control access by vehicles. Do not be afraid to ask questions if something does not seem right. If you cannot find the owner of a vehicle parked in a critical place, start to assume the worst.
4. By minimizing the amount of garbage and containing it in a place far from the building, you will simplify your bomb search procedures and increase your level of security.

B. *Public Area Search Team.* Logically, the areas of highest risk in any building are those areas most easily accessible by the public.

1. One way to limit the risk in these areas is to screen the public as they enter and also to have guards watching for suspicious packages or activities.
2. Another way would be to minimize the number of places, in an area, where a device could be hidden. Cylindrical ash trays, garbage cans, plants, under benches, etc., all could provide a place to hide a bomb and therefore must be searched.
3. Do not forget the obvious places. When were the fire extinguishers last filled and by whom?
4. Search carefully and thoroughly but do not waste time.

C. *Lower Level Search Team.* Generally speaking, the lower a bomb is placed in a building, the more damage it does. For this and all other spaces it is best if the searchers are people who generally work in the area as they can more easily recognize what belongs and what does not.

D. *Detailed Room Search Team.* This is possibly the most complicated and time consuming of all the team assignments.

1. A ball of string, a flashlight, search mirrors and some tape will make the job of searching easier, safer and more efficient.
2. A room search card that carries a check list can help organize a team. A generic card for each of the four teams is a good memory aid for the searchers.

III. DETAILED ROOM SEARCH PLAN

A. The first step in any room search is to **STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN**. Look for anything unusual and listen for unusual sounds (such as ticking). **TAKE YOUR TIME**.

B. Turn off any noise makers if necessary. Do this carefully so as not to disturb others things in the room.

Note: *A new technique often used is the “string method,” as the name implies, it uses a string to mark the area being searched The string marks the area that has been covered and so all active searching is done on the far side of the string (from the point of entry).*

C. String Method.

1. Place the string on the floor, just inside the door, and being searching everything from floor to ceiling just on the other side of the string.
 2. When a decent amount of space has been covered (this will be a judgment call based on the size of the room and the complexity of the job), the string is moved forward and the search continued against on the far side of the string.
 3. Continue this way until the entire room has been covered.
- D. The last step in the room search is to check the false ceiling if there is one. This can be done either with or without a search mirror by lifting one of the ceiling panels and scanning the inside surface. Lift as many panels as necessary to view the entire ceiling surface.

IV. CONCLUSION

A comprehensive Bomb Search Plan can be developed to fit any facility. The degree of a search will depend on the threat. The most important issue is that there is a plan in place and that a search follows established procedures.

REMEMBER IF YOU FIND A DEVICE “DO NOT TOUCH.”

DISPOSAL OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IS THE JOB OF TRAINED BOMB DISPOSAL TECHNICIANS.

PROTECTIVE SECURITY POSTING PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION: “Protective Security Is Preventive Security.”

A protective detail must eliminate any and all threats to the protectee as well as unexpected events. The detail must establish security zones around the protectee to ensure his/her safety. To accomplish these goals a protective detail uses various security posts. All have different functions, yet are related, and each must perform its mission for the detail to perform effectively.

I. The Most Commonly Used Protective Security Posts

A. Pre-Posted Deputy Sheriff. Deputy sheriff’s are pre-posted to secure a particular area or observe a particular event prior to the protectee’s arrival. They are most often used for two purposes.

1. Deputy sheriff’s are posed in a room or area that has been swept by EOD technicians or deputy sheriff to maintain its security integrity.
2. Deputy sheriff’s are pre-posted strategically as part of a security perimeter around a departure or arrival site or around the protectee’s final location.

B. Press Deputy Sheriff. A deputy sheriff may also be pre-posted to monitor the press and ensure they do not present any security risks.

C. Checkpoint Post.

1. Controls access to a given area as part of the concentric rings of security that filter people or things through a given point.
2. Denies access to unauthorized individuals.
 - (a) Point where ID system is enforced.
 - (b) Works as a backup to on site personnel in checking ID’s or working from a guest list.
 - (c) Security personnel will always work as a backup, never as the primary checker (when possible).
3. Allows the screening of individuals to check for weapons.
4. Permits the screening to occur at a safe distance from the protectee.
5. Deputy sheriff assigned must have specific instructions regarding access.
6. The checkpoint post is flexible.
 - (a) Posted in street for vehicle access.
 - (b) Posted at building entrance for vehicles and pedestrians.
 - (c) Posted inside a building to allow access to specific persons.

Those posts are established at determined choke points and/or pre-determined possible attack sites. Those posts report all pertinent information to the command post and agent-in-charge.

D. Surveillance Posts. Surveillance posts are an effective way to cover a large area with limited manpower. Surveillance posts are at varied locations.

1. Rooftops.
2. Among crowds.
3. Hotel lobbies.
4. Street side (along a motorcade route).
5. Underground garages.
6. These posts are assigned the responsibility for
 - (a) observing a specific area or occurrence (i.e., demonstration);
 - (b) watching for activity which may result in harm to the protectee;
 - (c) looking for specific “*red flags*” from individuals and attempting to spot trouble before it occurs; and
 - (d) use against a specific individual, group, or occurrence such as
 - (1) suspicious person,
 - (2) demonstration, and
 - (3) delivery truck arriving in front of site before protectee departure.

E. Special Assignment Post. Anything, anyone or any event, which will be in close proximity to the protectee, may require posting to ensure that it is secure. These posts are usually short-term or site-specific in nature.

EXAMPLES:

1. Luggage deputy sheriff.
2. Pre-posters with the advance (to direct the motorcade).
3. Car post (securing vehicles).
4. Counter-surveillance (who is watching the detail?)

F. Command Post or Residence Watch. As discussed previously in the security perimeters class, one or two deputy sheriffs are posted in a command post to maintain security at the protectee’s residence and to serve as a communications’ hub for the detail.

II. Post Functions.

A. Questions to answer when assuming a post.

1. What are the specific post instructions?
2. What is to be observed?
3. What area encompasses the post?
4. Is access restricted? If so how?
5. What ID systems are in force at the post?
6. What people normally occupy the post?
7. How many buildings and/or windows have free fields of vision on the post?
8. How many ways are there to the post?
9. Where are the other deputy sheriff posts in the proximity located? Can the deputy sheriff see/communicate with them. Are there other law enforcement posts around (i.e., is there a SST team deployed)?
10. Are there obvious dangers to the deputy sheriff or protectee such as flammable liquids, explosives, loose flooring, weapons, speaker wire across the floor? If so, this information should be communicated to the advance deputy sheriff to ensure the threats are removed or fixed
11. Are there any heating or air conditioning ducts leading to the area? Are they secured?

12. Are there utility controls in the area?
13. Where is the fire extinguisher, fire alarm? What type is it?
14. What are a deputy sheriff's duties for REACT (terrorist, fire, medical)?
15. What is the best cover/concealment at the post?
16. Is there a telephone at the post?
17. Can the deputy sheriff communicate with the command post by radio?
18. Is the protectee expected at the post? If so where?
19. Have explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or bug sweeps been performed?
20. Are there any special instructions?

B. General Guidelines for the Posted Deputy Sheriff.

1. When relieving another posted deputy sheriff, a briefing should be requested from his/her.
2. In most cases posted deputy sheriffs will stand not sit on post (within reason).
3. The deputy sheriff should know the protectee's schedule.
4. Deputy sheriff remain at post until relieved, *except when it is necessary to escort the protectee.*
5. The deputy sheriff should know the push schedule and push on time. (Five to three minutes early.)
6. There is no eating on post nor smoking on post.
7. Posted deputy sheriffs must remain alert at all times.
8. If unsure of the specific duties of the post or equipment at assigned post, the deputy sheriff must "*ask someone.*"

CONCLUSION

Establishing a secure area is essential for the security of the protectee. By means of security perimeters, the detail is able to control access to the protectee and thus attempt to ensure his or her safety.

Security posts are critical to protective security. Without security posting there would be no guarantee of security for the protectee. It is essential that all deputy sheriffs understand what type of post they are being assigned and what their specific duties are at that post. This information will enable deputy sheriffs to define the actions required and to determine post specific questions. With this knowledge, all posts will function efficiently and effectively in the pursuit of protective security.

I. Crowd Control

A. Friendly Crowds. A friendly crowd will probably remain friendly and orderly if it is granted as much freedom and as many privileges as the protective situation will permit.

- (1) The use of uniformed officers/deputies has a strong psychological impact.
- (2) Deputies posed should not become involved in conversations, express opinions, or otherwise become involved in disputes or grievances of the crowd. The deputy's job is to scan the crowd for an individual who stands out because of his/her actions or appearances, i.e., acting nervous, cold fixed star.

B. Unfriendly or Hostile Crowds

- (1) Do not let their message deter you from your task.
- (2) Thrown objects should be batted down.
- (3) If it appears the crowd may get out of control, the SL will direct the detail to close in on the protectee and evacuate.
- (4) If a suspicious person is seen in the crowd, a deputy should stand between that individual and the protectee until the protectee passes by.

II. Banquet, Speech or Press Conference.

A. If possible the DIC should accompany the protectee onto the stage. The advance

deputy should arrange for seating.

B. Deputy should be placed at the

(1) entrance/exit of the stage.

(2) backstage, if there is access to public areas.

(3) front of the stage; and

(4) back of the auditorium behind the audience.

C. Additional deputies should be in the

(1) balcony;

(2) projection booth; and

(3) second row (either seated or standing).

ASSESSING CURRENT AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF BEING MENTALLY ILL

In the 1970's, traditional mental health care in the United States was dramatically affected by a U.S. Supreme Court decision based upon an American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") lawsuit filed in the state of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court's decision states in part, that mental health care facilities cannot confine a person against their will, who does not pose a danger to themselves or others.

Presumably, the ACLU suit was filed with the intention of protecting the civil rights of those who could not protect their own interests, but the result was chronically ill patients being released en masse. For example, in 1955, there were approximately 559,000 persons confined in state mental hospitals in the United States. In 1987, this figure had been reduced to 135,000, while the U.S. population had increased by 92 million persons. By 1955 treatment standards, there would be approximately 836,000 persons confined to state mental health facilities throughout the United States.

Subsequently, facilities that formally treated and housed these subjects have not been adequately maintained, and in fact many have been closed. The community half-way houses created to support these patients upon their release have not received the necessary funding required to provide adequate care and support to these former mental health care patients.

The law enforcement community has been greatly affected by this additional estimated 700,000 persons with mental disorders on the streets of America. Pending no major change in U.S. policy and funding for the homeless, it is highly likely that law enforcement personnel will continue to become increasingly exposed to persons with mental disorders.

It is estimated by mental health professionals that approximately 65-75% of the current homeless are former mental patients.

Consequently, it can be expected that many of these subjects will continue to gravitate to the courthouse as a means of obtaining a governmental solution to their perceived problems.

The purpose of this document is to assist threat assessment in assessing the dangerousness of subjects toward the protectee or law enforcement personnel during the protective assignment. The ultimate goal is to correctly answer the predictive question: How likely is it, that a person with a history of responding to extraordinary stress with violence will:

(a) again be in a situation that he/she will experience as extraordinarily stressful, and, if so,

(b) what is the setting around the person that might support stop violent behavior?

The U.S. Secret Service estimates that approximately 55% of their protectee contacts have a mental history. Of the thousands of persons on file with the Secret Service, only 2-3% are considered dangerous to their protectee, but of this relatively small percentage, 95% are part of this group with a mental history.

The challenge to the law enforcement community is therefore, to attempt to determine which persons suffering from a mental illness, and under what circumstances, pose a danger to the protectee. Statistically, most mentally ill persons do not act violently. Mentally ill persons,

like most people, act upon the thoughts they have. As with most people, desperation leads to fear, which can result in violence.

There are however, mental illnesses that tend to have a predilection toward violence. Symptoms of these disorders include paranoia, narcissism (with loss), depression, mania and command hallucinations or delusions.

As you can see, based on the above statistics and other factors, it has become increasingly important that members of the VIPER team intensify their skills at determining the dangerousness of those persons who may come within close proximity to their protectee.

The skills developed by law enforcement officers conducting interviews of mentally ill persons on the street should not be underestimated. As a result of circumstances indicated above, most law enforcement officers have extensive experience in evaluating the immediate dangerousness in persons they have encountered during brief stops. These same skills can be used in the more formal setting of comprehensive interviews of persons suspected of being mentally ill.

A good opportunity to evaluate a subject's potential for violence towards a protectee is during the interview process. Thus, it is important to identify the purposes of the interview which are:

- (a) to gain information;
- (b) to assess the subject's mental status;
- (c) to assess dangerousness; and
- (d) to establish or build rapport for further interviews.

The interviewer must use common sense, vigilance, patience and understanding in order to accurately measure the potential for current or future violence. There is no absolute right or wrong way to conduct an interview with a mentally ill person. It is important to discover the underlying cause of the stress that may have precipitated the current symptoms or disorder, in order to accurately predict what events or changes will lead the person to experience life as extraordinarily stressful in the future, and to anticipate how the person will react to this situation. In dealing with extraordinary stress, will he/she:

- (a) become physically ill?
- (b) become psychotic?
- (c) become violent to oneself?
- (d) become violent towards others?

It is important to note that everything a person does is a result of their wants or needs.

Thus, it is important to develop a sequential approach to interviewing a mentally disturbed person to include:

(a) **The Pre-Interview/Investigative Process.** If possible, prior to the actual interview, obtain as much background information on the subject as possible, to include criminal and mental histories, employment and family status, etc. Determine the subject's history of close personal violence, to include violence incurred as a victim. Interview close family members and others in a position to observe the subject's behavior patterns (do not interview the subject in the presence of family members as they may be part of the subject's problem). If the interview process includes co-workers, demand that a private area be utilized and confidentiality maintained. Make special note of any recent significant events in the subject's life, such as death or estrangement of a close family member, loss of employment, bankruptcy, serious mental problem or other indicators of an increased stress level in the subject. ***THE BEST PREDICTOR OF DANGEROUSNESS IS PAST DANGEROUSNESS.***

(b) **Ensure Your Safety.** Select the interview site that provides the greatest safety to yourself and your partner. The subject's residence may provide you with an important insight to the subject's lifestyle, but it also provides the subject with the advantage of familiarity with his/her surroundings, potential for hidden weapons,

etc. Remember, your firm and foremost concern is *self preservation*. Do not proceed until you are sure the environment is free of any and all potential weapons.

(c) **The Interview Process.** The success of handling the interview process will depend greatly upon:

- (i) the interviewer's observation skills;
- (ii) the interviewer's interviewing skills; and
- (iii) the interviewer's decision making process.

In order to successfully conduct the interview process, it is important to identify those forces working for and against the interviewer during the process of conducting the interview. Forces working *against* you may be the subject's guilt feelings, childhood experiences, fear or hatred or authority, fear of reprisal from others, desire to protect another, fear of appearing in front of strangers or in court, strangeness of the situation and lack of memory or capacity due to mental illness or mental retardation.

Forces working *for* you during this process are: the subject's desire for attention or to appear in court, their desire to be important, fear of withholding information, desire for preferential treatment, desire to please others, relief from guilt feelings and/or a desire for revenge or to punish.

Additionally, it is important to recognize the forces acting on you, the interviewer, and their impact on the interviewing process. These forces include: fear of the unknown, uncertainty about dealing with a mentally disturbed person, desire for safety, desire to succeed, pressure from superiors and/or the total responsibility of your position.

After selection of the interview site is completed, let the subject choose his/her seat first. Upon initiating the interview, remember *treat the subject with respect*, and allow them to tell their story. If you are concerned, let the subject know. It is important to realize that these persons are often very lonely. Once any initial mistrust is overcome, they may exhibit a need to talk. During the interview process, don't violate the subject's personal space. Do not sit between the subject and the door (especially a subject suffering from paranoia). When interviewing subjects not under arrest, consideration may even be given to leaving the door open. Avoid any action that may increase the subject's anxiety or fear level, resulting in violence. Speak slowly, simply, calmly, avoid law enforcement or psychological jargon. Avoid "why" questions as they may be interpreted as threatening by the subject. Attempt to use

opened questions such as "describe your feelings," etc. Do not attempt to talk a subject out of a delusion and avoid being "brought into" the delusion. Most importantly, periodically try to take a moment to "mentally break away" from the interview process to observe objectively what is taking place before you.

Keep in mind, that for every basic human action, to include communicating with others, is done so as a result of either *wanting* to, or *needing* to.

Observe the subject for indications or influence of any of the following types of hallucinations:

- (a) **Auditory** (most common form, especially in schizophrenia). Does the person appear to be staring off into a fixed non-existent point? Ask the person about the frequency, and time frame of the sounds to determine authenticity, etc., as most schizophrenics do not claim constant sound/voices.
- (b) **Command** (voices ordering the subject to commit certain acts). Ask the subject if he/she has heard similar voices in the past, and if they have been able to resist the orders in the past. In most cases, subjects are able to resist hallucinatory commands (at least initially).
- (c) **Tactile** (touch). Often symptomatic of drug or alcohol withdrawal.
- (d) **Visual** (sight). Also symptomatic of drug or alcohol withdrawal (second most common form of hallucination).

(e) **Olfactory** (smell). Often suggest some form of seizure activity such as:

(i) Grand Mal: spasms, shaking, uncontrolled, urination, progressing to unconsciousness, etc.

(ii) Jacksonian: spasms, shaking that begins in a singular area, i.e., hand, arm, etc., and spreads to the entire body.

(iii) Petite Mal: inability to concentrate, etc. Can commonly be misdiagnosed as day-dreaming in children.

(iv) Complex: (also known as Temple Lobe seizures). Partial seizures caused by abnormal brain waves that affect emotions. Common with paranoia.

Observe the subject's mood. For example, ask the person, "How do you feel?" The goal here is to determine what the person reports.

(a) **Affect**: Look for discontinuity of the above, i.e., a person reporting that they feel fine, but appear to be very depressed, etc. Sighs may be indicative of anxiety, or a feeling of being under pressure. Looking away from the interviewer may indicate shame or guilt regarding the topic. Ask about the number of persons the subject interacts with daily. Mentally ill persons often interact very limitedly with other persons.

(b) **Vegetative (Objective) Signs**: Such as sleep. Does the person have a sleep disorder, i.e., getting to sleep, intermittent waking (symptomatic of anxiety), early awakening (symptomatic of depression), feel worse in the morning (depression), or feeling better in the morning and worse in the evening (symptomatic of a physical disorder). Ask about specific timing of any of the above, i.e., if the person reports that they had been waking at 5-6 a.m., but are now waking at 4-5 a.m., this may be indicative that the disorder has worsened.

(c) **Appetite**: Ask about any changes in appetite of the subject, particularly any loss of weight, constipation, etc. (both symptomatic of depression).

(d) **Change in Sexual Function**: Dramatic increase may be indicative of a mania. Dramatic decrease may be indicative of depression.

(e) **Intellect**: Do you know who you are? Do you know where you are? Do you know the date, time, day of week, etc.? Disorientation regarding place of time may be suggestive of an organic problem, e.g., Alzheimer's Disease. If the subject does not know who they are, this may be suggestive of a mental problem.

(f) **Immediate Memory**: Evaluate the subject's immediate memory, e.g., "count to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc." Loss of immediate memory is indicative of an organic problem.

(g) **Recent Memory**: Evaluate the person's recent memory, e.g., "what did you have for breakfast?". Problems with this process are also indicative of an organic problem.

(h) **Remote Memory**: Evaluate the subject's remote memory, e.g., "do you remember your birthday?". This may also be indicative of an organic problem.

As mentioned above, organic disorders can impact on memory recall. For example, Alzheimer's Disease may cause paranoia. If the subject is unable to remember where he or she placed an object, they may suggest that the item has been stolen, resulting in anger being displayed by the subject.

(i) **Evaluate the subject's capacity to abstract**. Ask the subject to explain what is meant by the phrase "You can't tell a book by looking at the cover." The inability to abstract is often present in schizophrenics.

(j) **Evaluate the subject's judgment**. Impaired judgment raises the possibility of impaired behavioral controls, likely to be organic, likely to be organic, i.e., brain inhibitor fibers sensitive to alcohol or brain tumors.

Ask the subject for his/her insight to their problem, "What they think is going on, etc."

Note specific language used in the response that may be indicative that the subject is in therapy.

If the subject can display some insight into the illness, it may be a sign that the illness has not

been prolonged, or that the subject is already being treated.

Persons having command hallucinations and/or delusions deserve special attention for obvious reasons. But it is also important to note that as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision regarding confining persons against their will who are mentally ill, an effective way for a mentally ill person to get re-committed without committing violence would be to threaten a public official.

When evaluating any mental health professional's assessment of the dangerousness or non-dangerousness of any subject, it is important to recognize the following factors: mental health professionals are recognized as experts on behavior, but have no formal training in assessing potential dangerousness of their patients; an important consideration given by mental health professionals is that of potential law suits when they assess potential dangerousness in their patients.

IMPORTANT:

DON'T PROMISE ANY SUBJECT ANYTHING YOU CANNOT DELIVER.

TREAT ALL SUBJECTS WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT AT ALL TIMES. KEEP IN MIND THE SAFETY OF THE NEXT DEPUTY OR POLICE OFFICER TO ENCOUNTER THE SUBJECT.

Utilize only one interviewer at a time with the subject in order to increase the potential for rapport development and reduce confusion. The interviewer should concentrate all of his/her faculties on the actual interview process. The Field Mental Status and Dangerousness Assessment and Social & Environmental Assessment Forms (attachments), should be completed by the accompanying deputy sheriff to allow the interview process to proceed without interruption.

Your partner should be utilized as your "big stick," i.e., as a readily available back-up and observer and note taker. Note taking may act as a distraction to the subject, but if a subject is demanding immediate action or service from the interviewer, the use of notes by the interviewer may suggest prompt action or attention to this subject's perceived problem. Note taking should be done by the accompanying deputy sheriff, and even then, use discretion on a case by case basis. If it becomes obvious that completion of the assessment forms is becoming a hindrance to the interview process, make mental notes and complete the forms immediately after the interview.

During the interview, observe the subject's general appearance. It is important to note that the physical abnormalities listed below may be symptomatic of a mental or physical illness:

- (a) Bulging eyes (hyperthyroidism?)
- (b) Profuse sweating (amphetamines/other drug abuse?)
- (c) Irregular heart beat (as described by subject)
- (d) High temperature (flu, possibility of brain disease, etc.?)

Simultaneously, during the interview process, evaluate the subject's mood and apparent emotional state:

- (a) **Agitated.** Keep in mind that agitated behavior may be normal if original contact was confrontational or violent.
- (b) **Relaxed.** May be normal or abnormal depending on the circumstances of the original contact. Does the subject appear more relaxed than he/she should be, under the circumstances?

It is important to recognize that a physical illness can result from a mental illness, to include physical symptoms. Any of the above symptoms can suggest a physical illness. Simultaneously, observe the subject's physical appearance:

- (a) **Obsessively Neat.** Does the subject's super-neat appearance indicate the possibility of obsessive behavior? E.g., is the subject a street person, but obviously extremely neat and clean, even abnormally so?
- (b) **Disheveled.** Note that misbuttoned clothing may be indicative of an organic problem.

(c) **Signs of Violence.** Does the subject's appearance indicate recent violence to include self-mutilation?

The importance of being a good listener cannot be overemphasized. The art of listening encompasses not only what you hear, but what you observe. Does the subject report facts that are inconsistent with what is observed? For example does the subject report that he is feeling fine, is not under stress, etc., but appears extremely nervous and agitated? **Be a good listener at all times.**

(a) Make the person feel important, i.e., use their last name unless offered the opportunity to do otherwise (e.g., Mr. Smith, Ms. Jones, etc.).

(b) Don't be specific about what you know.

(c) Don't let your body language indicate boredom, impatience, etc. Don't cut off the subject's answers with a next question, etc.

(d) Use silence to your advantage. Strategic pauses allow the subject to continue a train of thought.

(e) Repeat key phrases given by the subject to encourage them to expound on their thoughts.

(f) Listen with your eyes also. Observe the subject's body language that may contradict what the subject is reporting, or indicate unjustified emotions. It is impossible for a person to not communicate with you. By correctly analyzing body language, you can get the person to the talking stage. Record direct quotes made by the subject to assist mental health care professionals at a later date. Evaluate the subject's thought process (how the subject articulates his/her thoughts). Does the subject's thought process contain any of the following?

(a) Loose associations.

(b) Flight of ideas.

(c) Very slow speech (often symptomatic of persons suffering from depression).

Evaluate the person's thought content (what the person says). Does the subject's thought content indicate any of the following?

(a) Delusions (fixed, false beliefs)

(b) Obsessive toward singular topic, etc.

As the person if they ever have thoughts that someone is "out to get them." A "yes" answer may indicate paranoia. Persons indicating that they must commit a certain act to "save the world," etc. may be suffering from Grandiose Delusions.

General discomfort of the interviewer during this process may indicate an abnormal thought process of the subject.

FIELD SOCIAL/ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

1. MARITAL STATUS:

Married Separated Divorced Single

Widowed Remarried: ___ times; recent change/Date:

2. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS;

Alone With: Spouse Children Parents

Other relatives: list:

Friend or roommate list

Recent change/Date:

3. EMPLOYMENT STATUS:

Fulltime Part time Unemployed Disabled

Former student Confined Recent change/Date:

4. RELATIONSHIP WITH FAMILY MEMBERS:

Close Supportive Distant Strained

Estranged Who?

Recent change/Date:

5. CLOSENESS WITH FRIENDS:

Frequent contact: Yes No Supportive: Yes No

Who?

Recent change/Date:

Contact with opposite sex is: Frequent Infrequent

None Recent change/Date:

6. CHANGE IN DAILY STRUCTURE:

Residence Job School

Release from institution Release from military/police

Describe military/police training:

Other:

7. RECENT FAILURE OR LOSS OF STATUS:

Job Friends Family School

Other:

8. RECENT LOSS DUE TO DEATH:

Who? Date:

9. RECENT ILLNESS:

Self Family Other Who/Describe:

10. HISTORY OF HOSPITALIZATION(S):

(Medical/Psychiatric Details):

COMMENTS/NOTES:

FIELD MENTAL STATUS SUMMARY & DANGEROUSNESS ASSESSMENT

NAME (Last, First, Middle):

ADDRESS:

TELEPHONE: DOB:

POB: RACE: SEX:

HGT: WGT: HAIR: EYES:

SCARS/TATOOS: PHOTO AVAIL:

DATE/LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:

INTERVIEWER: OFFICE:

WITNESS: OFFICE:

WITNESS: OFFICE:

1. APPEARANCE: Professional Blue Collar

Street Neat Unkept

Bizarre Other:

2. GENERAL ATTITUDE: Cooperative Passive Evasive

Frank Manipulative Defensive

Hostile Cocky Suspicious

Indifferent Other:

3. LEVEL OF ALERTNESS: Drowsy Fully alert

Hyper-alert Intoxicated

Other:

4. LEVEL OF ORIENTATION: Full Partial Disoriented Re:

Person Place Time

Other:

5. MOTOR ACTIVITY: Underactive Hyperactive

Average Other:

6. MOOD: Depressed Elated Anxious

Guilt Embarrassed Flat

Scared Angry Irritable

Changeable Other:

7. THINKING PROCESS: Clear Confused Illogical

Racing thoughts Sudden change

Sudden stop Other:

8. THOUGHT CONTENT: Appropriate Bizarre

Paranoid Beliefs

Homicidal/Suicidal thoughts

Describe:

9. SPEECH: Rate: Rapid Slow

Volume: Loud Soft

Inaudible Repetitious

Describe:

10. MEMORY: Good Fair

Poor (remote past) (recent past)

Confused Other:

11. HALLUCINATIONS: Visual Auditory Command

Other:

12. DELUSIONS: Persecution Grandiosity

Reference

Other:

13. SIGNS OF STRESS: Things you observe: Heavy smoking

Sweating Pallor Flushing

Shortness of breath Tics or twitches

Finger/foot tapping Other:

14. SYSTEMS OF STRESS OR

DEPRESSION:

Subject reports: Change in appetite

Difficulty in sleeping

Increased drinking/drug usage

Physical complaints (list):

Other:

15. MEDICATIONS: None Yes List:

Dosage:

Currently taking: Yes No

If no, list date of last dosage:

16. MEDICAL

CONDITIONS/INJURIES:

Describe:

17. DIRECT INDICATIONS OF
DANGEROUSNESS:

Acts of violence or signs of violence (injury): self destructive
acts or signs of previous acts

Detailed plans Threats

Gestures to harm self or others

Dangerous environment Other:

18. SUICIDAL: In the past Recently Currently

Never Methods(s):

19. PAST HISTORY OF

VIOLENCE:

Yes No

Details/Dates:

20. SUBJECTS STATEMENTS AND BEHAVIORS OBSERVED:

21. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OTHER(S) REGARDING SUBJECT:

22. CRIMINAL HISTORY

Date:

Offense:

Disposition:

23. MENTAL OBSERVATIONS/CONFINEMENTS:

Date:

Diagnosis:

Disposition:

24. NOTES:

25. ASSESSMENT::

26. RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-UP::

27. Prepared by: Date:

28. Supervisor: Date:

THREAT ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

While there are no known accurate “profiles” of individuals who might assassinate or present harm to protectees of agents, the following list of factors should be considered in making determinations of harm (dangerousness). These factors include, but are not limited to:

1. Does the subject have a history of violent behavior?
2. Has the subject threatened (directly or indirectly) a person protected by this Department?
3. Does the subject have a history of weapons use, and is there data to suggest that the subject might be inclined to use weapons to harm a protectee?
4. Does the subject have a history of mental illness with any of the following symptoms?
 - a. command hallucinations (voices ordering the subject to take certain actions);
 - b. command delusions (beliefs that he/she must take prescribed actions)?
 - c. beliefs that he/she is being persecuted, threatened, attacked, mutilated, injured;
 - d. severe depression with beliefs that the work is coming to an end;
 - e. serious suicide attempts; or
 - f. beliefs that someone who the subject cares about is being injured or hurt by a protectee?
5. Has the subject had any recent experiences that might have led to feelings of desperation?
6. Does the subject currently have access to weapons or other means of injuring a protectee? Might the subject be likely to gain access to such means?
7. Does the subject have the means and/or capacity to travel to an area where he/she might come in proximity with a protectee?
8. Are there known factors in the subject’s life or recent significant events, i.e., loss of life of a close friend or relative, loss of employment, divorce, etc., that might increase or decrease the likelihood that the subject might attempt to injure a protectee?
9. Does the subject possess a violent attitude toward an administrative or legislative decision, policy, or action of federal, state or local government, excluding nonviolent expressions of legitimate political opposition?
10. Does the subject adhere to hate beliefs or philosophies that advocate the overthrow of the Government by force or subversion?
11. Does the subject have a history of making personal visits to offices, government agencies, and/or public officials, to voice or exhibit strong feelings of animosity or hatred?
12. Does the subject have a history of hostility towards authority figures at school, employment, parents, military, law enforcement, or politicians?

13. Does the subject have a history of being a social isolate? Does he/she have support systems (family, friends, etc.)?

14. Has the subject ever been diagnosed by mental health professionals as being dangerous to himself/herself or others?

15. Does the subject's mental history (records) include such terms as explosive, impulsive, hostile, unpredictable, aggressive, poor-control, "grudge against society," angry, homicidal, suicidal, agitated, or belligerent in describing the subject's personality or behavior?

16. Does evidence exist to suggest that the subject may be interested in political assassination (e.g., newspaper clippings, books, personal scrapbooks, diaries, poems, photographs of protectees, etc.)?

17. Does evidence exist to suggest that the subject may admire or be attempting to emulate past assassins or notorious figures? Is the subject trying to fashion himself/herself after Oswald, Sirhan, Moor, Fromme, Hinckley, etc.?

The above factors are provided to assist the investigating officer in thinking about the danger a subject might present to a protectee of this Department. They should be used in conjunction with the personal interview, other investigative information developed during the background investigation of the subject, and common sense.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF AN ASSASSIN

1. Psychological aspects.

a. Paranoid thoughts, ideas or behavior.

b. Suicidal, history of previous attempts.

c. Delusions - omnipotence, grandeur (when confronted with facts will he/she revert to reality).

d. Hallucinations - false readings of one of the senses, (e.g., voice).

2. Behavior aspects.

a. Intelligent quotient (IQ) - potential assassin will most likely have an IQ of 80 or higher.

b. Age: 18-045 year old age group, peaks at early twenties.

c. Relationships, or lack thereof: usually no support systems. This may be real or perceived.

d. Grievance: real or perceived, acknowledge difference.

e. Past violence: single most important characteristics.

f. Habit strength: did he/she get what they wanted through use of violence (e.g., bully behavior)>

g. Episodic drug abuse: includes alcohol and prescribed drugs (often valium). Uses drugs to reduce inhibitions below normal level. Uses drugs to stimulate abnormal behavior.

h. Wanderlust: transient, moves from place to place, job to job, no permanent relationships.

i. Relationship with groups: seeks peer support. Has difficulty being accepted. On fringe of sect or group.

j. Attempts to contact public officials.

k. Recently publicized acts of violence. Has fascination with notorious, infamous figures. Shows trends of mimicking others.

l. Possess low self esteem.

TRAITS OR CHARACTERISTICS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH ASSASSINS

1. From a broken home, one or more parents absent or unresponsive to the child.

2. Withdrawn, a loner, no close friends, unmarried or divorced.

3. Low self esteem, feelings of inadequacy, non-assertive.

4. Unable to work steadily; nomadic in employment and residency.

5. Non-accomplisher.

6. Unable to relate to the opposite sex.
7. Dire need to become successful or notable in a grandiose manner.
8. Questions self image and identity.
9. Possess suicidal tendencies; history of previous attempts.
10. Zealot for a political, religious or other cause.
11. Perceives him/herself as becoming a dominant political figure.
12. Attacks or assassinates in the name of a specific issue, real or perceived.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VIPER PRELIMINARY THREAT REPORT

To:

From:

1. Date Threat Received: Time: Location:

2. Individual Reporting Threat:

Title: Phone:

3. Person Threatened: Title:

4. How received (verbal, written, informant, mail, etc):

5. Suspect Name: Sex: DOB:

Race: S.S.# FBI #

If Incarcerated Location:

6. Is a security detail being provided Yes _____ No _____,

If yes, Date: Time:

7. Victim Notified? Yes _____ No _____ Date: Time:

Note any victim comments in attached narrative.

9. A copy of the Preliminary Threat Report was sent to the Threat Analysis Officer.

Yes _____ No _____

10. Attach a narrative description of the threat and the subsequent actions taken.

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

Alonzo D. Black, II, Sheriff **INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

VIP / Witness Protection Unit

After Action Report

DATE OF REPORT: CONTROL #

INITIAL OR SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT MADE BY: STATUS OF
ACTIVITY:

SUBJECT OF ACTIVITY:

DAY, DATE, TIME:

LOCATION:

PRINCIPLE:

UNIT PARTICIPANTS:

DOCUMENTARY:

REPORT SUBMITTED BY: DATE:

REPORT REVIEWED BY: DATE:

I. Deputy Reactions to an Attack on the Protectee

In case of attack, the following should take place:

A. **Sound Off**. The first deputy perceiving an attack should alert the others by shouting the method and direction of the attack.

1. Use the **Clock Method** to determine where the threat is.

a. The **protectee's direction** is always twelve o'clock.

b. The clock method gives a better idea to all members of a detail as to the location of the threat.

2. Calling right or left is too general and may result in deputies being confused as to the direction.

3. Deputies can react and sound off simultaneously.

B. **Cover.** The deputy nearest the attacker must neutralize the offender.

1. Only use the *minimum number of deputies* necessary to subdue an attacker.

2. The other deputies in the detail should “cave-in” on the protectee to provide body protection.

3. The DIC lowers the protectee by grabbing his belt and making the protectee’s knees buckle slightly. ***Be careful not to knock the protectee off his feet.***

4. If a vehicle is in the proximity, it is brought up and the protectee literally shoved into the back seat with the DIC on top of him.

5. If possible, allow other law enforcement officials to arrest attackers.

Making an arrest drains the detail of its manpower.

6. A deputy’s first responsibility is to ***protect the protectee***, not help fellow deputies, until the protectee is safe.

7. This procedure defends against a ***secondary attack!*** The first attack may be a diversion.

C. **Evacuate.** Move the protectee to a safe haven with the entire detail.

1. Evacuate in the direction ***opposite*** from where the ***attack was first called.***

2. This will ensure that everyone is covering to the correct side and not pulling the protectee in a different direction. ***The DIC’s body should be between the protectee and the attacker.***

3. This opposite-direction-requirement applies only until the protectee is out of immediate danger or the kill zone.

4. The protectee is then moved, as ***quickly and calmly as possible, to the closet safe haven.*** ***Be alert for the possibility of a second attack.***

5. Once the protectee is in a safe haven either evacuate, if the safe haven is a vehicle, or set up a defensive perimeter around the safe haven using deputies from the walking formation, and/or any other security available.

6. ***Remain Calm! Keep a level head!*** In the confusion, ***do not drop your guard*** but anticipate a second attack. Once you arrive at a safe haven, do not assume the attack is over. Be prepared for the next attack. Keep your calm while staff, press, etc. are losing theirs.

II. Medical Emergency

A. Drivers must be familiar with emergency routes to hospital.

B. DIC is decision maker as to whether or not to evacuate to hospital.

C. Recommend DIC enter rear of limousine with the protectee to perform any emergency safe have procedures.

III. Special Situations

Special events such as greeting ceremonies, speeches, banquets, etc. require flexibility in the standard walking formations. In addition, physical layouts may preclude maintenance of a strict moving formation, such as climbing stairs or using escalators or elevators. A thorough advance is crucial.

A. Revolving Doors

1. If at all possible, avoid leading the protectee through a revolving door.

2. The advance deputy should have the revolving door folded into an open position or use another door to prevent entrapment of the protectee.

B. Receiving line

1. The advance and left rear deputies watch persons entering the line.
2. The DIC, with the assistance of the shift or right rear deputies observe persons greeting the protectee.
3. The right front or well deputies observes the crowd that has passed by the protectee.
4. Additional deputies (pre-posts) should be placed at entrances to the room.

C. *The Fence Line*

1. This line occurs where a crowd gathers behind a barricade, fence, or stanchion, to greet the protectee.
2. There is always the possibility of an unstable individual entering a crowd (example of what happened to President Reagan).
3. If well-wishers become overzealous when shaking hands, use a thumb break.
4. ***Remember to Watch the Crowd's Hands.***
5. Deputy placement for a fence line.
 - a. Shift leader and DIC remain behind left and right shoulders of protectee.
 - b. The advance continues in the direction of the protectee's travel.
 - c. Any time a protectee is facing or greeting a crowd, one deputy sheriff, either right rear, left rear or well deputy sheriff must be placed in the second row moving parallel to the protectee. The deputy sheriff working the second row will conduct obvious surveillance. This way, if someone is hiding they will be intimidated. If not, the deputy sheriff is in a position to react if the attacker draws a weapon.
 - d. It is paramount that the second row deputy sheriffs remember to ***sound off!***
 - e. If it is not possible for a deputy sheriff to move with the protectee, then several pre-posted second row deputy sheriffs should be assigned responsibility for small areas of the crowd before the protectee arrives.

SITE SURVEY: DATE:

SITE POINT OF CONTACT ISSUES

_ CONTACT PERSON/MEETING NAME: TELEPHONE:

_ SITE/EVENT PROFILE

_ MEET AND GREET NAMES/LOCATION

_ TIME ROOM/SITE READY

_ HOLDING/TELEPHONE ROOM

_ ARRIVAL DEPARTURE POINTS*

_ ALT. ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE POINTS*

_ PROTECTEE SITE ROUTE*

_ RESTROOMS

_ PHONE INCOMING DISCONNECT

_ HOLDING/TELEPHONE ROOM

SITE SECURITY CONTACT ISSUES

_ SITE SECURITY/MEETING NAME: TELEPHONE:

_ INDIVIDUAL SITE/EVENT ACCESS

_ SITE ELECTRONIC SECURITY

_ SITE SECURITY OFFICER/PROFILE/ROLE

_ ELEVATOR/EXIT/KEYS

_ ELEVATOR HOLD

_ DOOR PROP

_ ARRIVAL DEPARTURE BARRICADES

_ MOTORCADE PARKING/SECURITY*

_ STASH CAR PARKING*

_ OTHER PRINCIPALS ON SITE

_ MEDIA EXPECTATIONS/PROCEDURES*

_ DEMONSTRATION EXPECTATIONS/PROCEDURES*

_ **SITE SAVE HAVEN**

_ FIRE EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS/OPERATION

_ FIRE ANNUNCIATOR SOUND

_ NOTIFICATION OF ACTUAL FIRE THREAT

_ PACKAGE/GIFT INSPECTION

_ ELEVATOR INSPECTION DATE/SERVICE TIME

ADVANCE DEPUTY SHERIFF ISSUES

_ **VEHICLE ROUTE TO SITE**

_ ENROUTE SAFE HAVENS

_ ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE POSTS

_ ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE BARRICADES

_ TECH/BOMB SWEEPS

_ SHIFT AGENTS ENTRY/POSTING

_ NEAREST POLICE

_ NEAREST FIRE

_ NEAREST HOSPITAL

_ HOSPITAL CAPABILITIES

_ HOSPITAL CONTACT NO.

_ NAME CHECKS

_ DETAIL FOOD/AMENITIES

* Issues that should be discussed with Contact and Security -- **Bold** -- Key last minute advance items. Not all

items are applicable for all Events but should be considered regardless.

I. BOMBS ARE POPULAR WEAPONS OF TERRORISTS

Note: *Through courses dealing with terrorist bombs, you will hear and see the abbreviation IED. It means improved explosive device.*

A. The advantage for the perpetrator of being psychologically and geographically distant from the crime makes the use of bombs preferable for the terrorist because:

1. there is no opportunity to establish a relationship or “bond” with the victim, which a face-to-face encounter might create; and
2. the use of a bomb allows for physical separation from the crime.

B. A detonating IED destroys or alters physical evidence at the crime scene and increases the difficulty, associated with forensic investigation, in identifying the bomber’s signature.

C. Detonations caused by IEDs are dramatic because:

1. The act ensures extensive, and possibly prolonged, media coverage of the terrorist organization, its goals and the crime committed; and
2. The damage incurred may take time to repair and provides a daily reminder of the crime.

D. IEDs can be simple and inexpensive to construct. Extensive knowledge of electronics or explosives is not required.

1. Many IED components are available commercially. Pipes, electronic components, flashbulbs and black powder are available at little cost or risk to the purchaser.
2. Household products and chemicals can be combined to form explosive filler material.
3. Low explosives such as black or smokeless powder can be legally purchased. Military and commercial explosives may be stolen or provided by sympathizers.
4. Publications are available providing instructions on IED fabrication.
5. An IED only has to work once.
6. An IED can produce multiple deaths in spite of its comparatively small size.
7. IEDs are easy to place and conceal.

8. The only limitation placed on IED construction, initiation, concealment or placement is the extent of the bomber's imagination.

II. RECOGNITION OF IEDs AND THE CORRECT RESPONSE WHEN DISCOVERED

A. Look for items that are out of the ordinary.

1. Luggage, briefcases or packages that are left unattended.
2. Items that do not conform to their surroundings:
 - a) Loose, clean wires on vehicles;
 - b) New items of unexplained origin; and/or
 - c) Suspicious packages inside of, underneath, or attached to vehicles.

B. Check out unusual behavior by individuals:

1. Surveillance of the premises;
2. Unexplained or unexpected deliveries; and
3. Suspicious conduct in or near public places (i.e., airports, restaurants).

C. Intelligence:

1. Understand the terrorist threat in your area; and
2. Become familiar with the method of operation of local groups.

D. Appropriate reactions to an IED can save lives.

1. ***Never touch an IED.***

2. Recognize its potential danger and clear the area in an expeditious manner. Use the R&R rule when dealing with suspicious devices, ***"Recognize and Run."***

3. Notify the proper authorities.

4. Keep a minimum safe distance of 100 yards.

5. If you can see it, it can see you. Take cover.

Note: Some terrorist groups initiate secondary explosives near the original explosion causing casualties among the responding authorities and curiosity seekers. If a detonation has occurred, move away and stay away.

III. CONSTRUCTION AND CATEGORIES OF IEDs

A. IEDs are usually made up of four components.

1. The ***container*** simply holds the explosives in place. It could be the paper wrapper around dynamite or a coffee can holding homemade explosives. The container could also provide fragmentation as in a pipe containing black powder. In some cases a container may not be present as in case TNT.

2. The ***main charge*** is the explosive or incendiary filler.

3. The ***detonator*** causes the main charge to explode. The detonator could be a blasting cap, flashbulb or a percussion primer.

4. Finally, the ***fuse*** is used to fire the detonator. It could be a simple burning time fuse or it could involve a complex system of electronic booby traps. The fuse can be electric or non-electric.

B. IEDs can be electrically or non-electrically initiated.

1. Electrically-initiated IEDs would be those that use electric blasting caps or flashbulbs and require a power source such as a battery, a wall plug or a charged capacitor.

2. Non-electrically-initiated IEDs are those that use a burning fuse or percussion primers. Military booby traps are a good example of percussion primers.

C. IEDs can be categorized in four different types:

Time delay.

Victim activated (booby-trap).

Command.

Environmental.

1. ***Time Delayed***

- a) Clocks and watches.
- b) Burning fuse.
- c) Chemical reaction.
- d) Metal fatigue.
- e) Electrical systems.

2. ***Victim Activated (BOOBY TRAPS)***

- a) Mercury switch.
- b) Mouse trap.
- c) Clothespin.
- d) Loop switch.
- e) Anti-disturbance.

3. ***Command***

- a) Radio.
- b) Wire, and/or;
- c) Pull wire

4. ***Environmental***

- a) Barometric (altitude).
- b) Temperature sensitive and,
- c) Light sensitive.

IV. THREE CATEGORIES OF EXPLOSIVES

A. Military Explosives.

- 1. C-4
- 2. TNT
- 3. PETN (Data Sheet)
- 4. Military dynamite (AN base)

B. Commercial Explosives

- 1. Commercial dynamite (NG base)
- 2. Water gels
- 3. Binaries
- 4. Black Powder
- 5. Smokeless Powder
- 6. ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel oil)

C. Improvised Explosives

- 1. Chlorate Mixtures
 - a) Potassium chlorate and sugar
 - b) Potassium chlorate and red phosphorus
- 2. AN Mixtures
 - a) ANFO
 - b) ANAL (ammonium nitrate and aluminum dust)
- 3. Incendiary Mixtures
 - a) HTH and score hair gel
 - b) Sodium peroxide and water
 - c) Match heads and battery acid

D. Black powder is often homemade (high school, college) and less stable than commercially manufactured.

Note: *Frequently a mixture or compound that would normally burn rapidly, such as smokeless powder, will detonate when confined.*

V. TWO MOST COMMON TYPES OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN ATTACKED WITH THIS TYPE OF DEVICE

These can be made in many different ways. Two of the most notable:

A. The classic Molotov that uses a saturated burning wick which ignites the filter when the bottle is broken.

B. The sealed Molotov uses a chemical reaction to ignite the filler when the bottle is broken. Normally, the chemicals are sulfuric acid mixed with the filler and a sugar/chlorate mixture in a sock or rag on the outside of the bottle.

C. If you are attacked with a Molotov while in a vehicle, ***continue to move***.

1. A moving vehicle will not catch fire after the burning filler is consumed.

A stationary vehicle may catch fire if the burning filler ignites the tires and grease under the car.

2. If you stop when attacked, you are now at the mercy of the attackers.

VI. LETTER BOMB CONSTRUCTION, ID FEATURES AND PROCEDURES TO BE USED TO SCREEN LETTER AND PACKAGE BOMBS

Letter bombs are made with a flexible explosive and a booby-trap initiator designed to function upon opening. Most letter bombs can be detected with a metal detector or X-ray.

Package bombs, because of their larger size, can contain any type IED. The fusing system is still designed to function upon opening. Most can be detected by X-ray.

A. The first step in screening letter bombs is recognizing the ID features normally associated with mail bombs. These ID features include:

1. Foreign mail, airmail, special delivery
2. Restrictive markings such as confidential, personal, etc.
3. Excessive postage
4. Handwritten or poorly typed address
5. Incorrect titles
6. Titles but no names
7. Misspelling of common words
8. Stains or strange odors
9. No return address or fictitious return address
10. Return address does not match post office cancellation
11. Excessive weight, heavy
12. Thick bulky rigid envelope
13. Protruding wires or tin foil
14. Excessive securing material such as tape or string

B. Confirm the return address if present. If fictitious or incorrect, treat the item as suspect.

C. Contact the addressee if possible and determine if the item is expected.

D. Confirm the letter or parcel was delivered through the general mail. If it did arrive through the mail, we can assume it can withstand limited movement.

E. Confirm delivery and sender if the letter or package was delivered by special courier to delivery service.

Note: Do not move the item if the delivery cannot be confirmed.

F. Shoot an X-ray of the item if available, and determine if the item is suspicious. If the letter or package cannot be confirmed as safe, treat it as suspect.

Note: Do not place the item in a confined space (i.e., safe or file cabinet).

G. Move the suspect item to a designated safe area. This area should be away from people and clear of power, gas and fuel lines.

H. Make the appropriate notifications. They may include, but are not limited to:

1. Supervisory personnel
2. Local security
3. Bomb squad
4. Federal officials, FBI, ATF, postal and supervisors of adjoining offices.

VII. GRENADE CONSTRUCTION AND ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN ATTACKED WITH THIS TYPE OF DEVICE

This is similar to that of an IED and, since its fusing is usually time-delayed, the two systems readily adapt to various booby-trap functions. Employ extreme caution when handling.

A. Hand grenades are usually comprised of a *container, main charge or filler, detonator, and fuse.*

B. Most hand grenades have a three-to-five second time delay that begins when the firing pin strikes the primer and ignites the time delay.

C. Immediate action:

1. If the grenade is close, kick it away, shout “**Grenade**” and take cover. To determine if the grenade is close enough to kick, use the “one step rule.”

If you can reach it in one step, kick it.

2. Drop down prone, heels together, arms close to the body, with the head facing away from the grenade.

3. If the grenade is far away, get behind cover and drop to the prone position.

VIII. ANTI-TANK ROCKET CAPABILITIES

This weapon derives its ability to pierce armored targets through its shaped charge technology. It concentrates the explosive force and the heat to a desired point, which enhances penetration.

A. In the hands of the terrorist, these weapons present a significant threat to Americans in many parts of the world. These weapons provide the terrorist with the ability to penetrate armored sites and vehicles as well as a method of delivering explosives from outside the security perimeter.

B. Some of these weapons, their country of origin, and their effective range are as follows:

Weapon Country Maximum

Effective Range

Penetration

RPG-2 Russia 150 meters Russian 7”

Chinese 10”

RPG-7 Russia 300m (moving target);

500m (standing target);

920m (maximum)

12”-13”

RPG-18 Russia 200m (moving target);

350m (maximum)

14.6”

M72

LAW

US 150m (moving target);

300m (stationary);

1000m (maximum)

11.9”

IX. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS A TERRORIST NORMALLY USES TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN EXPLOSIVE ATTACK AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO COUNTER THIS THREAT

A. Most terrorist bombings follow a sequence of events. Very few are “spur of the moment.” An understanding of what occurs will help in defending against the threat.

1. **Target Selection.** Many time terrorists will have a list of targets, both primaries and alternates. They like soft targets. Keep your self and your facility hard. If they are determined to make a statement, let them make it elsewhere!

2. **Site Surveillance.** This may be your first indication of trouble. Many

times during post blast investigations, it was found that surveillance was present and *noticed* but not reported.

3. *Rehearsal/Dry Run*

- a) bring in devices
- b) observe security procedures, and
- c) if found, reaction.

4. *Construct Device.*

5. *Plant Device* - willing or unwilling.

6. *Escape*

7. *Exploit the Act*

B. Security procedures to follow in order to counter the terrorist bomb threat involve adherence to already existing security guidelines. Use common sense and always be aware of your surroundings.

1. **BE ALERT!** Know that is going on around you. Notice lone cars or people who are loitering and out of place when you are at your residence, en route or at post.
2. Vary your itinerary as much as possible. Constantly change departure times, arrival times, route traveled and even vehicles if possible.
3. Perform a routine vehicle search each time a vehicle is left unsecured.
4. Establish mail and package processing procedures at home and at work.
5. Establish and exercise a bomb search plan to handle bomb threats and suspicious devices.

X. CONCLUSION

There are no limitations to the physical configuration of an IED. The only limitation would be the imagination of the builder and the resources available to him.

REMEMBER! Our job is to defend against, recognize and run.

DISPOSAL OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IS THE JOB OF TRAINED BOMB DISPOSAL TECHNICIANS.

CHAPTER II. INTELLIGENCE AND PLANNING

A. Initial Information Sheet

An information sheet will be written containing all available data relating to the assignment. It will include:

1. Case number.
2. Court location.
3. Defendant(s):
 - a. Name and physical description
 - b. Custody location
 - c. Sheriff's Office Number (SDN)
4. Court personnel:
 - a. Judge
 - b. State's Attorney
 - c. Defense Attorney
5. Charge(s)
6. Background
 - a. Incident history
 - b. Defendant information
 - c. Witness history
7. Situation:
 - a. Court/trial status
 - b. Available intelligence information
 - c. Anticipated problems/hazards

8. Recommendations:

- a. Depth of security
- b. Number of personnel
- c. Possible related activity

This information will provide the Operation Commander with preliminary data that will serve as a base for the operation plan.

B. Trial Background Information

Any and all available information concerning the defendant(s), their families, friends, and defense witness's criminal activity or the trial activity must be accumulated, centralized, evaluated and disseminated to the concerned personnel. This will be the primary responsibility of the Intelligence Officer. Information may be obtained from the news media publications, criminal record systems or investigative agencies of local enforcement.

Certain information may be deemed "confidential" and revealed only to selected key personnel so as to not to jeopardize the entire operation.

C. Operation Plan Format

This is the most important single factor in the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive plan. It is imperative that a course of action is adhered to by all involved in the operation. This can be accomplished through the use of an operational plan format:

1. SITUATION

- a. General Information
- b. Intelligence Information
- c. Assisting Units
- d. Command Structure

2. MISSION

- a. VIP/Witness Protection Team Responsibility
- b. Assisting Units(s) Responsibility

3. POST ASSIGNMENTS/INSTRUCTIONS

- a. General Instructions
- b. Post Assignments
- c. Specific Instructions

4. COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICS

- a. Communication Types and Methods
- b. Logistics

5. ARREST AND REPORTING PROCEDURES

- a. Arrest and Booking
- b. Prisoner Transportation
- c. Reporting procedures

SAMPLE

COURT ORDER FOR SEQUESTERED JURIES

In the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland

State of Maryland Criminal Trial #

Vs.

ORDER OF COURT

It is hereby **Ordered** this _____ day of _____, _____, that the jurors and alternate jurors in this case shall be sequestered and shall thereafter be kept in the custody of the Sheriff of Prince George's County, Maryland for the duration of this trial, or until further notice from this Court; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall make arrangements for appropriate accommodations for the jury during the trial, and shall provide the adequate security in the jurors' quarters beginning _____ day of _____, _____ and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall make satisfactory arrangements to assist the jurors in securing apparel and personal items from their homes; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall make appropriate arrangements for the furnishing of vehicles (including the hiring of vehicles, if necessary) for the transportation of jurors between their place of lodging and the courthouse; and it is further

Ordered that during the period of sequestration, the Sheriff shall provide to each of the jurors and alternate jurors so sequestered, breakfast, lunch, and dinner; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall maintain appropriate records during the trial providing:

- a. A record of deputies' assignments to shifts and duty stations.
- b. A record of the jurors' quarters.
- c. A record of persons entering the area of the jurors' quarters.
- d. A record of telephone calls to and from the jurors' quarters; and it is further

Ordered the assigned Sheriffs/Bailiffs shall make certain that no member of the jury:

- a. Has any unauthorized contact with any outside person.
- b. Reads newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or listens to radio or television newscasts or bulletins pertaining to the trial or programs where the theme resembles the case being heard or decided upon.
- c. Has any discussion with any outside person pertaining to the case.
- d. Has any discussion of the case with other jurors before the case is submitted for deliberation.
- e. Has written or telephone communication with any person, except under the direct supervision of the assigned Deputy Sheriff/Bailiff on matters not pertaining to the case; and it is further

Ordered that any communication with the Court shall be made in writing and placed in a sealed envelope by the jury or individual juror, and upon being turned over to the sheriff's personnel will be promptly delivered to the Court; and it is further

Ordered that mail and/or packages to and or from jurors shall be censored to ensure that no information relative to the trial is transmitted; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall make provisions to transport any juror who has previously made such arrangements with the Court to such medical doctors whose names the jurors shall furnish to the Sheriff; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall make provisions for the videotaping of television programs which will subsequently be shown to the jurors, thereby eliminating the possibility of hearing or seeing news bulletins; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall, to the extent possible, make suitable arrangements for jurors to attend religious services if such arrangement can be made under custodial supervision; and it is further

Ordered that the Sheriff shall make provisions at the county expense for the recreational activities of the jurors, including: attendance at athletic events, the theater, picnics, and short trips for dining purposes, or to historical or scenic sites where overnight travel is not involved.

This Order may be altered, amended, and/or changed from time to time as in the Court's judgment conditions warrant.

INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Case No. State v.

Date Time

Location

Deputy/Bailiff

Be accurate, brief, concise and fully explanatory.

Describe Incident

Signature Date

Supervisor Date

Page of Pages.

AUTHORIZATION FOR SECURITY TO MOVE JUROR’S AUTOMOBILE

I, hereby authorize the Sheriff of Prince George’s

County or his assigned representative to move my automobile until released to my family.

Year of automobile

Make of automobile

Color of automobile

Tag number

Automobile released to

By:

Date:

MAIL CENSORSHIP CONSENT FORM

State v.

Case No.

CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY

I, , do hereby authorize and consent to the opening of any and all incoming or outgoing mail matter, packages, correspondence, or other items addressed to me, marked for my attention or written by me, and to the censoring of the contents therein by the County Sheriff or his designee during the course and continuation of my sequestration in the above captioned trial.

Signature of Witness Signature

Title Date

I, , do hereby request the County Sheriff to forward or otherwise secure any and all mail matter, packages, correspondence or other items addressed to me or marked for my attention in the following manner:

Signature of Witness Signature

Title Date

MEDICAL INFORMATION SHEET

Please complete the following and return to the Bailiff.

1. Full name of Juror

2. In case of emergency notify

Name and Relationship

Address and telephone number of the above during the day

Address and telephone number of the above during the night

3. List your family doctor with his name and telephone number.

4. The closest hospital to your motel is Prince George’s General in Cheverly. If you become ill is it alright to take you there?

If no specify what hospital

If neither what action do you want taken?

5. Are you under doctor’s care at this time?

6. Are you required to take daily medicine?

7. What kind of medicine and dosage?

8. Do you have adequate supply with you?

9. If no specify type of medicine and where it can be obtained?

10. If you are allergic to any medicine please list below:

11. Please list any detailed instructions you feel should be know about your health
12. The above information will be considered confidential and will be available for court use only and will not be given and/or used in any way except to protect you while on this case.

VISITOR REGISTER

Case No. State v.

Time Visitor Deputy

Date Begin Ended Juror (Name and Relationship) Present

NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL REGISTER

Case No. State v.

Newspaper or Periodical

Date of

Publication

Number of

Copies

Censored By

TELEPHONE CALL LOG

Case No. State v.

Date

Time

Began Ended

Juror

Second Party and

Relationship to Juror

Incoming

Outgoing

No. Called

Topic of

Conversation

Monitor

INCOMING MAIL REGISTER

Case No. State v.

Date Received Juror Received From Censored By

OUTGOING MAIL REGISTER

Case No. State v.

Date Mailed Juror Address Censored By

SEQUESTERED JURY REGISTER

Case No. State v. Judge

Date Sequestered Date Concluded Housing Site

Juror Next of Kin

Room A. Name D. Name

Number B. Address E. Address

C. Phone F. Phone Number, Relationship

A. D.

B. E.

C. F.

A. D.

B. E.

C. F.

A. D.

B. E.

C. F.

A. D.

B. E.

C. F.

A. D.

- B. E.
- C. F.
- A. D.
- B. E.
- C. F.
- A. D.
- B. E.
- C. F.
- A. D.
- B. E.
- C. F.
- A. D.
- B. E.
- C. F.
- A. D.
- B. E.
- C. F.
- A. D.
- B. E.
- C. F.

TRANSPORTATION LOG

Case No. State v.

Time Vehicle/No.

Date Dept. Arr. From To (Bus, Van, Car) Driver Escort Officers

PERSONNEL LOG FOR SEQUESTERED JURY SECURITY

Judge Case Number

Day Shift

(Duty Hours)

Night Shift

(Duty Hours)

Personnel Assigned:

- 1. 1.
- 2. 2.
- 3. 3.
- 4. 4.
- 5. 5.

Date Day Time Remarks

In Out

BUILDING CLOSURE

A. General

A major trial operation may evolve to a point where the first line of defense becomes the building perimeter. This is advisable if the desired level of operational security could not possibly be achieved at the trial court location. This type is an extreme inconvenience to the building tenants, is time consuming and must be conducted with a great deal of tact and expert efficiency by security personnel.

1. Operational Procedure

A building closure is the establishment of a 100% screening of all those who wish to enter the building. This may be done by a court order from the presiding judge. The order will state the mode of operation, imposed restrictions and requirements, and personal exemptions

The administration of the search procedure and listed restrictions

must be extended to all persons. The only possible exemptions should be properly identified law enforcement officers.

Restrictions and requirements listed in the court order will be at the discretion of the Operation Commander

2. Building Liaison Officer

If a building closure is utilized, all tenant department heads must receive prior notification and be advised of the procedure. This will be the responsibility of the Operation Commander's second in command, who shall serve as the Building Liaison Officer.

The cooperation of the individual tenant heads should be encouraged.

BUILDING SECURITY

A. General

Conceivably, an operation of this type would require that security measures be extended. These measures would be in the forms of:

1. Extra exterior perimeter foot patrol.
2. Surveillance of entrances.
3. Parking security for the judge and jury.
4. Extra roving patrols of the main lobby and corridor in close proximity of the designated courtroom.
5. Patrol of building subterranean areas and housed equipment, i.e., power supply, air conditioner, etc.

The majority of the security effort would be during normal business hours. It may be desirable to maintain the extra patrol activity on a minimum basis after hours and weekends to prevent the possible introduction of explosives.

COURTROOM SECURITY

A. Search Screen Operation

Courtroom admittance control can be accomplished by use of a search screen. A check point at the entrance to the courtroom will require individuals to produce identification and submit to a walk-thru or hand held metal detector, which will be manned by a Public Service Aide. Failure to comply will result in non-admittance.

Necessary equipment includes a desk/table used both as an entrance barrier and work space, a sign-in log sheet and a displayed sign stating the restrictions. Desirable equipment would be ropes and stanchions to channel traffic and a walk-thru metal detector.

B. Spectator Seating

Spectator seating should be planned to minimize the possibilities of contact with the defendant(s). A good practice would be to reserve the front row of seating for the news media personnel, law enforcement officers other than security personnel. The available seating can be assigned by use of passes to the individuals on a numbered basis. Courtroom seating can be used to its full potential, but standing will not be allowed.

C. Courtroom Selection

The location of the courtroom, overt and covert access, and the physical layout play an important part in the assignment of personnel.

The Operation Commander should take an active part in the selection of the courtroom, if possible.

If warranted, funds should be allocated for the installation of special security equipment to satisfy the level of security required.

DEFENDANT SECURITY

A. General

Security of the defendant(s) is a primary concern. Transportation and in court phase are probably the most vulnerable points in the custodial process.

B. Defendant Transportation

A security escort should be provided for all phases of the defendant transportation and a "chase car" should be utilized. The 'chase cars' can be deployed as: 1) rear guard vehicle; 2) an advance vehicle to survey the route and clear lanes of travel in congested areas.

Liaison should be established with transporting personnel to formulate movement periods. The defendant(s) will be transported individually, and thoroughly searched prior to movement.

C. Holding Area

The defendant(s) will be detained in the courthouse cellblock area. A thorough search will be conducted of the holding area. A team member shall be assigned to meet the defendant(s) upon arrival, accompany him/her and maintain constant visual contact during the defendant(s)'s stay. This assignment should be rotated every two hours.

D. Courtroom Area

Pre-planning and several relatively simple precautions can greatly minimize dangers.

Seating arrangements for the defendant(s) should be formulated. Restraint equipment should be immediately available but not exposed to view.

Courtroom items, such as pencils, metal fasteners, water pitchers, should be removed or kept beyond the reach of the defendant(s). Care in the handling of weapons in evidence must be employed. Security trigger locks are highly recommended. Deputies assigned to "handle the defendant(s) will be unarmed.

The defendant(s) should not be presented an opportunity to establish physical contact with the spectator area. Deputies assigned to the defendant(s) as personal security should position themselves to the immediate rear of the defendant(s) and in close proximity.

POSSIBLE HOSTAGE SITUATION

A. General

A hostage situation cannot reasonably be discounted. Personnel involved in the security operation must be properly trained. Inter-departmental liaison must be established prior to the operation to ensure the availability of needed assistance and equipment, i.e., SST.

COURT ORDERS

A. General

It is best to secure a court order stating the imposed regulations prior to the operation. The trial judge upon request should issue the order. It will not only inform him of the security procedures employed in the operation, but will add legal force to the imposed restrictions.

At a meeting of the Security Committee, desired security measures can be requested and explained. It may include some or all of the following:

1. Search Screen Operation

- a. A limited number of available passes for admittance
 2. Seating arrangements:
 - a. Front row vacant
 - b. Press
 - c. Spectators
 - d. Officers/witnesses
 3. Package control
 4. Press/Interview Policy
- Involved security personnel will be familiar with all the court ordered regulations. A copy of the court order will be kept at the location.

JURY SECURITY

A. General

Security problems related to jurors in a major trial should be anticipated. These are classed into areas of 1) court facility, 2) individual residences, and 3) sequestration.

1. Court Facility

Hazards to jurors are limited to acts of intimidation and/or threats. This can be eliminated for the most part by proper escort and surveillance techniques.

An effort should be made in obtaining a specified parking area for the jury panel and a car guard given the responsibility for the parked vehicles. The jury should then be escorted en masse, preferably by a route not frequented by the general public.

2. Individual Residences

Depending on the nature and seriousness of the incident and jurisdictional location, preventive action may range from patrol checks to a protective security operation.

3. Sequestration

Care of the jury members and regulation of their conduct while sequestration will be the responsibility of the Bailiff personnel assigned that duty. Responsibility will be limited to the routine functions involved and not be extended into areas pertaining to security matters. Past difficulties indicate a need for a clear delineation of responsibility.

4. Sequestration Security

Jury sequestration will necessitate the assignment of the VIP/Witness Protection Team. The individual in charge of the site location must be contacted and apprised of the desired security restrictions. A site survey will be conducted of the location. It will also contain diagrams, floorplans of concerned areas, and all information pertinent to the location and its operation.

Depth of the security operation will depend on circumstances and the existing situation. Utilization of the VIP/Witness Protection Team is mandatory for this phase of the operation. Inept operating techniques could conceivably result in a mistrial.

MAJOR TRIAL SECURITY OPERATION

CHAPTER I. OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. Operation Commander

Authority and responsibility for a security operation in a major trial must

be vested in a single individual, Commander of the VIP/Witness Protection Team. He shall further be responsible for:

1. Coordination of the Security Committee.
2. Utilization and deployment of assisting units/agencies.
3. Alteration of the operation plan to conform to emergencies.
4. Inter-departmental communication and coordination.

B. Second In Command

Second in command shall act as Operation Field Commander directly responsible to the Operation Commander with the following responsibilities:

1. Creation of an operation plan.
2. The operation line function.
3. Compliance to the parameters of the operation plan.
4. Coordination of the operation activity.
5. Performance and conduct of the assigned personnel.

C. Security Committee

Members of this committee should include but not restricted to:

1. Operation Commander
2. Criminal Courts Coordinator
3. Chief Judge
4. Trial Judge
5. Representative of assisting units/agencies, i.e. police, fire department

The purpose of this committee is to disseminate information, coordinate necessary activities, and establish common procedures pertinent to the represented jurisdictions. Several areas of importance would be:

1. Jury security.
2. Necessary court orders.
3. Trial court selection.

D. Liaison Committee

This particular committee will comprised entirely of Sheriff's Office personnel chaired at the Captain's level. Other agencies may be requested to provide representation, if warranted by the situation. Membership includes ranking officers from any and all divisions/units.

The primary function of the committee establishes and ensures interdepartmental cooperation and coordination in the overall operation.

Secondary functions include stated potential difficulties anticipated at various phases of the process, and availability and capabilities of the support units.

PRESS POLICY

A. General

The scope of interest may be local, national or international. The attitude of the security operation shall be one of cooperation and assistance. This shall not violate the operational plan or procedure nor compromise the security situation.

1. Gag Order

It is recommended that a "gag order" be obtained from the trial judge prohibiting the discussion of the trial or its components by all those concerned.

2. Public Information Officer

This individual will be charged with the coordination of all the media activities as regards the operation. All requests for

information from security personnel shall be referred to the Public Information Officer.

3. Media Restrictions

Involvement of multiple news agencies at a location of interest generates a spirit of competition among the involved individuals. The court should be encouraged to impose certain restrictions upon the operational latitude of the news media. This would take the form of a court order and should not be restricted to: 1) prohibit interviews with the defendant(s) within the entire court building; 2) prohibit interviews of any kind within the courtroom. Partiality will not be shown or even implied to any agency by security personnel. Equal opportunity must be afforded to all. This will fall within the operational responsibility of the Public Information Officer.

4. Courtroom Admission and Seating

Seating reservations for representatives of the various news media will be the responsibility of the Public Information Officer. Reserved seating should not exceed 30% of the courtroom seating capacity. Unclaimed reserved seats would be forfeited to the general public 15 minutes after commencement of the proceedings.

5. Viewing Room

Request for admission to the proceeding by the news media may greatly exceed the allowable capacity of the courtroom. Alternate measures must be initiated. A possible solution would be the creation of a viewing room. This room would have closed circuit television for the viewing of the proceedings. This room would be restricted to the news media representatives. This room would be subject to the same restrictions as the actual trial courtroom.

SUMMARY

A. General

Trial security operation should be viewed as a potential activity of the utmost importance to both the justice system and the Office of the Sheriff. Mismanagement could have far reaching adverse effects on the justice system and/or a professional embarrassment, which could be detrimental to the welfare of the Office of the Sheriff.

Mandatory attributes for the successful conclusion of a major trial operation must include: 1) unity of command; 2) coordination and cooperation of all involved agencies; 3) the employment of trained and experienced security personnel.

TRIAL JUDGE'S SECURITY

A. Potential

Judges are frequent recipients of threats. The concern of the individual judges in these matters tends to decline with the repetition of the threat process during their judicial tenure. A received threat to the judge involved in a major trial may possibly be viewed more seriously. Should a situation of this nature occur, protective security directed toward the judge will probably be based upon his request and desires.

B. Vehicle Security

It may be necessary to provide security for the trial judge during travel periods to and from the courthouse and certainly for his vehicle while parked. A Deputy assigned to that task easily accomplishes this. Security

during travel may be established by the assignment of a Deputy as the judge's driver, a "chase car" procedure or a combination of both.

C. Residential Security

Protective security can be extended to the judge's residence and housed residents if deemed necessary. This responsibility should be assigned to VIP/Witness Protection personnel who are trained and experienced in activity of this type.

WITNESS SECURITY

A. General

Security may be provided for endangered witnesses.

1. Court Facility

Security may vary from an escort type of service to full personal protection.

2. Residence

A personal security operation could be effected at the residence of a witness that would provide 24 hour coverage.

Another method of protection could involve relocating the witness to other quarters. This would include transporting such person to and from the new location.


**OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
FOR
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM**



The following Standard Operating Procedures have been reviewed and are approved:

_____


Commander, Special Operations Division

_____

Chief Assistant Sheriff

Sheriff

Date

_____

Date

Date

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

FOR

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM



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111.PCTL--

Commander, Special
Operations Division

Date


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Date
Sheriff

OP

4/22/10

Date



Sheriff's Office for Prince George's County, Maryland
Special Operations Division's
Hostage Negotiators Team



Commander
Special
Operations
Division

Commander
Hostage
Negotiators
Team

Chronographer
/Radio
Operator

Primary
Negotiator

Primary
Coach

Up-Front
Primary
Negotiator and
Coach





TABLE OF CONTENTS

Policies

Introduction	4
Purpose	4
Savings Clause	5

Administrativekrwthma

Hours of Operation.....	6
Overtime Pay	6
Dress Code.....	6
Demeanor.....	6
Teamwork.....	6

History

PGPD/PGSO Negotiation Team Formulation.....	7
---	---

Operational Duties and Responsibilities Introduction..... 8

Team Construction	8
Selection of Team Members	
Reserve Member Positions	
Active Member Positions	
On-Call Status and Notification Procedures	9
On-Call (Standby) Periods	
Pager Notifications	
Failure to Respond	

Hostage Negotiation Team Roles

Commander 10

Team Leader.....11

Primary Negotiator 12

Primary Coach 12

Up-Front Primary and Coach 13

Intelligence Coordinator..... 13

Intelligence Assistance..... 14

Chronographer / Radio Operator 14

Witness Coordinator..... 14

Additional Negotiators 15

Training

Monthly In-Service Training 15

Appendix

HNT Intelligence Packet.....16

Negotiator Line-Up

Initial Intelligence / Street Supervisor

Suspect / Hostage Description

Debriefing Form

72 Hour Follow-Up

C.A.D. Printout

SHERIFF'S OFFICE FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM

rOLICIS

INTRODUCTION:

The Sheriff's Office for Prince George's County, Maryland, Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) is one component of the Conflict Management Team (CMT). The negotiators are assigned full time to numerous units throughout our agency, but come together when notified of a barricade or hostage situation. HINT is commanded by a Captain or as designated by the Chief Assistant Sheriff and during the operation of a critical incident comes under the control of the Special Operations Division.

PURPOSE:

The mission of the Conflict Management Team (CMT) is the preservation of life and the successful resolution of high-risk incidents. The CMT is composed of the On-Scene Command Staff, the Specialized Services Team (SST), the Victim/Witness Protection Team (VIPER), the Communications Technicians and the Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT).

The HNT is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of communication with involved persons, as well as the gathering and dissemination of intelligence information. The HNT intends to accomplish its mission by upholding the highest degree of standards of our specialty, by respecting the dignity of others, including all members of the HNT, and by providing the highest degree of professional service to our agency and the community.

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) will address the most common duties conducted by members of the HNT. A sampling of the HINT tasks would include:

- > Establishing and maintaining communication with an involved person
- > Gathering personal intelligence information
- > Preparing target location intelligence information
- > Compiling a chronological log of all significant events
- > Preparing an after action report detailing steps taken and tasks accomplished
- > Preparing and submission of a case folder with supporting documentation.

Members of the HINT will adhere to the operational procedures detailed in this SOP Manual, as well as the Sheriff's Office for Prince George's County, Maryland General Order Manual, the County's Personnel Law and Administrative Procedures, and County and State laws.

SAVINGS CLAUSE:

If any part of the Hostage Negotiators SOP is found illegal, incorrect or inapplicable, such findings shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of the SOP.

HOURS OF OPERATION:

There are no set hours of operation for members of the Hostage Negotiation Team. Personnel will be assigned to one of two teams and will be on a rotating weekly on-call basis. Upon notification of a critical incident active team members will respond to the target location and will remain on duty until relieved by the Commander, HNT.

OVERTIME PAY:

All overtime pay requests must be approved by the Commander, HNT. Requests for overtime pay must be submitted on the Sheriff's Office for Prince George's County Compensation Request Form PGC Form #3228 (Rev. 02/03) prior to the end of the pay period. Either the Commander or a Team Leader will sign the Compensation Request forms. The forms will be returned to the team member for submission on their bi-weekly time sheet. All overtime resulting out of a critical incident will be charged to the applicable accounting fund for SOD.

DRESS CODE:

The dress code for members of the HNT will be governed by the individual circumstances surrounding the critical incident. The following general guidelines will be adhered to regardless of the situation. All team members will be appropriately attired, in clothing that identifies them as a member of the Sheriff's Office for Prince George's County, Maryland. All HNT members will have available their issued body armor, and gas mask. The Commander, SOD may authorize adjustments to the standard summer/winter police uniform.

DEMEANOR:

All employees of the HNT will act responsibly and professionally in performing their duties. As members of the HNT, employees represent the agency and the county in every contact made with members of the public, other departments and outside agencies. Employees are reminded that a citizen's view of the entire agency may be dependent upon the way they were treated by one employee.

TEAMWORK:

The HNT is one component within the Conflict Management Team of the Special Operations Division. As such, employees are reminded that they may be called upon to assist other units or sections in the department in order to accomplish our overall goals. Teamwork and cooperation are essential in order to achieve the ultimate goals of law enforcement.

PGPD NEGOTIATION TEAM FORMULATION:

During the turmoil of the early seventies, police organizations everywhere realized that specially training personnel were needed to cope with the riots, bombings, sniper attacks, barricades, and other incidents of violence, which were occurring more frequently.

Prince George's County was especially vulnerable to these incidents because of its geographical location, its population, and economic conditions. These factors and the foresight of those who believed in professional law enforcement led to the formation in 1976 of the Prince George's County Police Emergency Services Team (EST). This group was equipped and trained to professionally handle any life threatening situations.

After a number of incidents came the realization that negotiations were a valid way to resolve situations in a non-violent manner. In fact, the EST personnel were themselves negotiating, which reduced their effectiveness as tactical planners and operatives. Plans were then made to train a group of officers as negotiators. Two officers who had studied negotiating procedures with other agencies having successful negotiation teams initiated a training program. They in turn adopted these "tried and true" methods for use by Prince George's County.

In February of 1980, twenty-four officers received eighty hours of intensive training, which included textbook work and mock situations designed to test their ability to communicate and react under stress. Subsequently, four members of the team formed a committee to oversee additional training and review of new methods. These members completed a forty hour course in telephone counseling presented by the Prince George's County Mental Health Association and did volunteer work for Prince George's Hotline. Impressed with the training, they recommended that negotiators become more involved with studying the social ills of society such as alcoholism, drug abuse, spousal abuse, terrorism, delayed stress syndrome, mental illness, and any other crisis — causing factors. With the addition of the full-time police psychologist came the chance to receive even more of this type of training

Numerous incidents have been successfully resolved by the use of the components of the Conflict Management Team. Commanders, Conflict Negotiators, Communication Technicians, Emergency Services and Tactical Team personnel have, through their own initiative, training and joint philosophy, formed a close working relationship that helps ensure continued success.

PGSO NEGOTIATION TEAM FORMULATION:

The Sheriffs Office for Prince George's County has worked towards establishing a Hostage Negotiations Team due to the growing number of incidents encountered by members of this agency while performing their regular duties. The HNT is another component within the Conflict Management Team to bring an incident to a safe and final conclusion.

INTRODUCTION:

Crisis negotiating is the use of communication skills to resolve crisis without violence through a combination of acceptable psychological principles and police practices. This type of intervention is the preferred method of resolving those conflicts, which threaten the safety of one's self and others.

A solid team having one philosophy and competent training gives law enforcement personnel the chance to deal with these conflicts from a position of strength. To have one component missing would weaken this position. An integral part, but of no more importance than any other component to the success of the CMT, is the HNT.

Presented here are the standard operating procedures, intended to be a guide for negotiations team behavior. However, it should always be remembered that negotiating is a creative process that requires innovation, flexibility and adaptability.

TEAM CONSTRUCTION:

The HNT Commander shall be as designated by the Chief Assistant Sheriff assigned under the Commander, Special Operations Division. To preclude any conflict that may arise from rank designation, the teams shall be comprised of trained negotiators the rank of Sergeant and below.

SELECTION OF TEAM MEMBERS

Participation in the HNT requires an unprecedented level of commitment. The HNT as a whole is only as effective as each individual part. The negotiators serve as an integral part of that team and play a significant role in the successful resolution of any high-risk conflict management incident. Hence, the selection of negotiators is no less rigorous and the position requires the same level of dedication as that of any other team component. In addition, current job assignment may adversely affect one's selection for the team as a conflict of interest may occur. This aspect shall receive consideration, but not necessarily exclude members in the selection process.

The initial selection for prospective team members shall consist of a competitive oral interview conducted in accordance with agency policy. Oral interview boards will be convened as needed at the direction of the Commander, SOD. Selected members will then be required to successfully complete the Basic Conflict Negotiators Training Course offered by this agency, or its equivalent. Upon team placement all members serve under the command of SOD on all critical incident scenes.

ALTERNATE MEMBER SELECTION

Candidates who complete the first two phases of the selection process may then be assigned to a team in an "alternate" member at the direction of the HNT Commander. Completion of the first two phases does not necessarily guarantee an employee placement on the team. Alternate designations will be made on an as-needed basis determined by a candidate's performance and proven level of commitment.

Team members assigned to the alternate list, although not required, is encouraged to respond to all incidents when their respective team is on call. These alternate members shall be placed in a role if an opening is available, shall be utilized to assist in the gathering of intelligence, or perform other tasks as designated by the HNT Commander or Team Leader. This policy shall afford alternate members the opportunity to become acquainted with this area of expertise.

ACTIVE MEMBER POSITIONS

Selections to fill permanent vacancies on the primary teams created by retirements, promotions, etc. shall be filled from the alternate members. The HNT Commander, in conjunction with the Commander of SOD, shall make selections to fill vacancies on a team. Selection criteria shall be based on, but not limited to performance, experience, commitment level and tenure on the alternate list. Special consideration shall be given to those members who have demonstrated commitment to the team evidenced by active participation during HNT in-service training and response to barricade incidents with their respective teams.

CELLULAR TELEPHONE NOTIFICATIONS

All team members will be issued and shall carry their agency cellular telephone. If a member has a cellular telephone that is not functioning, that member shall immediately contact the HNT Commander. The member must contact the appropriate county office immediately for repair.

When a situation is verified, the Communications Division will, along with the normal notifications, initiate the group call thereby notifying the negotiators. The HNT will respond as directed by the cellular telephone notification. Upon arrival on the scene, personnel will report to the HNT Commander or Team Leader for an assignment. During the operation of a critical incident all team members serve under the authority of the Commander, SOD.

When a member is not available for response, he shall immediately notify his/her respective Team Leader and the HNT Commander. The member will also submit a memo to their Team Leader specifying the dates he/she will be unavailable. The member, in conjunction with their Team Leader will select a alternate member from his/her team to fill the temporary vacancy with approval from the HNT Commander. The HNT Commander will ensure that selection from the alternate list is done in a fashion that affords each alternate member an opportunity to temporarily fill the vacancies, as they become available.

alternate list is done in a fashion that affords each alternate member an opportunity to temporarily fill the vacancies, as they become available.

The HNT Commander may call out one or more negotiators to assist in situations not requiring a full Conflict Management Team response.

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

Active members will respond to all notifications within a reasonable time frame. This time frame is generally one hour, however modifications may be made based upon time of day, weather, incident location, etc. Alternate members are encouraged to respond to any incidents involving their designated team, but due to being not on-call the response is not mandatory. All responding members will be fit for duty and have in their possession all necessary and proper equipment, as outlined in this SOP and the GOM.

FAILURE TO RESPOND

The HNT Commander and Team Leader will conduct a performance review of any active team member who fails to respond to an incident while on-call. The member's stand-by status will also be reviewed. The team leader and the HNT Commander will conduct a performance review for failure to attend in-service training. In-service attendance is mandatory for members of the team regardless of their status, active or alternate. A counseling session may be conducted and documented accordingly. A lack of improvement in any of these areas may lead to suspension or removal from the team. Active members may also be placed into the alternate member status for a designated period of time, pending improvement. Active or alternate members who continue to display a lack of interest or commitment to the team's mission will be replaced.

COMMANDER:

The HNT Commander shall be as designated by the Chief Assistant Sheriff assigned to the Commander, SOD. In the absence of the HNT Commander, the Team Leader shall assume this role. The HNT Commander's responsibilities include liaison between the on-scene Commander and the HNT Team. He should ensure that members have been assigned to all necessary roles.

The HNT Commander will ensure that the performance of all negotiators is professional and competent. He will accomplish this through in-service training, counseling sessions and normal disciplinary measures. He will coordinate with the Commander, SOD in all processes involving selection of team members, suspension or removal of personnel from the team, and changes in philosophy or procedures.

The HNT Commander shall:

- Coordinate all activities on the scene to ensure that team members are functioning smoothly in assigned roles
- Account for primary team members responding to the scene
- Designate the Team Leader to contact team members who are absent (without approval) from the scene

Post-Incident Responsibilities:

- Meet with all involved members immediately after the conclusion of the incident
- Determine the need for addressing stress management based on severity of incident
 - Psychological Services
 - Peer Support
- Ensure that an appropriate intelligence packet is submitted to the Commander, Special Operations Division within five working days after the incident
- The case folder will be submitted within 30 days of an incident to the Commander, CMT after being reviewed by the team leader. These case folders will be maintained at the Special Operations Division

Administrative Responsibilities:

The HNT Commander shall assume responsibility for the actions of all team members, ensuring that professional standards are maintained and that the integrity of the team is not compromised. He shall assume overall responsibility for the collection of all data and reports, ensuring completeness and accuracy. He will attend after-action critiques. He, or his designee, shall be responsible for coordinating all training, to include Basic Conflict Negotiation classes, in-service training and inter-agency training. The HNT Commander shall be directly responsible to the Commander, SOD.

TEAM LEADER:

The Team Leaders will be senior experienced negotiators, appointed by the HNT Commander. Their primary responsibility is to act as a coordinator and stabilizing factor for each of the two negotiating teams. In the absence of the HNT Commander, they will assume that role on a critical incident scene. The following is a listing of some of the tasks the Team Leader may be assigned:

- Advise personnel of assignments, placing team members into pre-assigned roles
- Ensure that the up-front team is prepared with a bulletproof vest, PA -system, radio, body and microphone.
- Assign reserve team members into vacant positions
- Give role assignments to the HNT Commander

The Team Leader should avoid a role assumption that would preclude him from carrying out their responsibilities.

The Team Leaders will also be responsible for the following administrative tasks:

- Act as a liaison between HNT members and Commander, HNT
- Maintain current team roster and update changes in role rotation
- Coordinate in-service training agendas on a bimonthly basis
- Maintain stand-by response and training integrity
- Update phone numbers, page assignments, addresses, special assignments, etc.
- Attend after action critique
- Ensures that all intelligence documentation is submitted to the Intelligence Coordinator prior to leaving the scene
- Ensure the submission and review of all case folders to the HNT Commander within 30 days of the incident

PRIMARY NEGOTIATOR:

The negotiator shall not be the on-scene commander or the highest-ranking official at the scene. In order to allow for a period of time to evaluate responses to demands made by the involved persons, the negotiator must be able to demonstrate that he does not have the ultimate authority for decision-making. However, he should be able to convince the parties that they are actively involved in the decision-making process, even if not true. Negotiations should be conducted remotely, preferably by telephone.

Upon arrival on the scene, the primary negotiator shall report to the HNT Commander or Team Leader. They should, if possible, debrief the officers who originated the call and obtain as much information as possible about the situation prior to making contact with the barricaded subject. This member will then be responsible for the initial contact and ensuing negotiations.

Under no circumstances will the primary negotiator take action solely on their own accord. The On-Scene Commander makes all decisions. Any trades, negotiated items, promises, or face-to-face confrontations will only be initiated after approval. This is not to preclude a primary negotiator from calling a suicidal subject, as the team is en route. However, no face-to-face should be attempted. The personal meeting with an involved person will only be agreed upon after consultation with the HNT and On-Scene Commander.

PRIMARY COACH:

The coach is responsible for monitoring the negotiations in order to give feedback to the primary negotiator in regard to the use of skills, voice inflection, tempo, trigger words, interpretation of messages given by the perpetrator and any other useful information to assist the primary negotiator. The primary coach also has the same responsibility as the primary negotiator, except

he/she does not engage in actual conversation unless introduced by the primary negotiator for specific purposes.

The coach controls access to the primary negotiator, thereby freeing them for negotiations only. He shall receive all messages from the HNT Commander. He shall disseminate any information from the primary negotiator to the HNT Commander. On occasion, the coach may need to fill in for the primary negotiator in the event of their temporary absence.

In short, the coach is the only person in direct contact with the primary negotiator during actual conversation. They are the funnel for all information coming into the negotiating room. They shall carefully monitor the primary negotiator for signs of stress and should constantly offer moral support and encouragement.

UPFRONT PRIMARY AND COACH:

Those designated as up-front primary and coach will perform the negotiation process within the inner perimeter. The Tactical Commander and the SST Supervisor will dictate their movements. They will be attired in appropriate clothing and will wear their personal body armor. The on-scene commander will govern the wearing and/or carrying of a firearm into the inner perimeter. Up-front team members will not have a firearm in their possession if so instructed. The Coach will carry a radio in order to maintain communications with the Command Post. The Primary will carry a portable public address system. One of the two up-front personnel will wear a body microphone.

Their mission is to initiate communications with the involved persons in the event phone service does not exist or when there is a refusal to answer the phone. They will attempt to have the parties agree to communicate with the primary negotiator in the Command Post, either by existing service or by mobile telephone.

They will stay available, in a position of safety, to use communication skills at the point of surrender, if needed by the Supervisor of the Specialized Services Team.

INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR:

The negotiator in this role is responsible for assigning persons to gather information about the perpetrator(s), hostage(s) and physical scene that would be pertinent to the ongoing negotiations. They will utilize any number of persons available and all intelligence comes to them for dissemination. When relaying information to the negotiating room itself, the HNT Commander shall be utilized unless the primary negotiator specifically requests the presence of the intelligence coordinator himself.

All intelligence gathered should be given to the Intelligence Coordinator and they shall be responsible for briefing the On-Scene Command Staff, Negotiators, and any other persons that need the information. In no case (EXCEPT THOSE CASES OF IMMINENT THREAT TO

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All intelligence gathered should be given to the Intelligence Coordinator and they shall be responsible for briefing the On-Scene Command Staff, Negotiators, and any other persons that need the information. In no case (EXCEPT THOSE CASES OF IMMEDIATE THREAT TO

LIFE) shall information be given to anyone before the Intelligence Coordinator reviews the information.

- A. The Intelligence Coordinator should remain at the Command Post and should use the Intelligence Assistant, or other designees when it is necessary to leave the Command Post to gather intelligence or carry out other necessary tasks.
- B. Collect all the paper work generated during the incident; to include notes, intelligence information, criminal histories, debriefing forms etc.
- C. Complete the 72-hour after action report and submit it to the HNT Commander.
- D. Complete the Incident case folder and submit it to their Team Leader.

INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT:

The negotiator in this role is responsible for assigning persons to gather information about the perpetrator(s), hostage(s) and physical scene that would be pertinent to the ongoing negotiations. All information should be given to the Intelligence Coordinator for dissemination.

CHRONOGRAPHER / RADIO OPERATOR:

The negotiator in this assignment will keep a chronological log of all proceedings. This log should include the following types of information:

- Arrival of personnel on the scene
- Requests by HNT members
- Decisions rendered by Commander Staff
- Assignments by the On-Scene Commander
- Other pertinent events
- Brief synopsis of all significant radio transmissions

This log may be used in court as evidence and should, therefore, be as accurate, concise and complete as possible.

Responsibility for communications will be diverted to the Command Post for the duration of the event. The Chronographer will also assume the role as radio dispatcher for the primary radio channel.

WITNESS COORDINATOR:

The Witness Coordinator will be a full-time position on the Conflict Management Team. The Witness Coordinator will work with the Intelligence Coordinator and will have primary responsibility for interviewing all family members and witnesses. The Witness Coordinator will ensure that all witnesses are interviewed and the information is recorded on the debriefing form. The Witness Coordinator will then ensure that the witnesses and / or family members are kept in a separate location, away from the command post, until the scene is secured. The Witness

Coordinator will also ensure that the Crisis Intervention Team is notified, when applicable, and that they respond to handle any emotional needs of the witness's / family members.

ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATORS:

Any additional trained negotiators that respond to the incident will assist with whatever roles deemed necessary by the HNT Commander. If no specific duties are assigned, then they will form in the area known as the "think tank" and be prepared to assist the Intelligence Coordinator and Team Leader in any capacity.

TRAINING

G MONTHLY IN-SERVICE TRAINING:

In-service training is recognized as a valuable tool that is necessary to maintain expertise in any given profession. It is essential that negotiators maintain their proficiency and skills to the highest standards of the specialty. Periodic in-service training will be scheduled in advance affording ample notice to all negotiators. All members, reservist included, must attend in-service training sessions and seminars. All members are expected and encouraged to take an active role in planning, coordinating, instructing, and developing monthly training sessions that serve to enhance the team's overall performance. The training session topics will be selected and prepared on an alternating basis between the two teams.

Notices shall be sent to all members for presentation to their District and Division Commanders to allow for necessary schedule changes. In-Service training will be conducted on the last Wednesday of every month. The HNT Commander for operational necessity may move this date. Negotiators who are unable to attend training must immediately notify their respective team leader. Once approval is granted from their team leader, the negotiator will email the team leader, training coordinator and HNT Commander. The email will include, at a minimum, the date and reason for the absence. Unexcused absences from training, seminars, and/or barricades, as determined by the HINT Commander, may result in removal from the team or re-designation from an active to a reserve member status. All team members are encouraged to assist with the planning and delivery of the two week Negotiations Training Class, and any other special seminars.

Coordinator will also ensure that the Crisis Intervention Team is notified, when applicable, and that they respond to handle any emotional needs of the witness's / family members.

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APPENDIX 1

**HOSTAGE NEGOTIATING TEAM
CHECK LIST AND INTELLIGENCE PACKET**

Sheriff's Office for Prince George's County, Maryland

Conflict Management

Case folder Check List

Summary, to include barricaded suspect(s) disposition, i.e. **EPS, Jailed** etc.

- 72 hour After Action report
- Sheriffs Incident Reports

- CAD Printout
- Intelligence Report
- Criminal History of Suspect(s)
- Personal! Medical History of Suspect(s)
- Criminal History of Hostage(s)
- Personal/ Medical History of Hostages(s)

- Photograph(s) of Suspect(s)

- Diagram of Barricade location
- C. Conflict management lineup
- Debriefing form(s) for involved Officer(s)
- E Hand written notes Check List

Disposition: _____
EPS, Jailed, Suicide, GOA, Homicide etc.

Reviewed by _____ Date _____
Team Leader

Reviewed by _____ Date _____
Hostage Negotiations Commander

FORM 1

CCN:

PAGE 1

DATE/TIME:

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATING TEAM

INTELLIGENCE PACKET

NEGOTIATORS LINE-UP:

TEAM LEADER:

PRIMARY:

COACH:

INTELLIGENCE:

INTEL ASSISTANT:

CHRONOGRAPHER:

UP-FRONT PRIMARY:

UP-FRONT COACH:

WITNESS COORDINATOR:

COMPLETED BY:

DATE:

17

FORM 2

CCN:

PAGE 1

DATE/TIME:

INITIAL INTELLIGENCE / STREET SUPERVISOR

SUPERVISOR NAME AND ID:

1) INITIAL CALL FOR SERVICE, LOCATION OF INCIDENT, PHONE NUMBER?

2) WHAT ACTION INITIATED BARRICADE (CRIME OR EPS)?

3) INITIAL DESCRIPTION OF SUSPECT, NAME- ANY INJURIES?

COMPLETED BY:
18

DATE:

FORM 2 CCN:

PAGE 2

DATE/TIME:

INITIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTINUED

4) LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF SUSPECT, OBSERVED BY WHO, WHEN, METHOD OF CONTACT (PHONE OR VISUAL)?

5) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, ANY DEMANDS?

6) WEAPON (5) USED OR PRESENT?

7) 'VEHICLES INVOLVED (SUSPECTS OR HOSTAGES)?

8) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ANY HOSTAGES AND INJURIES?

COMPLETED BY: _____ DATE:

FORM 2

CCN:

PAGE 3

DATE/TIME:

INITIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTINUED

9) DIAGRAM OF TARGET, LOCATION OF OFFICERS (UNIT #, NAME, ID#)

COMPLETED BY: _____

DATE: _____

FORM 2

CCN:

PAGE 4

DATE/TIME:

INITIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTINUED 10

DIAGRAM/INTELLIGENCE OF INTERIOR

COMPLETED BY: _____ DATE:

FORM 3

CCN:

PAGE 1

DATE/TIME:

**SUSPECT/HOSTAGE
DESCRIPTION FORM
SUSPECT #**

NAME:

ADDRESS:

AGE:

RACE:

SEX:

HEIGHT:

WEIGHT:

BUILD:

HAIR: EYES:

FACIAL HAIR:

GLASSES-STYLE: COMPLEXION:

COMPLETED BY: FORM 3

**DATE: CCN:
22**

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION CONTINUED

CLOTHING DESCRIPTION:

ALCOHOL/DRUG USE (TYPE, FREQ., LAST USE):

EMPLOYMENT (PAST AND PRESENT):

MILITARY HISTORY/MARKSMANSHIP ABILITY:

WEAPONS:

INTERESTS:

PETS ON PREMISES:

COMMENTS:

COMPLETED BY: _____

DATE: _____

FORM 3

CCN:

PAGE 3

DATE/TIME:

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION CONTINUED

CRIMINAL HISTORY:

PHOTO:

MENTAL DISORDERS:

MEDICAL DISORDERS:

MEDICATION USED:

DOCTORS NAME/LOCATOR:

CLERGY:

FAMILY MEMBERS/LOCATOR:

WIFE/HUSBAND:

MOTHER: FATHER:

HER:

CHILDREN:

CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS:

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS THAT MAY HAVE INITIATED THIS INCIDENT:

COMPLETED BY:

DATE:

FORM 3

CCN:

PAGE 4

DATE/TIME:

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION CONTINUED

ATTACH PRINTOUT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY/WARRANT INFORMATION

COMPLETED BY: _____ DATE: _____

FORM 4

CCN:

PAGE 1

DATE/TIME:

DEBRIEFING FORM

NAME:

ADDRESS/ASSIGNMENT:

PHONE:

ROLE/RELATIONSHIP:

OBSERVATIONS:

COMPLETED BY: _____ **DATE:** _____

FORM 5

CCN:

PAGE 1

DATE/ TIME:

72 HOUR FOLLOW UP

COMPLETED BY: _____

DATE: _____

FORM 6

CCN:

PAGE 1

DATE/ TIME:

C.A.D. PRINTOUT

COMPLETED BY: _____ DATE: _____

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

MOTOR UNIT

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

PROCEDURE TITLE

MOTOR UNIT

MOT 10	INTRODUCTION
MOT 11	OPERATION AND USE
MOT 12	MAINTENANCE
MOT 13	EQUIPMENT
MOT 14	UNIFORM
MOT 15	MOTOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS
MOT 16	FUNERALS
MOT 17	PROVIDING TRAFFIC CONTROL AND ESCORT FOR

MOT 18	DIGNITARIES
MOT 19	TERMINATION OF OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT
MOT 20	ASSIGNMENT
MOT 21	OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
MOT 22	CRITERIA FOR DEPLOYMENT
	FEDEX STADIUM EVENT ESCORT POLICY

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-10

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT – INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

The mission of the Motorcycle Unit is three fold: 1. To provide a specially trained, highly visible and mobile force. 2. The continuous development of good public relations within the County, Metropolitan area, and the United States. 3. Provide security escort assistance to the Secret Service & the State Department for the President of the United States (POTUS) the Vice President foreign heads of state and emissaries along the motorcade route to AAFB and on official visits to the County.

To accomplish our mission, we will adhere to the values of professionalism, integrity, and responsiveness as stated in the Prince George's County Sheriff's Office Mission Statement.

B. PURPOSE

To set forth guidelines for the Motor Unit and utilization of the full size police motorcycles by members of the Motor Unit.

C. DESCRIPTION

The Motor Unit is a part of the Special Operations Division. The motorcycles used by the Motor Unit are full sized motorcycles with an engine size of 1000cc or greater. The motorcycles are equipped with a solo seat, saddlebags, windshield, fairing, emergency lights, and siren in addition to standard safety equipment. The motorcycles used by the Motor Unit are manufactured and packaged for police use only.

D. OBJECTIVES

1. Sheriff Motorcycle Deputies will be used to;

Provide a specially trained, highly visible, and mobile force.

- Perform escorts for selected funerals.
- Perform escorts for dignitary motorcades.

MOT 10.1

- Perform in motorcycle demonstrations/safety competitions as a means of enhancing police-community relations and safety consciousness.
- Participate in selected civic events to include parades and static displays as a means of enhancing community visibility, job awareness, and public relations.

MOT 10.2
SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-11

CREATED/REVISED: 10/01/15

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT – OPERATION AND USE

- A. The motorcycles will be operated according to the guidelines established in the Maryland Vehicle Law, the Agency's General Orders, and these SOPs.
- B. An approved helmet that meets Department of Transportation (DOT) standards will be worn at all times by members while operating a Sheriff's Office motorcycle.
- C. The motorcycles may not be operated during hazardous weather conditions, i.e., snow, ice and extreme cold weather. The Unit Commander, Supervisor or Senior Deputy for the day shall make this determination. In the event that weather or other conditions prohibit the safe operation of the motorcycles, the members will utilize their assigned cars.

- D. The full-sized police motorcycles (1000cc/greater) will only be operated by authorized members of the Sheriff's Motorcycle Unit and,
1. Members of the Motorcycle Unit will continually possess a valid Maryland Class 'CM' endorsed License and,
 2. All Motor Unit candidates will be required to perform a pre-test consisting of the manual manipulation of the full size motorcycle prior to being granted an interview and,
 3. candidates selection into the Sheriff's Motor unit will be required to pass a basic and pre-described riding course, as designated by the Commander of the Motor Unit, before assignment to a basic Police Motors school and,
 4. candidates will be required to successfully complete a basic Police Motors School hosted by an approved agency. Upon graduation members who have successfully completed the basic motors school will become members of the Sheriff's SOD/Motorcycle Unit entitled to all the associated privileges including annual Technicians pay based on the Union Contract.
 5. If a candidate fails to successfully complete the Basic Police Motorcycle Training School, the member will be assigned to remedial training for a period of one week and,

MOT 11.1

6. If a candidate fails to successfully complete the Basic Police Motorcycle Training School after one attempt, the unit Commander will evaluate that member's suitability for further training or may recommend declining the member's application to the unit.
 7. The unit members will train on a regular basis to maintain a high level of proficiency regarding the safe operation of their police motorcycles, and their general physical fitness.
- E. Members will be in the full uniform of the day or an authorized alternate uniform while operating their motorcycles during duty hours.
- F. Members of the Motorcycle Unit may operate their assigned motorcycles while in an off-duty status. They must have safety equipment as required by Maryland Motor Vehicle law and be in full uniform.
- G. *Members of the Motorcycle Unit may operate an assigned Motorcycle that does not possess the standard "in-vehicle," hard mounted radio. Operators of the Sheriff's Motorcycles that do not have the hard mounted radios must use a working portable*

radio with microphone to helmet accessory to communicate. Motorcycle operators must first pull off roadway, away from traffic and come to a complete stop before adjusting the channel, volume or other radio feature or problem.

MOT 11.2
SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-12

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT – MAINTENANCE

- A. Unit members are responsible for the appearance and condition of their assigned motorcycles. All damage occurring as a result of Departmental/Non-Departmental accidents will be reported immediately to the Unit Commander. All shop repairs (excluding routine P.M. appointments) must have prior approval of the Unit Commander. A copy of the invoice/billing statement must be forwarded to the Office of Budget and Finance. A copy of the invoice/billing statement shall be kept on file by the Unit Commander.
- B. Unit members are responsible for performing minor maintenance on their assigned motorcycles, I.E., oil checks, cable and clutch adjustments, tire pressure checks, bulb replacements, etc.
- C. The Commander of the unit will conduct at minimum monthly inspections to ensure that

members have completed scheduled preventative maintenance on their assigned motorcycles.

- D. If towing a departmental motorcycle becomes necessary, unit members will make the provisions necessary to have the motorcycle taken to an approved place for repair.

MOT 12.1
SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-13

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT – EQUIPMENT

- A. Each motorcycle will be equipped with the necessary emergency lights and siren to perform a police/sheriff mission.
- B. No accessory equipment will be removed or altered without prior Commander approval.
Saddlebag rails may be removed one week prior to participation in any safety competition and replaced not later than one week thereafter.
- C. The motorcycles will be visibly marked and easily identifiable as Prince George's County Sheriff's Office vehicles.
- D. Each motorcycle will be equipped with citation books and departmental report forms necessary to provide Sheriff service. Other equipment, IE., inclement weather gear, cameras, flares, measuring tapes, etc., may be carried when authorized by the

Section Commander.

MOT 13.1
SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-14

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - UNIFORMS

A. Due to the high profile of Motor Officers special care and attention will be devoted to the uniform. Motor Officers will be held to the highest uniform standards.

Motorcycle Deputies will wear the uniform prescribed by the Commander of the Special Operations Division. This uniform is similar to that which is worn by Sheriff's

Deputies. Modifications are made for the safety and comfort of the officers and include but are not limited to helmets, leather jackets, motorcycle riding boots, gloves, full coverage inclement weather gear high neck sweaters, utility caps, utility uniforms, mittens, riding breeches, and other such items as prescribed by the Commander. The senior deputy in charge of the motorcycle team will determine on a daily basis the exact make up of the uniform, taking into consideration the type of assignment and weather conditions.

B. Uniform/initial provisions:

- Upon entry into the Motorcycle Unit, the Department will provide the officer with a helmet, leather jacket ,five pairs of breeches and one pair of leather boots, winter boots, one pair of light weight leather motorcycles gloves and one pair of winter motorcycle gloves, rain suit, heated pants, jacket socks and gloves.

All issued uniform items are the property of the Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office. Upon separation from the Motorcycle Unit, members will return to the Section Commander their helmet, helmet mike set, and other issued equipment; including boots, jacket, and gloves.

MOT 14.1
SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-15

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT – MOTOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS

A. ISSUE AND REPLACEMENT POLICY

Item	Useful Life	Policy
Helmet	12 - 18 months	Issue with annual replacement
Leather Jacket	Length of Assignment	Department to issue first jacket with no cost to the employee effective July 1, 2005 replaced only upon supervisory recommendation or if destroyed as the result of a

		departmental training or accident
Pants/Breeches	One Year	Five pair initially issued by Department; one pair replaced annually
Boots	Two Years	Department to issue first pair with no cost to the employee effective July 1, 2005; replaced every other year if needed.
Leather gear (to Wear over winter Jacket)	Three - Four Years	Issue with replacement every 3 - 4 years based on supervisory recommendation
Lanyard	One Year	Issue with replacement yearly
Heated Vest and Gloves	Two - Three Years	Issue with replacement every 2 - 3 years based on supervisory recommendation
Rain Gear	Two Years	Issue with replacement every 2 - 3 years based on supervisory recommendation
Riding Gloves	One Year	Department pays first \$25; balance paid by officer

MOT 15.1

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-16

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - FUNERALS

A. FUNERAL ESCORT GUIDELINES

Generally, a county employee, funeral home, Church or other government official may request a funeral escort if the following criteria are met:

- The funeral escort must be for a family member as established in The General Order Manual (Bereavement Leave).
- When an escort is requested, at least two days notice should be given whenever possible. This notice must also include the location and destination of the escort, and the anticipated time of departure and completion. If an escort fails to leave after 30 minutes of the anticipated

time of departure has passed, the supervisor may cancel the escort in order to serve other departmental needs.

- The use of Departmental Sedans shall be limited to support for the Motor Unit; specifically, as pace cars and one or two cars to block traffic at the rear of the funeral.

NOTE: IN VIEW OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS REQUIRED TO PERFORM THIS SERVICE, THE OIC SHALL STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE 30 MINUTE TIME LIMIT. THE FUNERAL DIRECTOR SHALL BE SO ADVISED, SO THAT HE MAY NOTIFY THE OFFICIATOR OF THE SERVICE.

- The size of the funeral must be inordinate (50 or more cars) and require continuous intersection control. The supervisor of the escort will coordinate with the Funeral director the most prudent route from the point of origin to the destination. As a general rule, the final decision will rest with the Section Commander of the unit or his designee.
- The distance of travel within the boundaries of Prince George's County must exceed five miles. Where extreme parking problems exist, a Funeral Director may request a unit to assist with vehicles departing a funeral site. These requests will be evaluated on a case by case basis as manpower and prior commitments allow.

MOT-16.1

- No funeral escorts will be conducted on weekends or motor officers regular days off without prior approval of the Commander, Special Operations Division, or his designee.
- No funerals will be escorted beyond the boundaries of Prince George's County without assistance from the jurisdiction entered and/or the approval of the Commander, Special Operations Division, or his designee. In any event, the jurisdiction being entered will be made aware of the impending escort.
- Escorts will be reviewed on scene by the supervisor or his designee prior to departure. No escort will depart if the supervisor or his designee has deemed the escort unsafe. Factors that may be considered include weather conditions, time of day or night, number of vehicles involved, and the route of travel. The supervisor or his designee shall limit factors as necessary to make the escort safe. These may include altering the route, escorting a selected number of vehicles (others to proceed on their own, observing all Maryland vehicle laws), or standing by until a thunderstorm passes.

- When situations dictate, this section does not restrict the flexibility of the Commander, Special Operations Division to fulfill special circumstances.

B. FUNERAL WAKE GUIDELINES

Generally, Funeral Wake assistance may be reserved for:

- All Law Enforcement Officers deceased in line of duty.
- Active duty Prince George's County Deputies
- Government Officials
- Other persons ordered by the Commander, SOD, or his designee
- Funeral Wake Assistance may include escort duties.

C. *STATE FUNERAL PLAN*

DEFINITION - State funerals are authorized for all former and current Presidents of the United States, Presidents-Elect of the United States, and other persons designated by the President of the United States.

MOT-16.2

POINT OF CONTACT –MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, SPECIAL EVENTS (202) 685-2957 OR Provost Marshals Office, Military District of Washington, Funeral Operations Center, Fort Myer, Virginia. (703) 696-3197 Fax (703) 696-3192.

D. STATE FUNERAL ESCORT PLAN

The plan is updated by the Military District of Washington Provost Marshal's Office every four years.

All former and standing Presidents of the United States will come to Washington, D.C.

Day 1:

Body arrives at Andrews Air Force Base for escort to the National Cathedral where the body will lie in state. The escort will be on post one hour prior to the arrival of the body.

MOTORCADE ROUTE - PRIMARY

From main gate AAFB, north on Suitland Road, west on Suitland Parkway, north on Firth Sterling Avenue, merge onto Route 295 north, north on 11th Street Bridge, merge west onto Eisenhower Freeway (SE/SW Freeway), exit Main Avenue, west on Independence Avenue, continue on to Ohio Drive, north on Rock Creek Parkway, exit Waterside Drive, northwest on Massachusetts Avenue, north of Wisconsin Avenue, right turn on to North Road to front of Cathedral.

16.1 miles

32 minutes

MOTORCADE ROUTE - ALTERNATE

From main gate AAFB, south on 495, north on 295, exit north on South Capitol Street, northwest on Washington Avenue, west on Independence Avenue, north on 15th Street, west on Constitution Avenue, north on 17th Street, north on Connecticut Avenue, west on Calvert Street, north on Cleveland Avenue, west on Garfield Street, northwest on Massachusetts Avenue, north on Wisconsin Avenue, right turn North Road to front of Cathedral.

20.1 miles

40 minutes

MOT-16.3

Day 2:

The body will be moved from the National Cathedral to the Rotunda of the U.S. Capitol Building where the body will lie in state. THE PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN DAY 2 ACTIVITIES.

Day 3:

The body will be returned to the National Cathedral. The body leaves Washington National Cathedral for Andrews Air Force Base. Escorts will be on post one hour prior to escort.

MOTORCADE ROUTE - PRIMARY

Exit North Road, east on Woodley Road, south on 34th Street, southeast on Massachusetts Avenue, south on Waterside Drive, south on Rock Creek Parkway, continue on Ohio Drive, east on Independence Avenue, south on Maine Avenue, east

on Eisenhower Freeway (SE/SW Freeway), south on 11th Street Bridge, south 295, exit Suitland Parkway, south on Suitland Road, (Morningside exit), enter main gate AAFB.

16.3 miles
33 minutes

MOTORCADE ROUTE - ALTERNATE

Exit North Road, east on Woodley Round, south on 34th Street, south on Connecticut Avenue, south on 17th Street, west on Independence Avenue, continue around tidal basin, east on Independence Avenue, south on Main Avenue, east on Eisenhower Freeway (SE/SW Freeway), South on 11th Street Bridge, south on 295, exit 495 north (beltway), exit Allentown Road, left on Allentown Road, right enter main gate of AAFB (20.2 miles 42 minutes).

E. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Sheriff's Office Motor Unit will assist in all escort services.

MOT-16.4

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-17

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

*TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - PROVIDING TRAFFIC CONTROL AND ESCORT FOR
DIGNITARIES*

A. DISCUSSION

Due to the close proximity of the Nation's Capital and Andrews Air Force Base, many dignitaries (foreign and domestic) travel through this jurisdiction. These dignitaries often represent Heads of State or Diplomatic Officials requiring high level security measures. Traffic control may consist of as little as one traffic post, or, as much as closure of major roadways.

B. POLICY

Upon request of the Secret Service, State Department, or U.S. Park Police, this department will provide security assistance in accordance with Title 16 U.S. Code, and General Orders.

This department will provide the degree of Traffic Control and route security necessary for the security risk of a particular dignitary.

The primary task of departmental personnel is to insure that no vehicular or pedestrian traffic interferes with the movement of the dignitary through this jurisdiction.

C. PROCEDURE

Upon receiving the request for security assistance, the Commander of the Special Operations Division will assign the supervisor of the Motor Unit to participate in route planning with the appropriate agency.

Certain times, routes and locations of travel will be classified as security risks and will not be available to the general public.

Route closures involving other agencies (i.e., State Police, Municipalities, etc.) will be coordinated to maintain security integrity.

The department may provide the officers necessary to properly secure a particular post. The Commander, SOD, or his designee will disseminate all intelligence reports to officers on post.

MOT 17.1

When possible and practical the Motor Unit will provide at least one Motorcycle Officer to assist the U.S. Park Police and Metropolitan Police with the escort of a dignitary.

The Motor Officer in the escort will use pre-determined codes to advise the location of the Motorcade Escort. Whenever possible, road or street names will not be used. All stationary traffic posts will be numbered in no particular sequence, and officers on post will use their post number as identification.

The supervisor of Motors in coordination with the O.I.C. U.S. Park Motors, and MPDC Motors will direct each post when to close and open the flow of traffic.

When the flow of traffic is restored, officers will stay near their post until the dignitary is safely out of this jurisdiction, and will not need an emergency return.

MOT 17.2

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-18

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - TERMINATION OF OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT

Generally, all personnel will report to the Special Operations Division Main Control Sally- port for release. However, in order to meet the objectives of the unit, officers will often be required to remain on an assignment location to the end of their tour and be released directly from that location. The Unit Officer in Charge will make this determination.

MOT 18.1

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT-19

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - ASSIGNMENT

The members of the Motorcycle Unit are engaged in active, overt police operations, wearing uniforms and operating motorcycles. Their appearance is designed to be conspicuous and provide a reasonable amount of safety. Their vehicle provides maneuverability in congested areas and restricted spaces.

MOT 19.1
SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT- 20

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

The primary deployment of manpower resources, when available, is the motorcycle Deputies will respond to emergency calls for service in the general area of their assignment. They will provide back-up assistance to street Deputies on calls for service, provide escort service and traffic control for Presidential Escorts and other VIP's, direct traffic at major problem areas, perform lengthy traffic assignments, and escort parades, funerals and other processions as needed.

MOT 20.1

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT- 21

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - CRITERIA FOR DEPLOYMENT

This Unit will review all requests for traffic and/or public relations tasks. These requests may be made from within the Agency, from citizens, or the community. Requests for assignments will generally be approved by the Unit Commander in Charge, with final authority resting with the Assistant Bureau Chief.

All of the details/escorts assigned will be pre-driven/ridden to look for detours, obstructions any other road hazards that my impede or restrict the escort and the route to be taken.

MOT 21.1

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS DIVISION

PROCEDURE NUMBER: MOT- 22

CREATED/REVISED: 12/14/04

TITLE: MOTOR UNIT - FEDEX STADIUM EVENT ESCORT POLICY

The Motors Unit will provide escorts for events at FedEx Stadium to and from the stadium to ensure the safety and security of the involved parties, to maintain proper scheduling and to offer appropriate accommodations for specific groups or individuals. The escorts of the following individuals/groups are authorized:

- Opposing teams
- Opposing team owners (on game day)
- Prince George's County Executive
- Redskin players' family buses (inbound only)
- NFL Commissioner
- Referees (outbound only)
- Announcers (outbound only)
- Heads of State and other dignitaries (as authorized by SOD Commander)
- VIP's (requested by Redskin management and authorized by the SOD Commander)

The SOD Commander or his designee must approve any stadium escort not authorized under this section. Escorts may be canceled by the SOD Commander or his designee due to weather conditions, safety concerns or unforeseen circumstances.

MOT 22.1